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ABSTRACT
Commenting on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Boumediene v.
Bush and the U.S. occupation of the Naval Station at Guantdnamo Bay,
Cuba, this Article argues that anomaly with respect to U.S. control of the
base has heavily influenced "War on Terror" detention jurisprudence. This
anomaly was created by agreements between the United States and Cuba in
1903 and 1934. These agreements affirm that the United States lacks sover-
eignty over Guantdnamo but retains "complete jurisdiction and control"
for an indefinite period, while Cuba has "ultimate sovereignty." Gerald
Neuman labels this an "anomalous zone" with fundamental legal rules lo-
cally suspended. The base was chosen as a detention center because of this
anomaly, with checks in constitutional and international law perceived to
not apply. This Article makes three arguments about how the United States
determines what legal norms apply on Guantdnamo. First, the base's legal
anomaly is not an aberration, but instead is a precise objective of U.S.-
Cuba relations, evident in the Platt Amendment and international agree-
ments. Second, four legal objectives frame this anomaly, historically and
presently. They are that the United States avoids sovereignty abroad, limits
incidents of Cuban sovereignty, avoids constitutional limits for overseas
authority, and protects strategic overseas interests. Using these objectives,
Boumediene addressed this anomaly. To hold that detainees have access
to the writ of habeas corpus in the Constitution's Suspension Clause, the
Court found that the United States exercises de facto sovereignty over the
base and that the Constitution has extraterritorial application. Third, track-
ing legal similarities in base occupation and base detention, post-colonial
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analysis illuminates how current doctrine evades individual rights protec-
tions with overseas authority. These three points illuminate how in the fu-
ture U.S. law may determine what legal norms check (or not) overseas
authority, whether on Guantdnamo or in other extraterritorial settings.
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Lando Calrissian: Lord Vader, what about Leia and the Wookiee?
Darth Vader: They must never again leave this city.
Lando Calrissian: That was *never* a condition of our agreement...
Darth Vader: Perhaps you think you're being treated unfairly?
Lando Calrissian: No.
Darth Vader: Good. It would be unfortunate if I had to leave a garrison
here.
-The Empire Strikes Back'
"[E]ven if we do not own the island, we are responsible for its conduct
. . and the just and equitable treatment of foreigners residing
thereunder."
-General Leonard Wood (U.S. Military Governor of Cuba, 1900-02)2
I. INTRODUCTION
OLLOWING over six years of detention and over seven hundred
detainees 3 at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba
("Guantdnamo"), 4 Supreme Court opinions in Boumediene v.
1. STAR WARS EPISODE V: THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (20th Century Fox & Lucas-
film 1980).
2. Robert Freeman Smith, Latin America, the United States and the European Powers,
1830-1930, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA, VOL. IV C. 1870 to 1930, at
96 (Leslie Bethell ed., 1984) (quoting a letter from Gen. Leonard Wood to President Theo-
dore Roosevelt).
3. The total base detainee population since 2002 including those released is estimated
to be 779, including persons from 47 nationalities. As of January 27, 2009, 242 persons
remain detained on the base. See generally BENJAMIN WITrES, LAW AND THE LONG WAR:
THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2008); Brookings Institute, The Current
Detainee Population of Guantdnamo: An Empirical Study, Dec. 16, 2008 & Jan. 22, 2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/1216 detaineeswittes.aspx; Names of the Detained
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, WASH. POST, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/
(last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (providing imperfect, due to state secrecy, but thorough analysis
of the detainee population).
4. This Article refers to the U.S. Naval Station at Guant~namo Bay, Cuba as "Guan-
t~namo" for the sake of simplicity. In English popular discourse, the base is also referred
to as "Gitmo," "GTMO," or "Guantinamo Bay." More precise identifications refer to the
base detention camps, e.g. Camp Delta, Camp Echo, Camp Iguana, and Camp X-Ray.
Specifically, the U.S. Navy uses the acronyms "GTMO" or "Gitmo." "Guantinamo" is
actually a city in Cuba, independent of any base. The city's population provided the base
much material and labor support until 1961. For the Cuban population, though, "Guanti-
namo" implies the city, and the base is referred to independently. The base does not in-
clude exclusive control of the Bay, which since its inception has been regarded as within
2009]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Bush refer to the base as a "quirky outpost"'5 with a "unique and unu-
sual" jurisdiction.6 Critics call it the "gulag of our time' 7 and a "legal
black hole," 8 where detention includes torture, indefinite confinement,
no charges or court proceedings, and violations of individual rights guar-
anteed by the Constitution, Geneva Conventions, and international hu-
manitarian and human rights law. The base's "quirky" location in Cuba,
which the United States considers part of an "Axis of Evil,"9 facilitates
this type of detention. Agreements between the United States and Cuba
shape this anomaly. A 1903 agreement states that Cuba has "ultimate
sovereignty" over the base and that the United States has "complete ju-
risdiction and control." 10  Between sovereignty-and-jurisdiction and
Cuba-and-United States, legal norms ambiguously check military author-
ity on the base. Gerald Neuman describes this as an anomalous legal
zone, with "legal rules" fundamental to larger policies "locally sus-
pended" in a geographic area."1 Perceived as far from checks in constitu-
tional or international law, Guantfinamo was chosen as a detention center
to benefit from this uncertainty. 12 Examining the legality of this deten-
Cuban jurisdiction. The base is limited to the territory on the east and west sides of the
entrance to Guantinamo Bay, with the Caribbean Sea to the south. The base does not
fully surround the Bay, with the northern land around the Bay part of Cuba. The base is
over ten miles from the city of Guantinamo. For descriptions of changing jurisdictions,
territory, and waterway access, see generally JANA LIPMAN, GUANTANAMO: A WORKING-
CLASS HISTORY BETWEEN EMPIRE AND REVOLUTION 11-14 (2009).
5. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2293 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
6. Id. at 2279.
7. See Irene Khan, Amnesty Int'l, Rep. Speech at Foreign Press Association (May 26,
2005), www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/POL10/014/2005 [hereinafter Khan speech]; Rich-
ard Norton-Taylor, Guantdnamo Is Gulag of Our Time, Says Amnesty, THE GUARDIAN,
May 26, 2005, available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/may/26/usa.Guantfnamo.
8. See Lord Johan Steyn, 27th F.A. Mann Lecture at Lincoln's Inn Old Hall: GuantA-
namo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, (Nov. 25, 2003), available at www.nimj.com/documents/
Guant~inamo.PDF (describing how U.S. policy and law keep the base anomalous to rights
protections in international and U.S. law); Clive Stafford Smith, America's Black Hole,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2007 (presenting base secrecy and the absence of detainee protections
as interrelated from firsthand experience representing detainees).
9. See John R. Bolton, U.S. Under Sec'y Arms Control & Int'l Security Remarks to
the Heritage Foundation: Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of
Mass Destruction (May 6, 2002), available at www.state.gov/t/us/rm/9962.htm; MARK. P.
SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CUBA AND STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM LIST,
RL32251 (2005), available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32251.pdf (detailing how the
United States has placed Cuba on the terrorism support list during the Cold War in 1979
and presently with states such as Iran, Libya, Sudan, and North Korea).
10. Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coal-
ing or Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 16-23, 1903, T.S. No. 418, art. III [hereinafter U.S.-
Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease].
11. Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1996).
12. E.g., Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin and John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant
Attorneys Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to William J. Haynes It,
Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Def., Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba, in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 29-37 (Karen J.
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter Philbin & Yoo Memo]; Daniel F.
McCallum, Why GTMO? 8-9, 11 (cited in the Brief for Petitioners, Al Odah v. United
States, 124 S. Ct. 534 (2003) (No. 03-43)) (reporting on the Dec. 2001 inter-agency decision
making process choosing the base as a detention center and how it was regarded as
"unique piece of property" with minimal foreign relations and domestic security concerns
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tion, Rasul v. Bush,13 Hamdan v. Rumsfield,1 4 and Boumediene v. Bush
address this anomaly.
This Article makes three general arguments about how U.S. law has
determined what norms apply to Guantdnamo. First, Guantdnamo's legal
anomaly is not an aberration, but instead is a precise objective of U.S.
foreign relations since Cuban independence in 1898. This anomaly is the
product of legal determinations in the Platt Amendment from 1901,
which limited Cuba's foreign relations power, provided the United States
with a "right to intervene" in Cuba, and required that Cuba provide the
United States bases on Cuban territory. 15 Second, four legal objectives
concerning U.S. influence overseas frame this anomaly, historically and
presently. These are that the United States avoids sovereignty abroad,
limits incidents of sovereignty for foreign states, avoids constitutional lim-
its for its overseas authority, and protects strategic overseas interests
(geopolitical, economic, and legal). With the Platt Amendment securing
influence over Cuba by limiting its sovereignty, these objectives charac-
terized U.S.-Cuba foreign policy. Specific to Guantdnamo, these objec-
tives appear in bilateral agreements, which provide the United States
infinite control over the base without formal sovereignty, while Cuba has
"ultimate sovereignty" and no power to end U.S. occupation. 16 Outside
and providing existing facilities, expansion space, vital support, and proximity to the
United States and law enforcement and intelligence personnel). See generally Brief for
Respondent, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195 & 06-1196) (argu-
ing that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
eliminate federal court jurisdiction for Guantdnamo detainees). Cf. U.S. Dep't of Def.,
The Legal Basis for Detaining Al Qaida and Taliban Combatants (2005), available at www.
defenselink.mil/news/Ju]2007/Legal%20basis%20Guantgnamo %20Detainees%20OGC%
20FINAL.pdf (arguing that detainees are not "prisoners of war" entitled to Geneva Con-
vention rights, but "enemy combatants," and that the law of war permits detaining persons
in "unlawful belligerence" without charges or trial); The White House Fact Sheet: Status of
Detainees at Guantdnamo, Feb. 2, 2002, available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2002/02/20020207-13.html. But see Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of
Justice Withdraws "Enemy Combatant" Definition for Guantinamo Detainees (Mar. 13,
2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/March/09-ag-232.html (presenting the
government's most recent position in habeas proceedings that base detention authority is
sourced in the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) from Sept. 2001 versus
sourced in the Executive's Commander-in-Chief power, withdrawing the previous detainee
classification of "unlawful enemy combatant," and arguing this authority is informed by
international laws of war); Exec. Order No. 13492, infra note 18, § 7 (finding base detain-
ees are protected by Common Art. III of the Geneva Conventions).
13. 542 U.S. 466, 480-83 (2004) (holding that the federal habeas corpus statute extends
extra-territorially to the base because it is for practical purposes within U.S. jurisdiction);
see also id. at 487 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (stating the base is "in every practical respect a
United States territory"). But see id. at 500-01 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (explaining Cuban
sovereignty is a bar to extraterritorial application of habeas rights on the base).
14. 548 U.S. 557, 578 (2006) (interpreting base specific jurisdiction-stripping provisions
from the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 as inapplicable retroactively and holding military
commissions initially created by the Executive to be unauthorized by law and inconsistent
with the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions).
15. An Act Making Appropriations for the Support of the Army for the Fiscal Year
Ending June 13, 1902, ch. 803, para. VII, 31 Stat. 895, 898 (1902) [hereinafter Platt Amend-
ment-U.S. appropriations]; see also discussion infra Part III.B.
16. U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 10, art. III; see also infra Part III.C (dis-
cussing the Guantinamo lease termination provisions of the U.S.-Cuba 1934 Treaty). This
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U.S. territorial sovereignty, Guantinamo is perceived to be beyond the
Constitution's application. Boumediene addresses this anomaly with
these four legal objectives. Specifically, to hold that the Constitution's
Suspension Clause has extraterritorial effect, the Court makes significant
determinations regarding sovereignty on the base and the Constitution's
limited application overseas. 17 Objectives regarding United States and
Cuban sovereignty, limited rights protections, and strategic overseas
goals are highly influential in the Court's reasoning. These objectives are
central to legal reasoning supporting base occupation in 1903, as well as
Boumediene's holding in 2008. Third, tracking the relationship between
legal norms, base occupation, and base detention, a post-colonial analysis
of U.S. foreign relations suggests how current legal doctrine evades indi-
vidual rights protections with overseas authority. This illuminates how,
capitalizing on legal determinations since 1898, the United States at-
tempted to create a rights-free zone overseas in 2002. These post-colonial
points shed light on how U.S. law may carve similar zones after base de-
tention is set to end on January 22, 2010.18 This Article argues legal
anomaly remains embedded in the law supporting overseas authority.
As illustrated below, Boumediene examines the law in a post-colonial
situation. 19 "Post-colonialism" refers to the effects of colonization and
imperial influence on a society's culture or political structures. 20 Examin-
Article uses the term "occupation" since the 1903 Lease refers to the U.S. "occupation."
See id.
17. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, at 2237-39 (2008). The writ of habeas corpus
is a common law action permitting a detainee or prisoner to seek relief from unlawful
detention. With access to the writ, GuantAnamo detainees may challenge the legality of
their detention in a court, as opposed to in a military commission or tribunal proceeding or
having no ability to challenge detention. Boumediene addresses whether detainees enjoy
the privilege of the writ in the Constitution's Suspension Clause, art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
18. See Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 27, 2009), available at http://
edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-1893.pdf (order made on Jan. 22, 2009 and reported on
Jan. 27, 2009) (ordering the Department of Defense appropriately dispose all individuals
detained at Guantinamo, "promptly close" the base detention facilities as "soon as practi-
cable" and no later than Jan. 22, 2010, and release or transfer of detainees to "another
United States detention facility").
19. Beyond just the Boumediene legal issues, many scholars from diverging normative
and theoretical positions have made the general correlation between the "War on Terror"
and empire. See, e.g., Amy Kaplan, Violent Belongings and the Question of Empire Today,
Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, Oct. 17, 2003, 56 AM. Q. 1 (2004)
(explaining how the denial of empire in American public discourse has been an "ideologi-
cal cornerstone" of U.S. imperialism and American exceptionalism); EMPIRE'S LAW: THE
AMERICAN IMPERIAL PROJECT AND THE "WAR TO REMAKE THE WORLD" (Amy Barthol-
omew ed., 2006) (examining how the law and practice of U.S. exceptionalism, unilateral-
ism, and global power, with a focus on Iraq); Niall Ferguson, Hegemony or Empire?,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2003 (presenting the difference U.S. scholars place on "lead-
ership" or "hegemony" versus British counterpart do on "empire"); Tony Judt, Dreams of
Empire, 51 N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov. 4, 2004 (reviewing nine books on "American empire,"
global power, and the "War on Terror" to suggest that the United States no longer serves
as an example for the world or itself); Paul Krugman, White Man's Burden, NY. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 2002, at A27 (finding similarities in the "Bush Doctrine" and historic practices
during the Spanish-American War like favoring private and corporate interests, military
interventions for strategic and market gains, and proclaiming the sense of "manifest
destiny" or duty in foreign affairs).
20. BILL ASHCROFT ET AL., POST-COLONIAL STUDIES: THE KEY CONCEPTS 186 (2000).
[Vol. 62
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ing overseas authority and the historic doctrine supporting it,
Boumediene answers a post-colonial legal question: Do constitutional
habeas corpus rights extend to non-sovereign territory under United
States control? This is often presented as a constitutional, national secur-
ity, or international law issue.21 The decision relies on legal doctrine
from American informal imperial influence over the Caribbean, Cuba,
and Guantdnamo.2 2 This is intrinsically post-colonial, because it exam-
ines what happens after imperial influence, i.e., after U.S. overseas au-
thority in the region commenced in 1898.
The phrase "The Empire Strikes Back" exemplifies the significance
and ambiguity of what happens "after the empire." For this Article, the
phrase questions how overseas power influences a central authority or its
subjects overseas. Describing the uniqueness of literatures from
decolonized countries, which are wrongly labeled English literature,
21. See, e.g., Paul A. Diller, When Congress Passes and Intentionally Unconstitutional
Law: the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 61 SMU L. REV. 281 (2008) (presenting
Boumediene as fulfilling Congress' intent of invalidating MCA's Section 7, which tried to
strip habeas jurisdiction and as arrogating constitutional interpretation powers to the judi-
ciary); Gerald Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, S.
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract-id=1272951 (examining the Court's "functional approach" to selectively apply con-
stitutional limitations to government action outside the United States and describing
ambiguities in application to non-citizens not in U.S. custody and in different foreign loca-
tions); David D. Cole, Rights Over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantd-
namo Bay, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 47, available at ssrn.com/abstract=1272202 (arguing
Boumediene is groundbreaking because of its conceptions of sovereignty, territoriality, and
rights evident in finding a law on military policy unconstitutional even though it was passed
by Congress and the President during armed conflict, extending extraterritorial constitu-
tional rights to noncitizens during conflict, and finding a law stripping court jurisdiction
unconstitutional); Anthony J. Colangelo, "De Facto Sovereignty": Boumediene and Be-
yond, GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=1275413 (arguing the Court's finding of "de facto sovereignty"
over the base is a new categorization with separation of powers implications); Eric. A.
Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2008 CATO
Sup. CT. REV. 47 (arguing that the Court overlooks significant limitations for noncitizens'
constitutional status and that separations of powers justifications mask cosmopolitan con-
cerns for human rights and international law); Gregory S. McNeal, Beyond Guantdnamo,
Obstacles, and Options, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 29 (2008) (presenting how the military com-
missions system used on the base, not changed by Boumediene, should be re-structured to
be more fair); Daniel R. Williams, Who Got Game? Boumediene v. Bush and the Judicial
Gamesmanship of Enemy-Combatant Detention, NEW ENG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009),
available at ssrn.comlabstract=1270765) (arguing that detainee jurisprudence is presented
increasingly as a process issue because human rights concerns are too controversial, but
this has not stopped executive detention on the base or resulted in a fair adjudication
process).
22. Here the post-colonial context is after 1898, when there existed a formal empire
over Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands and varying degrees of informal empire over
Cuba, Caribbean states such as Haiti and Dominican Republic, and Central American
states such as Panama, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Foreign relations and legal instruments
developed then are still influential today. The law here operates on two general planes:
constitutional and international. Constitutional law determines how the U.S. political sys-
tem has authority over unincorporated territories and overseas possessions. While interna-
tional law concerns sovereignty over territory, international agreements, protectorate
arrangements, and rights individuals may have.
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Salman Rushdie explains "the empire writes back with a vengeance. '2 3
In his book The Empire Writes Back, Bill Ashcroft examines how varia-
tions in language and representations are central to Eurocentric assump-
tions in literature.24 In the movie "Star Wars V: The Empire Strikes
Back," the Empire hunts down rebel Jedi Luke Skywalker and tries to
indefinitely detain his friends Princess Leia and Chewbacca in the protec-
torate of Cloud City.25 City administrator Lando Calrissian asks how an
agreement with the Empire provides for detention. These examples point
to imperial rule's long-term and structural effects, whether it is resisting
this power or eliminating this resistance. Law, whether it is constitutional
or international, supports this overseas authority, past and present. Fo-
cusing on U.S. influence over Cuba and Guant~inamo, this Article high-
lights the significance of post-colonial legal methodologies. It asks
whether there is a post-colonial response, i.e., "does the empire strike
back," when the law examines detention on overseas non-sovereign terri-
tory under U.S. control? Post-colonial inquiry analyzes how legal instru-
ments (doctrine, reasoning, treaties, and adjudication) developed during
prior relationships of empire or colonialism and how these instruments
influence current legal reasoning.26
This Article is not an exhaustive normative, doctrinal, or empirical
study of Guantdnamo detention litigation, which has been extremely
complex and evolving. This litigation includes military commissions,
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), appeals to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, and district court
habeas proceedings. Adding to this, in an Executive Order, President
Obama ordered the base detention program to end by January 2010.27
From a policy perspective some things appear certain, i.e. base detentions
will end. Similarly, some legal issues on the base have become clearer,
since Boumediene affirms base detainees have constitutional habeas
rights. Much uncertainty remains regarding what law, whether in terms
of individual rights protections or checks on executive authority, actually
applies to the base. Litigation since Boumediene in response to court or-
ders to release Guant~inamo detainees has been the most dramatic.2 8
Similarly, the January 2009 Executive Order stopped many military com-
missions, which had been conducted in response to the Rasul and
23. Salman Rushdie, The Empire Writes Back With a Vengeance, THE TIMES
(London), Jul. 3, 1982.
24. See generally BILL ASHCROFT ET AL., THE EMPIRE WRITES BACK: THEORY AND
PRACTICE IN POST-COLONIAL LITERATURES (1989).
25. THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK, supra note 1.
26. See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2004). See also infra discussion Part II.B. For an example of how
law's current role in profit maximization, consumption excesses, nativism, and overseas
intervention resembles imperial events in U.S. history, see generally Richard Delgado,
Idea: You are Living in a Gold Rush, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 417 (2006).
27. See Exec. Order No. 13492, supra note 18.
28. See infra Part V.B.
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Hamdan decisions and provided detainees some rights protections. 29 The
Order also claimed that it creates no individual rights. It set a date to end
detention but leaves the state of rights protection uncertain. Rights pro-
tections on the base remain anomalous, but perhaps judicially moot with
detention ending.30
With so much uncertainty about the law's present and future, this Arti-
cle is a limited analysis of habeas corpus jurisdiction on the base, as seen
from a post-colonial lens concerning the base's legal history. As such,
Boumediene is merely one judicial step, beginning in 2002, recognizing
that the right of habeas extends to the base and finding procedural substi-
tutes for habeas inadequate. With such uncertain and developing juris-
prudence, this Article offers a researched suggestion on post-
colonialism's relevance regarding international and constitutional law and
how they are intertwined, even when the mix is foreign in a "domestic
sense."
31
This Article describes U.S.-Cuba relations and U.S. foreign relations
after the Spanish-American War of 1898 (the War). From these events,
legal instruments were developed to extend U.S. influence overseas,
avoid U.S. de jure sovereign authority abroad, limit sovereignty for for-
eign states, and evade constitutional limits in U.S. foreign relations
power. After the War, the U.S. occupied Cuba until 1902.32 Devised dur-
ing occupation, the Platt Amendment provided that the United States
had a "right to intervene" in Cuba, control Cuba's foreign relations, and
most importantly (for this inquiry) it provided a right to put U.S. bases on
29. See Exec. Order No. 13492, supra note 18, § 7 (ordering "immediate review of all
Guantinamo detainees" (as provided in Section 4), ordering Military Commission pro-
ceedings to stop when charges are "referred" but without judgment rendered, stopping
proceedings pending, and barring the swearing of any new charges).
30. The Order ends detention. In Section 2.c, it affirms detainees "have the constitu-
tional privilege of the writ of habeas corpus," and most detainees have filed writ challenges
in federal court. Id. § 2. In Section 6, it requires "humane standards of confinement,"
which is described as in conformity with "all applicable laws governing" such confinement
and including "Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Id. § 6. But it does not
confirm what other constitutional rights may be protected on the base. See id.; see also
infra Part V.
31. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 320 (1901). This Article merely attempts to
suggest the value of post-colonial analysis to legal debates about Guantdinamo detention
and overseas U.S. authority by correlating legal instruments supporting base occupation
with developing jurisprudence on base detention. Since detention litigation is a complex
and evolving process, this Article does not solely provide a doctrinal, normative, or empiri-
cal analysis. For the sake of simplicity, this Article merely examines how base occupation
history influences what legal norms apply on the base. Central to this inquiry is identifying
how legal practices (in foreign relations or Supreme Court jurisprudence) determine what
norms do (or do not) apply to non-sovereignty territory under U.S. control. This generally
focuses on 'law and territory.' This does not analyze applicable substantive rights in legal
doctrines such as due process, alienage law, international humanitarian law, law of war,
international human rights law, or prisoner of war protections. Similarly, this does not
fully examine the legality of base occupation and international agreements between Cuba
and the United States. These issues are important, but beyond this Article's limited scope.
32. See infra Part III.
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Cuban soil. 33 The Platt Amendment made Cuba a U.S. protectorate. 34
During this period, the United States continually exercised informal im-
perial influence over Cuba. Reflecting this, a lease agreement in 1903 set
the terms of base occupation at Guantdnamo. 35
This Lease begins to frame present legal anomaly.36 Referring to base
territory, it provides Cuba with "ultimate sovereignty" and the United
States with "jurisdiction and complete control. '37 This unclearly demar-
cates which norms apply on the base and whether "ultimate sovereignty"
has any significance before U.S. occupation ends.38 The Lease ambigu-
ously designates legal obligations on the base, but clearly provides the
United States indefinite control.39 This anomaly has facilitated "War on
Terror" detention, because the base escapes limits in constitutional and
international law. Those who support the current detention policy argue
this.40
This Article correlates norms in recent base detention with norms de-
veloped during prior foreign relations. 41 In both contexts, U.S. law has
33. Platt Amendment-U.S. appropriations, supra note 15, art. III.
34. See Rafael Rodriguez Altunaga, Cuba's Case for the Repeal of the Platt Amend-
ment. The Views of President Machado, 26 CURRENT HIST. 925, 925-27 (1927) (describing
how the international community regards Cuba as an "American Protectorate, a semi-
sovereign State"); see also Lester H. Woolsey, The New Cuban Treaty, 28 AM. J. IN'L L.
531 (1934); see also infra Part. III.A.
35. See PETER MACALISTER-SMITH, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 382 (1992) (describing Guantinamo's foundation during U.S. imperialism and such
bases as the "starting point of colonial expansion"); Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Jus-
tice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2535, 2545 (2005) (describing base creation after 1898 and
the current lease terms as "remnants of the age of empire").
36. This Article focuses on legal anomaly on the base regarding detainees, who are
foreign nationals. An element not discussed, due to concerns of space, is how various
forms of U.S. law apply to the base independent of detainee treatments. This adds to the
anomalous legal quality of Guantnamo. On the base, U.S. citizens, endangered species,
military operations, and government contracts benefit from protections and rights in U.S.
federal law. See Skip Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. United States, 6 F.3d 1573, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(applying the Takings Clause violation to Naval action on the base); United States v. Rog-
ers, 388 F. Supp. 298, 301 (E.D. Va. 1975) (prosecution for a drug offense of a U.S. citizen-
civilian employed on the base); Burtt v. Schick, 23 M.J. 140, 142-43 (C.M.A. 1986) (holding
that court martial proceedings on the base would be double jeopardy in violation of 10
U.S.C. § 844(a)); Transcript of Oral Argument at 52-53, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004)
(Nos. 03-334 & 03-343) (question from Justice Stevens indicating U.S. environmental laws
apply on the base). The base had also been argued to be similar to the Panama Canal
Zone. See Sedgwick W. Green, Applicability of American Laws to Overseas Areas Con-
trolled by the United States, 68 HARV. L. REV. 781, 792 (1955).
37. U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 10, art. III.
38. Id.
39. A 1934 treaty abrogates the Platt Amendment's intervention provisions. It also
makes U.S. base occupation effectively indefinite. For the lease period to end, it provides
one of two options. They are: 1) the United States must stop occupying the base; or 2)
Cuba and the United States must mutually agree to end occupation. With these two op-
tions, base occupation only stops when the United States chooses so. See Treaty Between
the United States of America and Cuba Defining Their Relations, U.S.-Cuba, May 29,
1934, 48 Stat. 1682 [hereinafter U.S.-Cuba 1934 Treaty].
40. See supra note 12.
41. This is heavily inspired by Amy Kaplan's analysis of how Guantinamo's current
detention in the "War on Terror" is an extension of ambiguous legal arrangements con-
cerning Cuba. These arrangements have placed the base at the forefront of foreign rela-
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endorsed overseas authority, i.e. over the protectorate of Cuba and over
the base at Guant~namo. To make these connections, this Article follows
insights from post-colonial scholarship. Defining the terms post-colonial-
ism, empire, and informal empire is important to this inquiry. They show
analytical links between recent jurisprudence and history. Post-colonial-
ism examines "the effects of colonization on cultures and societies. ' 42 It
assumes that these effects do not require formal colonial relationships;
influences may be de facto or informal, and they occur in cultural, eco-
nomic, political, or social realms. Post-colonial scholarship identifies how
Western or European perspectives use discourses, narratives, representa-
tions, or language to exclude the non-Western or the less powerful actor,
e.g. a state.43 This Article examines U.S. legal doctrine as such a dis-
course, with its assumptions and exclusions endorsing Guantdnamo
detention.
Definitions of empire or imperialism deepen these perspectives. Ed-
ward Said defines imperialism as "the practice, the theory, and the atti-
tudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory. '44
Michael Doyle describes empire as "a relationship, formal or informal, in
which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another po-
litical society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, or
by economic, social, or cultural dependence. Imperialism is simply the
process or policy of establishing or maintaining empire. '45 Informal em-
pire is the practice of overseas control, without formal political control,
between politically independent states, often with the dynamics of free-
trade economics and superior military power.46
Informal imperial control over Cuba from 1898 to 1934 crafted the
base's anomalous jurisdiction.47 Since 2002, Guantdnamo detention liti-
gation has addressed this legacy. This situation is intimately post-colo-
nial. First, the base is a remnant from when the United States sought
naval superiority in the Caribbean. The post-colonial condition is that a
base which served regional geopolitical and economic interests histori-
cally now serves detention objectives. Second, U.S. influence over Cuba
was imperial, using Said and Doyle's definitions. This created a need for
legal anomaly.
As previously mentioned, four objectives frame this anomaly. They are
that the United States avoids sovereign control over Cuba, limits Cuba's
tions in 1898, in Gunboat diplomacy, the Cold War, refugee crisis, and now the "War on
Terror." See Amy Kaplan, Where is Guantdnamo?, in LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS 239-266 (Mary L. Dudziak & Leti Volpp
eds., 2006).
42. See ASHCROFT ET AL., supra note 20, at 186.
43. See infra discussion Part II.
44. Said distinguishes this from colonialism which is a consequence of empire "im-
planting settlements in distant territory." EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM 9
(1993).
45. MICHAEL W. DOYLE, EMPIRES 45 (1986).
46. See infra discussion Part II.A.
47. See infra discussion Part III.C.
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sovereign powers, avoids constitutional limits to its overseas authority,
and protects strategic interests. These objectives were central to U.S. pol-
icy on Cuban independence. The Treaty of Paris of 189848 and the Platt
Amendment 49 articulate these objectives. The Treaty of Paris secured
Cuba's independence from Spain, while the Platt Amendment limited
Cuba's sovereignty. These four objectives similarly have influenced
Guantinamo litigation since 2002. With these objectives evident in legal
reasoning before, during, and after imperial influence, this context is in-
trinsically post-colonial. This helps explain how the law, by manipulating
sovereignty concepts and severing constitutional provisions, facilitates de-
tention. Put differently, legal determinations on sovereignty and consti-
tutional jurisdiction permit U.S. courts to avoid ruling on detention
disputes, effectively endorsing detention.
Building on these arguments, this Article contains five parts. Part I
introduces the Article's subject. Part II elaborates on post-colonial the-
ory as applied to foreign relations and international and constitutional
law. These theories show how legal reasoning endorses overseas author-
ity and rights exclusion, pointing to how the law is central to post-colonial
contexts. Generally, narratives in legal doctrine exclude populations
from sovereignty, create "ambivalence in the rule of law,"'50 and limit
constitutional protections for overseas U.S. territories such as Puerto
Rico, Guam, and other locations. Part III, "Guantinamo's Anomalous
Past," examines the base's historic anomaly in legal approaches to Cuban
independence in 1898, the Platt Amendment in 1901, and agreements for
base occupation in 1903.51 For each period, the mentioned four objec-
48. In the Treaty of Paris, ratified on April 11, 1899, Spain relinquished all sovereign
claims over Cuba. See Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the
Kingdom of Spain, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754, at 1755-56 (commonly known
as the Treaty of Paris).
49. See Platt Amendment-U.S. appropriations, supra note 15; see also infra Part
III.B.
50. See generally Peter Fitzpatrick & Eve Darian-Smith, Laws of the Postcolonial: An
Insistent Introduction, in LAws OF THE POSTCOLONIAL 1 (Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitz-
patrick eds., 1999).
51. Due to concerns for space, this Article does not explain how judicial disputes in
the 1990s began to signal how the base could be used to avoid individual rights protections.
The anomalous quality of the base first became evident as the United States began detain-
ing asylum seekers there in the early 1990s. Interestingly, this detention started after the
Cold War, when the base used to patrol the socialist state of Cuba then acquired a new
purpose. These offshore detention practices were litigated with human rights groups argu-
ing that rights protections in international law and constitutional law applied to this terri-
tory under U.S. control. These disputes never reached the Supreme Court, but they did
result in out-of-court settlements. One Circuit Court of Appeals decision held that the
Constitution did not apply to the base. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155,
158-59 (1993) (rejecting challenges to government detention authority). See also Cuban-
Am. Bar. Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1430 (11th Cir. 1995); Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1236, 1326-29 n.19 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding constitutional claims for
base detainees likely to succeed in court); Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. Sale, 823 F. Supp.
1028. 1049 (E.D.N.Y 1993) (vacated by order to a settlement agreement); Haitian Refugee
Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1506 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding constitutional rights do not
apply to base detainees). Gerald Neuman describes this best. See, e.g., Neuman, Anoma-
lous Zones, supra note 11, at 1197-1201, 1228-33 (describing how anomaly's appearance
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tives shaped the legal anomaly. Part IV, "Guantinamo's Anomalous Re-
cent Past," examines how this anomaly and the four objectives shaping it
influence recent detention litigation. It describes Boumediene's holding,
that the writ of habeas corpus in the Constitution's Suspension Clause
applies to base detention, as an example of the law addressing post-colo-
nial anomaly. The decision does not question the legality of base occupa-
tion. Importantly, it finds that the United States has de facto sovereignty
over the base and that prudential factors determine if the Constitution
has extraterritorial application on the base. Part V, "Empire's Anoma-
lous Future," describes how despite Boumediene's holding and an Execu-
tive Order to end base detention, individual rights protections on the
base continue to be a legal anomaly. Even if base detention ends for the
remaining 242 persons, much uncertainty remains for rights protections in
extraterritorial contexts. As such, U.S. law may apply similar anomalous
reasoning to create other rights-free zones. Given the extensive U.S.
network of bases worldwide in over ninety-eight countries 52 and the "War
on Terror" presented as global,53 the Guantinamo experience could be
replicated. The Conclusion, Part VI, presents these examples as sugges-
tions for further post-colonial inquiry on constitutional and international
law endorsing overseas authority.
II. THE POST-COLONIAL IN GUANTANAMO: SOVEREIGNTY
DENIED, OVERSEAS AUTHORITY,
AND RIGHTS EXCLUSION
For the purposes of this Article, a post-colonial perspective analyzes
how prior foreign relations practices of empire or colonialism (with one
state controlling an overseas population or territory) resonate in current
international affairs. 54 This perspective identifies how imperial practices
with decisions by the 11th and 2nd Circuit Courts of Appeal, which interpreted U.S. base
authority as non-sovereign and not subject to constitutional limitations); Gerald L.
Neuman, Closing the Guantdnamo Loophole, 50 LOYOLA L. REV. 1, 3-5, 42-44 (2004)
(describing how refugee detention disputes and their divergent findings on the base's con-
stitutional law and international law status influenced the government's selection of Guan-
t~inamo as a detention center in 2001). See also Philbin & Yoo Memo, supra note 12.
52. Catherine Lutz, Introduction: Bases, Empire, and Global Response, in THE BASES
OF EMPIRE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE AGAINST US MILITARY POSTS 2-3 (Catherine Lutz
ed., 2008) (citing CHRIS BEST & DAVID VINE, ISLAND OF SHAME: THE SECRET HISTORY
OF THE U.S. MILITARY BASE ON DIEGO GARCIA (2009)).
53. At times the Bush Administration presented the "War on Terror" as the "Global
War on Terror" or GWOT. See Language and Terrorism, ECONOMIST, Jul. 5, 2007. The
expanding geographical reach of the War has raised budgetary question. See AMY BE-
LASCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE COST OF IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER GLOBAL
WAR ON TERROR OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11, Oct. 15, 2008, available at http://fas.orglsgp/crs/
natsec/RL33110.pdf. The Obama Administration has distanced itself from the presenta-
tions of a "global" War on Terror. See generally John Ferrer, GWOT's End?, WORLD
BEAT, Jan. 27, 2009, http://www.fpif.org/fpifzines/wb/5819; Howard LaFranchi & Gordon
Lubold, Obama Redefines War on Terror, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 29, 2009, at 25.
54. As this Article is a simple and initial suggestion, it uses simple definitions and
assumptions which may overlook many post-colonial scholarly debates and positions. Post-
colonialism is a highly-diverse scholarly perspective. It has many multi-national and inter-
disciplinary applications. There is much debate in the field regarding definitions of "post-
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continue and how they presently pose important limits.5 5 Post-colonial-
ism examines how political institutions, economic relations, or social con-
structs in the international system are inherited from imperial or colonial
relationships. These legacies influence current circumstances. Post-colo-
nial legacies are often de facto, economic, political, or cultural, not neces-
sarily requiring de jure control.56 Such control would entail a relationship
of a colonizing population and colony, or of one state having formal polit-
ical control of a colony.57
Applied to this Article's subject, a post-colonial perspective generally
argues that foreign relations between Cuba, globally powerful states, and
the international system developed the legal structures that facilitate cur-
rent overseas detention by the United States on Guantinamo.5 8 The
United States would be the most influential state in these relations as
Cuba's neighbor, the most powerful regional state, and its former protec-
tor, but relations with Spain, the Soviet Union and other socialist states,
Europe, and Western Hemispheric states would also be influential. The
United States first occupied Guantinamo during the war for Cuba's inde-
pendence from Spain in 1898. 59 Following four years of occupation, Cuba
was made a U.S. protectorate, with the United States seeking a right of
colonialism," appropriate methodologies, theoretical assumptions, and utility of the term
"post-colonial" versus neo-colonial or other terms. For a brief and working set of defini-
tions to key terms, see generally ASHCROvr ET AL., supra note 20.
55. This definition of post-colonialism is adapted from Chowdhry and Nair's applica-
tion of post-colonialism to international relations. See G. Chowdhry & S. Nair, Introduc-
tion: Power in a Postcolonial World, in POSTCOLONIALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: READING RACE, GENDER, AND CLASS 11 (G. Chowdhry & S. Nair eds.,
2002).
56. See infra part II.A.
57. For elaborate discussions on why U.S. scholars almost innately disregard the no-
tion of empire in U.S. history, see Joseph A. Fry, Imperialism, American Style 1890-1916, in
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONSIDERED 1890-1933, at 53 (Gordon Martel ed., 1994)
(emphasizing how the United States' formal colonial possessions were limited to Puerto
Rico and the Philippines, but informal power control by the U.S. has been far more com-
mon, although denied); Louis A. P6rez, Jr., Review of The War of 1898 and U.S. Interven-
tions, 1898-1934, 65. PAC. HIST. REV. 313, 314 (1996) (describing the tendency to see U.S.
interventions abroad as "isolated" or aberrations, while not making larger connections be-
tween these events); Emily S. Rosenberg, "The Empire" Strikes Back, 16 REVS. AM. HIST.
585, 589 (1988) (describing the difference in British pride in empire and U.S. denial of
empire). For a description of how post-colonial perspectives may enrich understandings of
U.S. civil rights and race, see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Corrido: Race, Postcolonial The-
ory, and U.S. Civil Rights, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1691 (2007).
58. For a post-colonial perspective explaining how Cuba's foreign relations history and
present Guantinamo detention are inter-related with U.S. foreign relations goals, see Amy
Kaplan, Where is Guantdnamo?, in LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF AMERICAN BORDERS 239-266 (Mary L. Dudziak & Leti Volpp eds., 2006). For a post-
colonial analysis of the "unlawful enemy combatant" classification, see generally Fr6ddric
M6gret, From 'Savages' to 'Unlawful Combatants': A Postcolonial Look at International
Humanitarian Law's Other, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 265-318 (Anne
Orford ed., 2006). For a post-colonial analysis of the competing values present in denying
the writ of habeas on the base, see generally Nasser Hussain, Beyond Norm and Exception:
Guantdnamo, 33 CRITICAL INQUIRY 734 (2007). For an examination of how the base's
anomalous jurisdiction impacted base workers (American, Cuba, and others) in cultural,
legal, and foreign relations terms, see generally LIPMAN, supra note 4.
59. See infra Part III.A.
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intervention and significant influence in Cuban affairs. 60 In 1903, base
occupation was legally sanctioned with lease agreements between the
United States (protector/occupier/lessee) and Cuba (protectorate/host
state/lessor). 61 These agreements delineate the terms of Guantinamo's
legal anomaly.
To track the historic development of the base's normative anomaly and
its present influence, this Article borrows theoretical insights from post-
colonial perspectives on foreign relations, international law, and U.S.
constitutional law. These perspectives illuminate two applicable points
for this Article's central thesis. First, international law is used to control
and exclude weaker states (and their populations) in the international
system by manipulating the doctrine of sovereignty. 62 Post-colonial
scholarship shows how international law, specifically by denying sover-
eignty to certain populations, facilitates overseas political authority in im-
perial and post-colonial contexts.63 Overseas territorial possessions, such
as Guantinamo, the historic Panama Canal Zone, or treaty ports in nine-
teenth and twentieth century China, were acquired by denying sovereign
authority to Cuba, Panama, or China, respectively. 64 Likewise, interna-
tional law engineers ambiguities or anomalous circumstances by both in-
cluding and excluding states from the benefits of sovereignty. 65 This
Article explores how international law, specifically the concept of sover-
eignty, has been applied to Guantinamo to craft the current anomaly.
Such an "anomalous" situation was addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court
in finding that the Constitution has extraterritorial application.66
Second, U.S. constitutional law has a long history and current practice
of denying statehood to territorial possessions overseas, consequently ex-
cluding rights protections for their populations.67 Beginning with the In-
60. See infra Part III.B.
61. See infra Part III.C.
62. See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY; Susan Marks Em-
pire's Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 449 (2003) (emphasizing the cultural, eco-
nomic, and political aspects of empire).
63. See generally id.
64. See infra III.C. (discussing the use of leases for bases and port control by powerful
states in the international system); MACALISTER-SMITH, supra note 35, at 381-83.
65. See Fitzpatrick & Darian-Smith, supra note 50, at 2. Legal anomaly also character-
ized the U.S. Panama Canal Zone and its lease agreement with Panama, which was agreed
to almost at the same time as Guant~inamo. See Neuman, Closing the Guantdnamo Loop-
hole, supra note 51, at 15-23.
66. The Boumediene Court held that whether a constitutional provision has extraterri-
torial application or not depends on if judicial enforcement is "impracticable and anoma-
lous." Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2255-56 (2008) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S.
1, 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result) and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259, 277-78 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). See also David D. Cole, Rights Over
Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and Guantdnamo Bay, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
47, 50.
67. See generally FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO Rico, AMERICAN EXPAN-
SION AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001);
GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUN-
DAMENTAL LAW (1996); EDIBERTO ROMAN, THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES: AN IN-
TERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES'
NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURY ISLAND CONQUESTS (2006); Christina Duffy Bur-
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sular Cases (1901-1922) and still governing territorial possessions,
constitutional law endorses overseas authority while selectively applying
constitutional limitations to political authority and individual rights pro-
tections on these territories. 6 8 Territorial examples include insular pos-
sessions in the Caribbean Sea and in Asia acquired as a result of the
Spanish-American War, and island possessions in the Pacific Ocean ac-
quired during the twentieth century (e.g., the Northern Mariana Islands,
American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and others). With these posses-
sions, the United States values strategic and geopolitical objectives in the
Caribbean and Pacific theatres over republican and self-determination
goals for these populations. Alternatively, the United States could make
these territories states in the Union or relinquish sovereign control over
them.
These relationships shed some theoretical light onto Guantinamo's
current anomaly. Foreign relations objectives motivated the creation of
an anomalous legal zone on the base. 69 Specifically, as a territorial space
controlled by the United States, GuantAnamo was purposefully excluded
from U.S. sovereign authority, territorially classified as exogenous to
many constitutional rights, and ambiguously placed between Cuba's sov-
ereignty and U.S. control. This was done to avoid checks on overseas
authority in international and constitutional law. This anomaly is a prod-
uct of early twentieth century foreign relations. These perspectives on
international and constitutional law provide theoretical guidance to pose
post-colonial questions about present U.S. authority over Guantinamo.
A. POST-COLONIAL THEORY SHEDS LIGHTS ON INFORMAL EMPIRE
AND ITS CURRENT INFLUENCE
Applied to a range of disciplines, post-colonial perspectives ask how
international structures of empire and colonialism influence present cir-
cumstances.70 For the sake of simplicity, the post-colonial school of
thought gained popular academic appeal in the United States with Ed-
nett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.
797 (2005).
68. The Insular Cases refer to a series of Supreme Court cases from 1901 to 1922
determining how the U.S. Constitution and international law checked political authority
over territorial possessions that were not states in the Union but that lacked international
sovereignty, which Spain ceded to the United States in the Treaty of Paris. While including
many cases, the most common ones are Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), Dorr v.
United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904), and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). See supra
note 60; BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF
AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006) (examining the Insular Cases' historical legacy and the legal
support for an informal empire).
69. See infra Part III.
70. Popular post-colonial theory publications in the English language include: ASH-
CROFT ET AL., supra note 20; GLORIA ANZALDOA, BORDERLANDS/LA FRONTERA: THE
NEW MESTIZA (1987); HoMI BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (1994); GAYTARI SPI-
VAK, IN OTHER WORLDS (1987); GAYTARI SPIVAK, A CRITIQUE OF POSTCOLONIAL REA-
SON: TOWARD A HISTORY OF THE VANISHING PRESENT (1999). For a quick description of
post-colonial thought before Said's Orientalism, such as Albert Memmi and Frantz Fanon
and variations of post-colonial thought including subaltern studies and gender and race
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ward Said's Orientalism, published in 1979.71 Basically, Said argued that
false assumptions held by European and Western academics about the
Middle East; painting the foreign as an "Other," exotic, or irrational; sus-
tained a discourse whereby Middle Eastern populations or perspectives
were denied, excluded, and/or rejected.7 2 These assumptions were cen-
tral to characterizations by Western academics and policymakers and
were self-perpetuating by denying alternative perspectives. 73 European
perspectives were able to exclude alternative visions by presenting them-
selves as a scientific, positivist, or objective voice. Like with many post-
colonial scholars, Said suggests examining how this exclusion occurs, what
discourse is used to justify it, and what assumptions are needed for this
exclusion.74
Post-colonial scholars build on these viewpoints by arguing that exclu-
sion or domination of subaltern populations or states occurs by a dis-
course built on false assumptions or misstated "objective," universal, or
scientific conclusions.7 5 Said initially examined Western scholarship on
the Middle East, but his insights have been applied to other regions, such
as Africa, South Asia, Asia, Oceania, and Latin America. 76
Post-colonial perspectives are quite varied and are not necessarily in
agreement on many issues concerning definitions, causations, and future
options. 77 This Article does not take a position on detailed debates about
the terms "post-colonial" versus "neo-colonial," "empire," or
"decolonization." 78 Importantly, many post-colonial perspectives share a
methodological appreciation for historical and transnational approaches,
which this Article employs. Post-colonialism generally argues that prior
events frame how current circumstances develop and what options pres-
elements, see generally Siba N. Grovogui, Postcolonialism, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORIES: DISCIPLINE AND DIVERSITY 229-46 (Tim Dunn et al. eds., 2007).
71. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979).
72. See id.
73. While Said's perspectives on Orientalism have influenced numerous critical and
non-Western scholars throughout the world, many of his general arguments and methodol-
ogies have been contested. See generally ORIENTALISM: A READER (Alexander Lyon Mac-
fie ed., 2001).
74. See generally SAID, supra note 71.
75. See generally ORIENTALISM: A READER, supra note 73.
76. For Latin American examples of post-colonial approaches, see Gilbert M. Joseph,
On the Trail of Latin American Bandits: A Reexamination of Peasant Resistance, 25 LAT.
AM. RES. REV. 7 (1990); Latin American Subaltern Studies Group, Founding Statement in
THE POSTMODERNISM DEBATE IN LATIN AMERICA 135 (John Beverley et al. eds., 1995)
(also emphasizing the limits of scholarly focus on the nation-state in Latin American re-
search since migration in the region is so pervasive, resulting in, for instance, populous
Puerto Rican and Mexican cities in the United States as opposed to in Puerto Rico or
Mexico); Florencia E. Mallon, The Promise and Dilemma of Subaltern Studies: Perspectives
from Latin American History, 99 AM. HIST. REV. 1491 (1994).
77. For an example of the debates concerning the utility of the term "post-colonial,"
see ASHCROFT ET AL., supra note 20, at 186-92 ("colonialism/postcolonialism").
78. For a description of the debates surrounding the use of the term "post-colonial-
ism," see id. For a description of many of the debates (disciplinary, normative, and meth-
odological) concerning post-colonial theory and of the work of theorists Edward Said,
Gaytari Spivak, and Homi Bhabha, see BART MOORE-GILBERT, POSTCOLONIAL THEORY:
CONTEXTS, PRACTICES, POLITICS (1997).
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ently exist to confront these predicaments. 79 This can be labeled as his-
torical appreciation in post-colonial scholarship. Likewise, from a
transnational vein, these scholars argue that events and actors abroad
heavily influence local contexts.80 Local or domestic circumstances are
not determined solely by local or domestic actors or events. These in-
sights help explain why Guantgnamo's present legal anomaly is framed
by events and actors influential in Cuba's history.
Applied to international relations, a post-colonial perspective examines
how imperial practices continue in the relations between states in the in-
ternational system; how these practices currently pose critical limits; and
how these practices and limits exist in formal, informal, global, regional,
national, and local contexts. 81 Informal or de facto imperial control be-
tween states in the international system becomes an important assump-
tion for many post-colonial perspectives. Even though a hypothetical
state may be independent or not formally a colony or possession of an-
other state, its functional autonomy may be quite limited. Matters of
global finance, commerce, governance, ideology, cultural practices, or
foreign relations create situations where sovereign states are often depen-
dent, have limited influence, or are powerless to resist the influence ex-
erted by European, Western, or previously metropolitan powers. In this
regard, prior events (e.g., military or economic power or access to re-
sources or control of a legal discourse) exert a post-colonial influence in a
state's present circumstances. Post-colonial, world-systems, and depen-
dency theory schools of thought present this dynamic as "center-states"
influential in "periphery states" and metropolitan power influential over
colonies. 82
79. See generally DIPESH CHAKRABARTY, PROVINCIALIZING EUROPE: POSTCOLONIAL
THOUGHT AND HISTORICAL DIFFERENCE (2000) (presenting how history is often recorded
as favoring European or "modern perspectives" while ignoring voices or impressions from
the "periphery"); Antony Anghie, Civilization and Commerce: The Concept of Governance
in Historical Perspective, 45 VILL. L. REv. 887, 891-92 (2000) (borrowing insights on his-
tory from Chakrabarty to show how international law uses the notion of "good govern-
ance" to deny sovereignty in post-colonial contexts).
80. Not all, or even most, post-colonial scholarship may explicitly refer to "transna-
tionalism." The central concern of postcolonialism is to examine the challenges posed by
universal/particular, center/periphery, and national/local discourses refers to a transna-
tional perspective because it identifies the significance ideas gain when they cross borders.
See generally Brenda Cossman, Turning the Gaze Back on Itself- Comparative Law, Femi-
nist Legal Studies, and the Postcolonial Project, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 525; LINDA BASCH ET
AL., NATIONS UNBOUND: TRANSNATIONAL PROJECTS, POSTCOLONIAL PREDICAMENTS,
AND DETERRITORIALIZED NATION-STATES (1994); Eve Darian-Smith, Rabies Rides the
Fast Train: Transnational Interactions in Postcolonial Times, in LAWS OF THE
POSTCOLONIAL, supra note 50, at 287-89.
81. This paraphrases definitions from Chowdhry and Nair, supra note 55, at 11. This
Article is limited to examining U.S. law's perspective on norms in Guantdnamo territory
during War on Terror detention. As such, this post-colonial analysis focuses on territory
and law. The Chowdhry and Nair volume expands on other post-colonial themes such as
power and representation; the intersection of race and gender; global capitalism, class, and
postcoloniality; and recovery resistance and agency. See generally id.
82. See generally IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: AN INTRo-
DUCTION (2004); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM I: CAPITALIST
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The notion of informal empire becomes central to many post-colonial
inquiries. Informal empire refers to a relationship of control, often based
on economic and military objectives, between states without requiring
formal relationships of colonial administration or without the complete
transfer of sovereignty to an imperial power. 83 Informal empire differs
from formal empire or colonialism, wherein a foreign population would
not have sovereign control over its territory8 4 With informal empire, two
states are formally independent, but economic or military power gives
one state overwhelming influence. 85
Debates about the magnitude of informal empire are fueled by com-
parisons between "free-trade" practices, which are associated with infor-
mal empire and mercantilist practices, whereby an empire emphasizes
protectionist economic policies.86 Often, informal empire is seen as a
consequence of industrialization, which drives the search for markets
overseas for raw materials imports, investments, and exports. Histori-
cally, since overseas markets were lucrative, limited in number, and prof-
itable, military and legal protection was needed to ensure access to them.
This protection would be less formal than a colony but still substantial
enough to protect center-state objectives. By the 1890s, U.S. economic
and political leaders found overseas markets, naval power, and bases
abroad necessary for further industrialization.8 7 This quest for overseas
markets, territorial control (not necessarily sovereign control), and naval
superiority was particularly accented in the Caribbean and Central Amer-
ican regions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. With this,
the United States tried to protect its global influence and access to Asian
and American markets.88 With informal empire, powerful states bene-
AGRICULTURE AND THE ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY IN THE SIX-
TEENTH CENTURY (1974).
83. See generally John Gallagher & Ronald Robinson, The Imperialism of Free Trade,
6 ECON. HIST. REV. 1 (1953),
84. Warren Kimball explains that "informal empire" allows for the exercise of power
without having formal political control, and that the term "hegemony" describes the rela-
tionship as well. See Foreword, in THE UNITED STATES AND DECOLONIZATION: POWER
AND FREEDOM (David Ryan & Victor Pungong eds., 2000).
85. See generally Gallagher & Robinson, supra note 83 (discounting the idea that for-
mal colonialism is needed for, or that free trade eliminates, imperial power); William
Roger Louis & Ronald Robinson, The Imperialism of Decolonization, 22 J. IMPERIAL
COMMONWEALTH HIST. 462 (1994) (charting the shift in informal empire worldwide from
British to U.S. power in the twentieth century).
86. Historians heavily debate whether informal empire achieved the same influence as
formal empire. The debate questions whether late-nineteenth and twentieth century Brit-
ain had an informal empire in regions where its economic and military presence was sub-
stantial, although it lacked formal colonies. See Oliver MacDonagh, The Anti-Imperialism
of Free Trade, 14 ECON. HIST. REV. 489 (1962).
87. See Walter LaFeber, The American View of Decolonization, 1776-1920: An Ironic
Legacy, in THE UNITED STATES AND DECOLONIZATION: POWER AND FREEDOM 30 (David
Ryan & Victor Pungong eds., 2000). This need for overseas markets (supply and demand)
would help sustain further industrialization and offset limits in domestic purchases. Law,
whether constitutional, foreign relations, or international, was central to supporting these
efforts to extend U.S. influence abroad.
88. See generally THOMAS SCHOONOVER, UNCLE SAM'S WAR OF 1898 AND THE ORI-
GINS OF GLOBALIZATION (2003).
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fited from geopolitical or strategic influence overseas. 89
One legal instrument used to maintain informal imperial control was
the protectorate relationship. With protectorate arrangements, one state
would be the protector of a protectorate state. 90 The former was usually
a center-state and the latter was peripheral to the locus of economic, mili-
tary, and political power. In theory, the protector (often a European or
Western state) possessed external sovereignty, controlling the protector-
ate's foreign relations.91 This was used to control the protectorate state
and fend off other imperial powers. The protectorate state retained inter-
nal or domestic sovereignty, in theory controlling its own domestic af-
fairs.92 In most scenarios, the internal/external sovereignty distinction
was porous, and protectorate relationships provided informal and flexible
imperial control for center-states. International law treatises from the
time explain that for protectorate relationships, the terms of a particular
treaty determined what state had sovereignty over the protectorate terri-
tory.93 This includes Cuba's protectorate relationship with the United
States from 1898 to 1934.94 Generally, how sovereignty was determined
in a protectorate relationship depended on the particular circumstances. 95
Informal imperial relationships suited powerful states by avoiding the
expensive costs of having a colony. 96 Colonies required defending sover-
eignty over the territory from other imperial powers. A costly adminis-
trative presence was needed to rule these societies. Protectorates
provided flexibility to exert metropolitan control, especially to counter
89. Sparrow generally shows how the legal doctrine developed in the Insular Cases by
the U.S. general foreign relations trend of creating an informal empire in the Caribbean,
Central America, and Asia. See SPARROW, supra note 68, at 229-55.
90. Lassa Oppenheim defines the arrangement as "aris[ing] when a weak State surren-
ders itself by treaty to the protection of a strong State in such as a way that it transfers the
management of all its more important international affairs to the protecting State." LASSA
OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 92 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955).
This leaves the protectorate as losing its "full sovereignty, and is henceforth only a half
sovereign state." Id.
91. See ANGHIE, supra note 26, at 87.
92. See id.; WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 30-31 (A.
Pearce Higgins ed., 8th ed. 2001); OPPENHEIM, supra note 90, § 92.
93. These relationships are also characterized as restricting a state's, "complete liberty
of action" "by obligations into which they have entered with other states." These pro-
tected states have "imperfect independence" in exchange for protection by the United
States. This grants the U.S. "rights for special purposes." See HALL, supra note 92, at
30-31.
94. See id. at 31 (referring to "relinquished or suspended normal rights of political
independence" in treaty-making and the right of intervention for the preservation of good
or protection, as in Cuba's example). But see OPPENHEIM, supra note 90, § 94 n.2 (infer-
ring that the United States established "quasi-protectorate" relationships with Cuba, Pan-
ama, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti with a "right of intervention" and
restrictions on foreign policy).
95. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 90, §§ 92-93 (indicating that no "general rule" exists
concerning the protectorate's position within the "Family of Nations").
96. See Gallagher & Robinson, supra note 83, at 13 (arguing that only when informal
means of dependency did not function in the second half of the nineteenth century where
more formal empires were needed).
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other imperial forces with an initial military presence overseas. This was
possible without the expense of colonial administration.
A key goal of any informal empire was attaining flexible control in
terms of legal commitments and administrative costs. Generally, this
flexibility was attained with metropolitan influence based on trade trea-
ties, protectorate relationships, naval power (providing the ability to
transport troops and protect trade routes), and strategically located bases
overseas. Describing how the United States developed this control, Spar-
row highlights informal empire's defining characteristic: powerful eco-
nomic states controlling the one-sided development of a weaker
economy, while avoiding the day-to-day colonial administration of a for-
eign population.97 Sparrow describes how American informal empire re-
flects the normative determinations of the Insular Cases, which sanctions
overseas authority while escaping significant constitutional limits. 98
Important facets of the American informal empire included military
bases overseas and a strategic foreign policy doctrine. 99 In addition to
Guantinamo, overseas bases serving U.S. strategic interests were located
in Panama, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Philippines, Guam,
Hawai'i, and Alaska. With this set of bases, the United States patrolled
the major entryways into the Caribbean, protected the Panama Canal and
American trade in the region, and deterred European intrusions. 100 Pa-
cific bases served similar goals, protecting the Pacific Coast. Next, the
"Roosevelt Corollary" to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine justified interven-
tion in the affairs of Latin American states. 10 1 The Monroe Doctrine
sought to bar European interference in the Western Hemisphere. The
Roosevelt Corollary added the element of intervening in regional states.
It provided that "[c]hronic wrongdoing or an impotence" by these states
ultimately required the United States to act as an "international police
power" in the Hemisphere.10 2 Through occupations, military interven-
tions, or sending troops abroad, U.S. interference occurred; in Nicaragua
in 1908, 1912-1915, and 1926-1933; the Dominican Republic during
1916-1924; Panama in 1918; Honduras in 1919 and 1924; and Mexico dur-
ing 1913-1916.103 This Doctrine provided a way to avoid characterization
97. See SPARROW, supra note 68, at 231 (referring to William Appleman Williams'
description of informal empire).
98. See id. at 229.
99. See id. at 232-34. See generally Louis & Robinson, supra note 85.
100. See Woolsey, supra note 34, at 534 (describing protecting the Panama Canal as
central to regional U.S. foreign policy objectives).
101. See SPARROW, supra note 68, at 234.
102. See id.
103. See id. For a sophisticated analysis of the commonalities in U.S. foreign policies of
imperial expansion (with economic, political, and military objectives) from the 1898 to the
"War on Terror" period which aggressively begun with these early twentieth century events
in the Americas, see generally GREG GRANDIN, EMPIRE'S WORKSHOP: LATIN AMERICA,
THE UNITED STATES, AND THE RISE OF NEW IMPERIALISM (2006).
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as imperialism.1°4 The United States had fought off European imperial-
ism during its independence and sought to limit its penetration with the
Monroe Doctrine. 10 5 To justify intervention, U.S. foreign policy was
presented as part of a civilizing mission and to promote superior political
virtues. 106
Sparrow explains Cuba was the "prototype" of informal empire, since
the United States did not territorially annex it, although it effectively con-
trolled Cuba. 10 7 Cuba was a protectorate from 1898, when Spain relin-
quished sovereignty over the island, until a 1934 treaty with the United
States abrogated protectorate arrangements. 10 8 The United States be-
came involved in Cuban independence as part of a search for economic
markets, as opposed to the objective of ending colonial rule.'0 9 Before
the Spanish-American War, Congress passed the Teller Amendment stat-
ing Cuba should be independent and that the United States would not
exercise sovereignty over it.110 Later the Platt Amendment legally imple-
mented protectorate status."' It secured non-sovereign control of Cuba.
It created a protectorate status by limiting Cuba's sovereignty, prohibit-
ing it from entering into a treaty with another state and securing the
"right to intervene" in Cuba. 112
A post-colonial examination of U.S.-Cuba relations suggests that the
United States exercised informal imperial control over the island from
1898 to 1934. Cuba was formally independent and the United States did
not annex it or make it a colony. U.S.-Cuba relations were part of a re-
gional process to exert authority over the Caribbean and Central
America. This history of U.S. involvement is expressed in competing nar-
ratives. One perspective generally argues that the United States was
seeking free markets, exporting democratic values, promoting regional
security, and furthering a civilizing mission and decolonization from Eu-
ropean control, while the other viewpoint argues that the United States
intervened in foreign states, valued economic or strategic goals over sov-
ereign independence or republicanism, and racial and religious intoler-
104. See Laurie Johnston, The Road to Our America: The United States in Latin
America and the Caribbean, in THE UNITED STATES AND DECOLONIZATION: POWER AND
FREEDOM 43 (David Ryan & Victor Pungong eds., 2000).
105. See id.
106. See id. at 43-44.
107. See SPARROW, supra note 68, at 235. Examining decisions made by U.S. policy-
makers, David F. Healy argues that U.S. policy towards Cuba provided indirect control, by
way of protectorate status and economic penetration, without the burdens of colonialism.
See DAVID F. HEALY, THE UNITED STATES IN CUBA 1898-1902: GENERALS, POLITICIANS,
AND THE SEARCH FOR POLICY (1963).
108. See infra Part III.A and C.
109. WALTER LAFEBER, THE NEW EMPIRE: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN Ex-
PANSION 1860-1898, at 408 (1963).
110. See HEALY, supra note 107, at 24.
111. See id. at 162-63.
112. Other Amendment provisions prohibited Cuba from taking public debts it could
not pay interests on; ratified all acts by the United States during military occupation; re-
quired Cuba to sanitize its cities; and left title of the Isle of Pines for future determination.
See generally Platt Amendment-U.S. appropriations, supra note 15.
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ance excluded populations of Iberian, African, and indigenous descent
and Catholic or other religions.
B. INTERNATIONAL LAW FACILITATES OVERSEAS AUTHORITY BY
EXCLUDING TERRITORIES AND POPULATIONS
FROM SOVEREIGNTY
International law had a central role in extending imperial and post-
colonial control around the globe. International law seeks to order the
obligations and rights in foreign relations belonging to states and individ-
uals. With states extending their influence overseas, this set of legal doc-
trines alternatively justified, facilitated, or resisted imperial influence.
Post-colonial perspectives critically examine both international law's as-
sumptions and its limitations (past, present, and future). 113 Norms and
doctrines in international law are based on previous state practices. 114
These practices are often an outgrowth of European states, or more pow-
erful states, expanding their influence worldwide and seeking economic
and territorial gain. From its genesis, international law developed from
these contexts of empire, colonization, and protectorates.' 5
In Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law,
Antony Anghie shows how international law, from its sixteenth century
origin to the present day multilateral institutions, developed from the im-
perial encounter initiated by European states. 116 Central to this encoun-
ter is how international legal doctrine uses the concept of sovereignty to
include or exclude certain populations. He examines the assumptions in
international law's reasoning and its cultural currency throughout his-
tory.1 17 Anghie argues that the discipline and practice of international
law possessed a "civilizing mission" in which Western mindsets classified
113. Post-colonial theory has been applied to international law in a variety of contexts.
See generally Fitzpatrick & Darian-Smith, supra note 50; James Thuo Gathii, Imperialism,
Colonialism, and International Law, 54 But'. L. REV. 1013 (2007). A particular perspec-
tive on international law drawing much inspiration from post-colonial theory is "Third
World Approaches to International Law" (TWAIL). For summaries of TWAIL perspec-
tives and examples of its scholarship, see THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL OR-
DER: LAW, POLITICS, AND GLOBALIZATION (Antony Anghie et al. eds., 2003); Antony
Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Re-
sponsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 77 (2003); James Thuo Gathii, Inter-
national Law and Eurocentricity, 9 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 184 (1998); Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric
and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse, 16 Wis. INT'L L.J. 353
(1998); Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94 AM. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 31 (2000).
114. Anghie and Chimni describe the influence, often overlooked in common jurispru-
dence and scholarship, of various third world perspectives from leaders, jurists, diplomats,
and scholars throughout history, such as Alejandro Alvarez, Georges Abi-Saab, F. Garcia-
Amador R.P. Anand, Mohammed Bedjaoui, and Taslim 0. Elias. See Anghie & Chimni,
supra note 113, at 77 n.5.
115. ANGHIE, supra note 26, at 3 (presenting colonialism as central to the creation of
international law, especially in its basic doctrines such as sovereignty, and to accounting for
the relationship between European and non-European worlds).




the Orient or non-European as "the Other."118 Legal determinations of
"cultural difference" repeatedly classified societies as "civilized" or "un-
civilized." Foreign relations practice claimed that law created by "civi-
lized" perspectives was "universal," while "uncivilized" perspectives on
the law were instead particular. Race-based reasoning motivated legal
determinations of civilized versus uncivilized persons.119
Through this process, native or non-Western populations were denied
international sovereignty. Sovereignty provided recognized final author-
ity in the international system, which was vital to protect any state inde-
pendence from foreign powers. 120 To have influence in this international
system, many non-European societies found accommodating Western
pressure necessary, which led to relationships as colonies or protector-
ates. Economically and militarily powerful states extended their govern-
mental authority overseas to attain colonies, extend empires, establish
protectorates, and lease territories.
Peter Fitzpatrick and Eve Darian-Smith present another post-colonial
insight into international law: the "ambivalence in the rule of law."1 21
Fitzpatrick and Darian-Smith examine how law is at the forefront of the
West's relations to its "others.1 22 They explain how European or West-
ern structures seek to exclude non-Western identities as "others,"
savages, or barbarians, and even those in the West who are "less occiden-
118. See id. at 3-4, 10 (presenting legal reasoning predicated on this "cultural differ-
ence," illustrated with examples such as the sixteenth century Spanish encounter with Indi-
ans in the Americas, nineteenth century positivist jurisprudence, the League of Nations'
mandate system in the early twentieth century, the United Nation and decolonization after
World War II, contemporary financial regulation and human rights, and the War on Ter-
ror). See generally MARYVI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE
AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 (2001) (arguing that international law as
both a discipline and a practice develops from late-nineteenth century efforts to "civilize"
states and societies with significant liberal and cosmopolitan assumptions).
119. See ANGHIE, supra note 26, at 103 (examining the importance race played in posi-
tivist descriptions of international law); Ediberto Rom~in, A Race Approach to Interna-
tional Law (RAIL): Is There a Need for Yet Another Critique of International Law?, 33
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1519, 1531 (2000) (illustrating how race-based assumptions exert sig-
nificant influence in international law's reasoning). See generally Ruth Gordon, Critical
Race Theory and International Law: Convergence and Divergence, 45 VILL. L. REV. 827
(2000) (showing the benefits of applying critical race theory to a series of international law
questions); Makau Mutua, Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an
Insider-Outsider, 45 VILL. L. REV. 841 (2000) (presenting how critical race theory and
TWAIL perspectives on international law are applicable to current international relations).
120. This Article uses a definition of "sovereignty" as the "final and absolute political
authority," taken from F.H. Hinsley's comprehensive historical study of sovereignty. See
F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY 26 (2d ed. 1986). This Article assumes that sovereignty is a
subject that changes in meaning over time, that this meaning is socially constructed, and
that it is perpetually contested. See, e.g., Thomas J. Biersteker, State, Sovereignty, and Ter-
ritory, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 157, 167 (Walter Carlsnaes et al.
eds., 2002); STATE SOVEREIGNTY As SOCIAL CONSTRUCt 1-21 (Thomas J. Biersteker &
Cynthia Weber eds., 1996).
121. Fitzpatrick & Darian-Smith, supra note 50, at 2.
122. Id. at 4. See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS (Anne Orford ed.,
2006) (providing diverse and extensive analysis of how international law treats certain
populations as "others").
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tal than they should be. '123 This is antithetical to international law's
claims of universalism because it rejects while it simultaneously claims to
be inclusive or all-encompassing. 124 This produces an "irresolute iden-
tity," wherein the West is excluding yet encompassing its "others. '125
Fitzpatrick and Darian-Smith refer to Homi Bhabha's characterization of
post-colonialism as "in between" two impossibilities of "ultimate fixity
and ultimate responsiveness."' 126 Historians examining U.S.-Latin Amer-
ican relations similarly examine this ambivalence. In a cultural study of
these histories, Gil Joseph refers to "contact zones" where U.S. and Latin
American cultures meet. 127 These exchanges are "multifaceted and mul-
tivocal" producing "blurring of boundaries, of who or what is 'local' and
'foreign,' 'inside' or 'outside."1 28 For Guantinamo, this includes Cuban
and third country national base workers traveling between Cuban and
American jurisdiction during everyday contexts such as remuneration
and commuting and in highly volatile situations such as criminal prosecu-
tions and worker detentions. 129
Such anomaly clouds the legal ordering supporting U.S. authority in
the Caribbean. Christina Duffy Burnett and Burke Marshall describe
such ambivalence in current legal doctrine as having developed with the
Insular Cases. They explain that while no one defends the colonial rea-
soning of these cases, there is an ambivalent legacy in reasoning of these
cases. 130 Specifically, the characterization of Puerto Rico as "foreign in a
domestic sense," taken from Justice White's concurring opinion in
Downes v. Bidwell, describes public sentiment in Puerto Rico regarding
its relationship to the United States.131 Similarly, Amy Kaplan argues
that Justice White's characterization of "foreign in a domestic sense" is
reflective of the "anarchy of empire," or discord in national identity, felt
at home by American expansion abroad. 132
This Article applies these two general post-colonial suggestions on law
and sovereignty and law and ambivalence to make sense of how Guanti-
namo's legal anomaly frames current detention dispute resolution. This
anomaly was purposefully created by legal reasoning in U.S. foreign rela-
tions and constitutional law. As such, recent concerns of a "gulag" or
"legal black hole" 133 are just contemporary descriptions, possibly lacking
123. Fitzpatrick & Darian-Smith, supra note 50, at 1.
124. Id. at 1-2.
125. Id. at 2.
126. Id. at 2 (referring to the Chapter "Signs Taken For Wonders" in Homi K. Bhabha's
book, The Location of Culture).
127. Gilbert M. Joseph, Close Encounters, in CLOSE ENCOUNTERS OF EMPIRE: WRITING
THE CULTURAL HISTORY OF U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS 5, 15 (Gilbert M. Joseph,
Catherine C. LeGrand & Ricardo D. Salvatore eds., 1998).
128. Id. at 16.
129. See generally LIPMAN, supra note 4.
130. Id.
131. FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 67, at 2.
132. AMY KAPLAN, THE ANARCHY OF EMPIRE IN THE MAKING OF U.S. CULTURE 7-8
(2002).
133. See generally Khan Speech, supra note 7; Steyn, supra note 8.
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in historical or Cuban appreciation, of the legacies of informal empire.
What has actually occurred on Guantdnamo, i.e., detention avoiding sov-
ereignty and checks in constitutional or international law, is a legal out-
growth of ambiguity. Narratives of "foreign in a domestic sense"
(referring to Insular Cases reasoning) and "complete jurisdiction and con-
trol" absent "ultimate sovereignty" (referring to text from base agree-
ments) shape this discourse.134
C. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXCLUDES OVERSEAS TERRITORIES AND
POPULATIONS FROM SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS PROTECTIONS
Next, in contextualizing Guantinamo's legal anomaly, this Article
draws on lessons from U.S. constitutional law concerning overseas au-
thority.135 Scholarship analyzing the Insular Cases and U.S. island terri-
tories suggests constitutional law, throughout history and in current
practice, sanctions informal imperial arrangements.1 36 This research illus-
trates how assumptions and practices in constitutional law vary once U.S.
authority governs overseas territories.137 These territories are mostly lo-
cated in the Caribbean Basin and the Pacific Ocean. 138 The legal rela-
tionships between the United States and these territories conflict with
political theories of democratic or republican government. Specifically,
these territories lack sovereignty and full constitutional rights protections.
Denying sovereignty for these territories results in their dependence on
the United States in foreign relations matters. Importantly, the United
States did not incorporate (or ever plan to include) these territories into
the union as states. These possessions are not insignificant. Their com-
134. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 341-42 (1901); U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease,
supra note 10.
135. Gerald Neuman generally describes four stages in how U.S. law determined that
the Constitution applied to territories within its sovereignty: 1) from 1789 to the early
nineteenth century, when the issue was not consistently settled; 2) from the middle to end
of the nineteenth century, when constitutional limitations were applied in territories and
states; 3) beginning with the Insular Cases in 1901 until the 1950s, with distinctions drawn
between incorporated and unincorporated territories where in the latter only fundamental
constitutional limitations apply; and 4) after 1950s until recently, when in some instances
courts recognize constitutional limitations apply outside U.S. boundaries. See NEUMAN,
supra note 67, at 72-94, 104-08 (providing the most detailed analysis of these stages);
Neuman, Closing the Guantdnamo Loophole, supra note 51, at 5-15 (summarizing the
stages and drawing four categories relevant to Guantinamo's constitutional status).
136. See SPARROW, supra note 68, at 247 (arguing that the Insular Cases facilitated in-
formal empire by permitting the United States to expand territorially without annexing
new possessions); Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should be Expanded to Include the
Insular Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 246
(2000) (arguing that the importance of the Insular Cases is that they permitted the United
States to "emulate the European nations and conquer and possess colonial territories").
137. SPARROW, supra note 68, at 248-49.
138. These possessions include Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands in the Caribbean,
and American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Federated States of Micronesia,
Marshall Islands, and Republic of Palau in the Pacific Ocean.
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bined population is four million, with 3.8 million in Puerto Rico. 139 Im-
portantly, many mainstream or common approaches to constitutional law
in the United States overlook the legacy of these cases or the informal
imperial ordering. 140
Developed in two planes, the legal status of these non-state possessions
points to an imperial relationship. First, a central state power exerts gov-
ernmental authority overseas and possesses sovereignty overseas. Simul-
taneously, individual rights enjoyed under U.S. law are denied there.
These two determinations, the former in international law terms and the
latter in constitutional law terms, govern many aspects of overseas au-
thority. The Court in Boumediene, in both majority and dissenting opin-
ions, refers to doctrine from the Insular Cases as evidence for why the
constitutional writ of habeas corpus is (or is not) available to detainees on
Guantdinamo. 1
41
Scholarship analyzing this constitutional ordering suggests a series of
questions for examining Guantdnamo's legal anomaly. This research may
not always be labeled "post-colonial," since these possessions remain in
U.S. control without political independence. Likewise, this research may
not identify post-colonial themes of identity, exclusion, dependence, sub-
ordination, or resistance. Regardless, this diverse and engaging scholar-
ship provides an excellent inspiration to identify limits, deference, or
rights protections, if any, that apply to U.S. authority on Guantinamo.
For these territories, denial of statehood status and exclusion of rights
protections conflicts with the liberal tenets of constitutional law. 142 Basic
constitutional law principles regard U.S. political authority as based on
popular sovereignty as represented through the states.' 43 Citizens of
139. Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall, Between the Foreign and the Domestic:
The Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, Invented and Reinvented, in FOREIGN IN A Do-
MESTIC SENSE: PUERTO Rico, AMERICAN EXPANSION AND THE CONSTITUTION 1-27
(Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001).
140. For instance in 2000, prominent constitutional law professor Sanford Levinson ex-
plained how after two decades of teaching constitutional law he was "sadly under-
informed" about the importance of the Insular Cases. Levinson, supra note 136, at 265. He
described how "almost" all contemporary constitutional law casebooks and treatises fail to
mention anything about these cases. Id. at 245. Importantly, he notes John E. Nowak and
Ronald D. Rotunda (my Chapman colleague) do explain the importance of the cases in
their treatise. Id. at. 245 (referring to JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 210-11 (5th ed. 1995)).
141. 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2254-56 (2008); id. at 2301 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
sovereignty is required to extend constitutional protections to overseas territories). See
also Brief for the Respondents at 69-71, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (Nos.
06-1195, 06-1196); Brief for Petitioners Al Odah et al. at 20-22, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.
Ct. 2229 (2008) (No. 06-1196); Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners at 46-47, Boumediene
v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (No. 06-1195). See also Pedro A. Malavet, From Downes v.
Bidwell to Boumediene v. Bush: "The Constitution Follows the Flag... But it [Still] Doesn't
Quite Catch Up with It" (Univ. of Fla. Levin College of Law Research Paper No. 2009-03,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1333185.
142. ROMAN, supra note 67, at ix-xx.
143. The holdings of the Insular Cases-finding that the federal government had
unenumerated power to rule over these territories-broke with many prior constitutional
law principles which focused on enumerated powers needed for the federal government to
have authority. See ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITz, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE
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these states and the United States elect their leaders and enjoy individual
constitutional rights protections. Applicable to these overseas posses-
sions, legal designations such as territories, commonwealths, and trusts
deny these liberal attributes.1 44 Traditional impressions in U.S. historiog-
raphy, political theory, and the law do not label the United States as hav-
ing an empire or these territories as part of a colonial relationship.145
Current arrangements, some crafted as early as 1898, suggest a U.S. em-
pire overseas, since there is a separation in political participation and le-
gal protection between a governed population (territorial residents) and
governing authority (the Federal Government).1 46
ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 6-16 (1989); Sarah H. Cleveland,
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, A liens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Ori-
gins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002).
144. FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 67, at 1-2.
145. Motivated by commercial, territorial, or strategic interests, de facto or informal
imperial practices have shaped U.S. foreign relations for over a century. Historians, for-
eign scholars, and critical researchers provide a variety of reasons for why U.S. public
discourse and history adamantly deny the existence of any empire in U.S. foreign relations,
despite extensive overseas possessions since 1898. Explanations include: associations of
"empire" with the Communist bloc or Soviet Union after 1917 through the Cold War (the
"Evil Empire"); associations of "empire" with formal colonies, mercantilism, and limited
political participation as referenced by European colonies; a legacy of fighting against im-
perial rule in the Revolutionary War to achieve political independence; an assumption that
constitutional principles of equality under the law, popular sovereignty, and electoral rights
apply universally to those governed by the United States (ignoring the unequal treatment
of women, Native Americans, slaves, persons of color, foreign nationals, and residents of
unincorporated possessions); and a cultural understanding that extending U.S. authority
overseas benefited populations abroad by exposing them to "free trade" or republican gov-
ernance, or that these populations lacked the culture to participate in this project. See
generally THE UNITED STATES AND DECOLONIZATION: POWER AND FREEDOM, supra note
87 (providing a series of chapters on foreign relations from Independence to the 1960s to
argue that the United States supported both decolonization and imperial powers through-
out the world, as it maintained an informal empire and protected economic objectives of
the world powers); Joseph Fry, Imperialism, American Style, in AMERICAN FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, RECONSIDERED 1890-1993 (Gordon Martel ed., 1994) (examining "power, control,
and intent" of U.S. foreign policy to argue empire is evidenced by a consistent policy not
too distinct from European practices, socio-economic domestic motives to extend influ-
ence, and cultural "missions" to spread liberty in a racial context not dissimilar to conti-
nental experiences with Native Americans, African-Americans, and Mexican-Americans);
Edward P. Crapol, Coming to Terms with Empire: The Historiography of Late-Nineteenth
Century American Foreign Relations, 16 DIPLOMATIC HIST. 573, 573-97 (1992) (discussing
how diplomatic history traditionally has discounted "empire" in U.S. foreign relations);
Louis A. P6rez, Jr., Review: 1898 and Beyond: Historiographical Variations on War and
Empire, 65 PAC. HIST. REV. 313, 314 (1996) (explaining how U.S. history regards interven-
tions and occupations overseas by the United States as isolated events versus within a
larger framework of imperialism); Emily S. Rosenberg, "The Empire" Strikes Back, 16
REVS. AM. HIST. 585, 585-590 (1988) (illustrating how with extensive efforts U.S. history
seeks to distinguish itself from imperialism); John Fabian Witt, Anglo-American Empire
and the Crisis of the Legal Frame (Will the Real British Empire Stand Up?), 120 HARV. L.
REV. 754, 756 (2006) (arguing that the "law of empire" has moved front and center in
American public discourse..." in reviewing books on British imperialism and its influence
in U.S. constitutional law (present and historic) by Niall Ferguson, Daniel J. Hulseboch, R.
W. Kostal, and John Yoo).
146. Sparrow argues that the Insular Cases provided the U.S. with the legal mechanisms
in constitutional law to sustain informal empire; a project begun before the cases in 1898
but sustained in larger contexts beyond the immediate islands of Puerto Rico and Hawai'i.
See SPARROW, supra note 68, at 229-32.
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In his comprehensive book The Other American Colonies, Ediberto
Romfin examines how, for these possessions, constitutional and interna-
tional law have exclusionary effects. 147 U.S. expansion, initially after
1898 and then later in the Pacific Ocean during the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, justified judicial and legislative constructs creating a colonized status
for these possessions. 148 Rom~in explains the current relevance of the In-
sular Cases, which created the Incorporation Doctrine. 149 This Doctrine
generally argues that the United States retains sovereignty over these
types of territories, that the political branches have plenary authority to
govern these possessions, and that only "fundamental" rights in the Con-
stitution apply there. 150 This last distinction refers to rights derived from
natural law. 15 1 This does not include many of the Constitution's positive
rights articulations. 152 Citizens of these territories do not receive many of
the public benefits or aid provided by the federal government that "main-
landers" receive. These citizens do not vote for President, Vice President,
or members of Congress.153
While these territories have different legal relationships with the
United States, commonalities in this legal ordering (constitutional and in-
ternational) suggest an informal empire. Christina Duffy Burnett and
Burke Marshall highlight shared elements: Congress governs each under
the Constitution's Territorial Clause; international sovereignty is denied
for each territory; no territory is a state in the Union; persons born in
these territories are U.S. citizens (except for American Samoan U.S. "na-
tionals"); Congress has sole discretion to govern these territories by fed-
eral legislation; and no territory has representation on the federal
level.154
Similarly, political and economic factors suggest an informal empire
developing from the Insular Cases and governing current overseas terri-
tory. First, international sovereignty is denied to these populations but
147. See generally ROMAN, supra note 67, at xx-xxv.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 48-56.
150. Rom~in provides a great summary of the context and holdings of key Insular Cases
decisions used to govern American colonies. See id. at 48-56 (describing Downes v. Bid-
well 182 U.S. 244 (1901), Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1903), and Balzac v. Porto
Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1921)). Sparrow offers a detailed analysis of the political and popular
contexts surrounding the Insular Cases, including a quite expansive list of the Insular
Cases, and their influence on U.S. foreign relations and Supreme Court jurisprudence. See
generally SPARROW, supra note 68. Sparrow's listing of the Insular Cases, a total of thirty-
five including disputes involving Cuba, the Philippines, and Alaska in addition to Puerto
Rico, is described in "A note on the Insular Cases." See SPARROW, supra note 68, at 257-
58, 259-63.
151. Downes, 182 U.S. at 282-83 (listing examples of natural rights as the ability to
have: religious freedom; personal liberty and individual property; freedom of speech and
press; free access to courts; due process of law: and equal protection of the law: and immu-
nity from unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel and unusual punishments).
152. Id.
153. Iguarta De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam)
(finding that statehood or a constitutional amendment is required for a Puerto Rican resi-
dent to have federal voting rights).
154. FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 67, at 1-2.
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retained by the United States. 155 Foreign relations are conducted by the
U.S. government as opposed to local territorial authorities. 56 Second,
the objectives of the political liberal theory electoral and individual rights
do not fully apply there, since these populations do not fully participate in
U.S. governance. 157 The federal government's sovereignty over these ter-
ritories reflects imperial or centralized political goals not immediately as-
sociated with the narratives of republican and democratic governance.' 58
Popular sovereignty is denied to these populations, with no congressional
representation on their behalf.' 59 States in the Union have this represen-
tation. Third, the initial U.S. interest in these territories was to compete
with European imperial powers or global military powers.' 60 From
before 1898, the United States eyed Caribbean territories with great in-
terest as it tried to enforce the Monroe Doctrine.16' The Pacific islands
were equally appealing as the United States tried to "open" markets in
Asia. 162 The Cold War's global scope, especially with accessibility to at-
tacks on the Pacific coast, made these islands strategically appealing. 63
Fourth, critical perspectives in legal studies, race theory, and post-colonial
theory and scholarship from these regions highlight the imperial, neo-co-
155. Roman explains how the Territorial Clause permitted Congress to acquire new
territories, but the Spanish-American War of 1898 introduced the predicament where a
"sovereign right" of the United States resulted in acquisitions such as Puerto Rico, the
Philippine Islands, and Guam; and the Insular Cases resulted in these populations excluded
from many constitutional rights protections. See ROMAN, supra note 67, at 28-29, 35-37.
Burnett emphasizes "deannexation" in the Insular Cases which permitted the United
States to relinquish sovereignty over unincorporated territories but gave it the ability to
immediately rule them. See Burnett, supra note 67, at 802.
156. ROMAN, supra note 67, at xx.
157. Id. at xix-xxi.
158. Id. at xix-xxi.
159. Id. at xx.
160. Smith, supra note 2, at 84.
161. While this Article focuses on U.S. foreign relations with Cuba and the required
legal determinations to implement these policy choices, similar policy and legal contexts
were evident generally in foreign policies respecting Latin America and Asia. For summa-
ries of U.S. policies toward Latin America and the legal changes used to implement them,
see Smith, supra note 2, and Johnston, supra note 104, at 41-61. Walter LaFeber examines
how U.S. foreign policy objectives changed after the Civil War and how these changes had
global targets (including the Caribbean, Central America, and Asia), geopolitical compo-
nents, material objectives, and cultural motivations in Protestant missionaries or "Anglo-
Saxon" superiority. See LAFEBER, supra note 109, at vii; Walter Lafeber, The American
Search for Opportunity, in HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 234-35 (Warren I.
Cohen ed., 1993).
162. Simultaneous to events in the Caribbean and Central America, the United States
was engaged in similar foreign policies in Asia with goals of opening markets, competing
with European powers, and securing strategic territories. For instance, in 1900 President
McKinley sent troops as part of multinational coalition into sovereign China. Importantly,
this happened without express authorization from Congress and mostly under the execu-
tive's initiative. Walter LaFeber, The "Lion in the Path": The U.S. Emergence as a World
Power, 101 POL. Scl. Q. 705, 714 (1986) (correlating a worldwide foreign policy after 1898
with naval theory from Alfred Thayer Mahan, constitutional reinterpretation, and political
centralization of military power). See generally Walter LaFeber, The Constitution and
United States Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, 74 J. AM. HisT. 695 (1987) (presenting the
Constitution as a contested barrier to U.S. foreign policy choices for the presidency from
Independence onward with relevant foreign policy contests worldwide).
163. See ROMAN, supra note 67, at 211-56.
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lonial, or colonial relationship still exist for these populations. 164 Impor-
tant cultural influences shaped U.S. interests overseas and the domestic
legal ordering used to sustain them.1 65 This includes notions of Manifest
Destiny and the "White Man's Burden," justifying a reason to go over-
seas and, more specifically, concerns of Anglo and/or White superiority,
missionary objectives to spread Christianity and convert local popula-
tions, emerging ideas of "manhood," and perceived incapability of per-
sons of color or non-Protestant residents in these territories to participate
in republican governance. 166
Viewed historically, this context identifies why the United States occu-
pied a base on the eastern end of the Cuban island. Guantdnamo's legal
anomaly is an outgrowth of this context. The United States occupied
Guantdnamo as part of a larger process to exert global influence. Legal
determinations implicit in extending authority overseas by the United
States, such as limiting rights protections, denying sovereignty to other
populations, or protecting strategic geopolitical goals, developed from
this context.
The Insular Cases provided constitutional law the first opportunity to
answer the question: "What rights protections and political deference ex-
164. See generally Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, History, Legal Scholarship, and Latcrit The-
ory: The Case of Racial Transformations Circa the Spanish American War, 1896-1900, 78
DENy. U. L. REV. 921 (2001) (presenting the significance of the War and its relevant legal
determinations in terms of racial categorizations in the U.S. and its territories). See also
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 326 (Juan F. Perea
et al. eds., 2000); RUBIN FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE
OF RACIAL ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1893-1946, at 262 (1972); Juan
F. Perea, Fulfilling Manifest Destiny: Conquest, Race and the Insular Cases, in FOREIGN IN
A DOMESTIC SENSE, supra note 67, at 140-63; Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico: Cultural
Nation, American Colony, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 41-44 (2000); Walter L. Williams,
United States Indian Policy and the Debate Over Philippine Annexation: Implications for
the Origins of American Imperialism, 66 J. AM. HIST. 810, 831 (1980).
165. Efr6n Rivera Ramos shows how the Insular Cases devised a doctrine to justify the
rule of overseas possessions and to make the populations of these territories subjects ver-
sus objects in disputes questioning U.S. authority. See generally EFRtN RIVERA RAMOS,
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF AMERI-
CAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RIco 114 (2001); The Legal Construction of American
Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 225 (1996).
166. Michael H. Hunt, Conclusions: The Decolonization Puzzle in US Policy-Promise
Versus Performance, in THE UNITED STATES AND DECOLONIZATION: POWER AND FREE-
DOM 207-29 (David Ryan & Victor Pungong eds., 2000) (presenting how ideology and
tensions in changing national values held by Americans (individually and collectively)
characterize why U.S. foreign policy moves between the promises of supporting
decolonization and self-determination and objectives of security and material gain). See
also DAVID HEALY, U.S. EXPANSIONISM: THE IMPERIALIST URGE IN THE 1890s (1970)
(presenting a diverse analysis of cultural, economic,and geopolitical intellectual currents
pushing the United States to become imperialist after a relatively isolated nineteenth cen-
tury); KRISTIN L. HOGANSON, FIGHTING FOR AMERICAN MANHOOD: How GENDER POLIT-
ICS PROVOKED THE SPANISH-AMERICAN AND PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WARS (1998)
(arguing how redefinition of gender roles, especially notions of chivalry and jingoistic man-
hood contrasting foreign savages or effeminate modern men, were vital to American im-
pulses for war in the Caribbean and Philippines in 1898).
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tend to territories overseas under U.S. sovereignty?' 167 These cases are
highly relevant to this Article's examination for two reasons. First, in
terms of context, they were argued and determined simultaneously as
U.S.-Cuba relations resulted in the Platt Amendment, base occupation,
and increased interference in the region. Assumptions and reasoning in
U.S.-Cuba relations developed at the same time and were made by many
of the same policymakers and justices from the Insular Cases. Second, in
doctrinal terms, the Insular Cases serve as relevant case law, as argued by
detainees and the Government, in determining what rights, protections,
or political deference applies overseas. 168 This is evident in how the ma-
jority and dissenting opinions in Boumediene examine extraterritorial ap-
plication of political deference and rights protections.1 69
The importance of the Insular Cases to recent detention practices is
related to historic developments in constitutional and international law.
Constitutional and international law scholar Gerald Neuman provides
some of the most sophisticated analysis on extraterritorial application of
the Constitution and the anomalous quality of GuantAnamo. 70 He ar-
gues that the Insular Cases point to a legacy in constitutional law of look-
ing to membership for determining what rights apply and where they
apply. 171 International law expert Kal Raustiala characterizes U.S. de-
tention on Guantfnamo as reflecting a "legal spatiality" based on strict
territorial limits to exerting legal jurisdiction.17 2 Historic foreign rela-
tions and the accompanying international law doctrine developed a strict
territorial approach to "legal spatiality," i.e., an assumption that territo-
rial location limits the law and the legal remedies that can be applied.173
Most recently, Boumediene engaged this doctrine, referring to history and
constitutional rights protections, membership, and overseas jurisdiction
and territorial demarcation. 174
167. Frederic R. Coudert provided a firsthand account, as a litigator in many Insular
Cases disputes. The Evolution of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation, 26 COLUM. L.
REv. 823, 823-24 (1926).
168. Brief for the Respondents at 69-71, Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008)
(Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196); Brief for Petitioners Al Odah et al. at 20-22, Boumediene v. Bush,
128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (No. 06-1196); Brief for the Boumediene Petitioners at 45-46,
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (No. 06-1195).
169. See infra Part IV D.-E.
170. See generally Neuman, Anomalous Zones, supra note 11; Neuman, Closing the
Guantdnamo Loophole, supra note 51; Gerald Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Consti-
tutional Methodology after Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073 (2005).
171. NEUMAN, supra note 67, at 6-7; Neuman, Closing the Guantdnamo Loophole,
supra note 51, at 6-7.
172. Kal Raustiala, The Evolution of Territoriality: International Relations and Ameri-
can Law, in TERRITORIALITY AND CONFLICr IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (Miles Kahler
& Barbara Walter eds., 2006); Raustiala, supra note 35, at 2502-03; see also Kal Raustiala,
Does the Constitution Follow the Flag? Territoriality and Extraterritoriality in American
Law (UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 08-34, 2009), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1291343) (presenting how U.S. power in foreign re-
lations and economics has helped changed territorial notions of jurisdiction).
173. Raustiala, supra note 35, at 2503.
174. See infra Part IV.D.
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Popular culture of the period presented the Insular Cases' constitu-
tional concerns as whether "the Constitution follows the flag," asking if
individual right-protections in the Constitution extend to places where
the United States governs. 175 The effective answer from the Insular
Cases was "yes, but not fully." Describing reaction to Downes v. Bidwell,
newspapers reported Secretary Elihu Root as saying: "as near as I can
make out the Constitution follows the flag - but doesn't quite catch up
with it."17 6 Constitutional application did not miss the territories, nor did
it stop at the continental states, but similarly not all rights in the Constitu-
tion were protected overseas. Approving overseas authority in a "Consti-
tution-light" fashion, the Insular Cases legally endorsed an informal
overseas empire in constitutional law. 177 Informal empire and U.S. over-
seas expansion relied on a legal sensibility denying sovereignty to over-
seas populations and avoiding constitutional limits.
This Article argues that recent Guant~inamo detention cases ask
whether limits in constitutional or international law follow U.S. authority
on leased overseas territory outside U.S. sovereignty. Colloquially, this
asks: "Does the Constitution or international law follow the flag flown
over detention camps at Guantinamo?" Referring to legal instruments
used to endorse informal empire in the Caribbean, both lease agreements
with protectorate-states and the Incorporation Doctrine, these questions
are clearly post-colonial.
III. GUANTANAMO'S ANOMALOUS PAST: CUBA AS A
PROTECTORATE AND A LEASED BASE
Following these theoretical elaborations, this Part argues that Guanti-
namo's current legal anomaly, i.e., the ambiguity concerning what norms
in U.S. or international law govern this territory, was a precise objective
of early-twentieth century U.S.-Cuba relations. Legal determinations on
sovereignty and the Constitution's applicability overseas characterized
U.S. foreign relations history in two relevant contexts. 178 The first is a
175. The reference to the Constitution following the flag comes from Mr. Dooley's
comments regarding electoral/political influence on the Supreme Court. FINLEY PETER
DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONs 26 (1901) ("[N]o matter whether the' constitution fol-
lows th' flag or not, th' supreme coort follows th' iliction returns."). See also Charles Fair-
man, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV. 587
(1949).
176. See generally PHILLIP C. JESSUP, ELIHU ROOT 348 (1938); SPARROW, supra note
68, at 101-02.
177. See SPARROW, supra note 68, at 229.
178. Historic and foreign relations contexts have intimately characterized the legal sta-
tus of the base. This became evident in U.S. legal debates about the base after Cuba's
revolutionary government came into power in the early 1960s. See generally Robert L.
Montague, III., A Brief Study of Some of the International Legal and Political Aspects of the
Guantdnamo Bay Problem, 50 Ky. L.J. 459, 470-71 (1962) (examining the lease's legality in
light of President Fidel Castro's public position on the base and legal understandings from
prior U.S.-Cuba relations and international legal practices (e.g., in customary law and the
United Nations agreements)); Joseph Lazar, International Legal Status of Guantdnamo
Bay, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 730, 730-740 (1968) (describing foreign relations history and rele-
vant international legal agreements and practices to argue that the American right to hold
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global context in which after 1898, the United States became a world
power with economic, military, and territorial objectives in Asia, Europe,
and throughout the Western Hemisphere. 179 The second context is spe-
cific to U.S.-Cuba relations, wherein the United States helped eliminate
Spanish rule in 1898 and then became Cuba's protector until 1934.180
Applied in both contexts, four objectives framed U.S. legal approaches
to overseas influence. 181 First, the United States tried to avoid de jure
sovereign control when exercising authority overseas. 182 Second, it de-
nied many incidents of sovereignty to foreign states. 183 Third, over terri-
torial possessions, it excluded constitutional rights protections and
limitations to U.S. political authority.' 84 Fourth, it adamantly tried to
protect overseas economic and political interests. 185 These four objec-
tives framed how the United States determined its legal obligations, def-
erence, and rights for foreign states and nationals. This Part describes
these objectives as they are relevant to Cuba's independence, protector-
ate status, and the leasing of base territory. These objectives also frame
how recent detention disputes have been resolved. This Part describes
how these objectives illuminate how Guantinamo's legal anomaly, from
its genesis, benefited U.S. foreign relations goals. 186
on to the base arises from the right to occupy Cuba provided in the Treaty of Paris of
1898); Gary L. Maris, Guantdnamo: No Rights of Occupancy, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 114, 115-
16 (1969) (questioning the right of occupation as a basis to have jurisdiction over the base,
arguing that agreements and the Platt Amendment provide for base occupation, and
doubting that Latin American international lawyers or members of the international com-
munity recognize the right of occupation).
179. See generally Cleveland, supra note 143, at 83-87 (arguing that the development of
plenary powers over foreign relations in constitutional law was an effort to make the
United States more competitive in global affairs); LaFeber, The "Lion in the Path," supra
note 162; LaFeber, The Constitution and United States Foreign Policy, supra note 162; Peter
J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIo ST. L.J. 649, 649-54
(discussing how constitutional law doctrine was developed for historic foreign relations
contexts and how present globalized and inter-dependent foreign relations contexts suggest
the need for changing these legal assumptions).
180. See generally Louis A. PI REZ JR., CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES: TIES OF SIN-
GULAR INTIMACY 96 (1997); SCHOONOVER, supra note 88; Louis A. PPREZ JR., CUBA
UNDER THE PLATT AMENDMENT: 1902-1934 (1986); LaFeber, The American Search for
Opportunity, supra note 161.
181. For a description of how the Platt Amendment's intervention provisions were part
of a regional policy to minimize security threats to the United States, especially to the
Panama Canal after 1902, and to maintain the independence of regional states, see A Car-
ibbean Policy for the United States, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 886, 888-89 (1914).
182. See infra Part III.A (describing how the United States avoided sovereign control
over Cuba with the Treaty of Paris, that this was domestically confirmed in the Teller
Amendment, and that the U.S. policy in the region was to avoid sovereign control abroad).
183. See infra Part III.B (describing how the Platt Amendment denied Cuba various
sovereign powers and how the U.S. also intervened in or took over custom operations in
various Latin American states).
184. See supra Part II.C. (discussing how the Incorporation Doctrine excluded many
constitutional provisions from application overseas).
185. See generally LAFEBER, supra note 109; LaFeber, The American Search for Oppor-
tunity, supra note 161; LaFeber, supra note 87; Johnston, supra note 104.
186. LaFeber argues that the United States regarded its control of Guantdnamo as it
did its control of Hawai'i or the Philippines, i.e. "as [a] strategic means" to protect eco-
nomic objectives. See LAFEBER, supra note 109, at 411.
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Early twentieth century U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean and Cen-
tral America included military intervention, territorial acquisition, terri-
torial lease agreements, and commercial treaties, and involved controlling
foreign states' customs operations, settling sovereign debts (diplomati-
cally and militarily), seeking a Pacific-Atlantic Ocean canal, protecting
geopolitical and economic interests from European and host country in-
terests, establishing protectorate relationships, and acquiring naval and
coaling stations overseas. 187 States as diverse as Colombia, Costa Rica,
the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Ven-
ezuela, the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico, and the (previously Danish)
Virgin Islands faced these legal practices. 188 Important to this context,
Guantinamo served as a starting point or support station for military in-
terventions in Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. 89 In the
mid-nineteenth century, U.S. interests in the region were to counter Eu-
ropean colonization or intervention. 190 Later, and quite obviously by
1898, the United States developed tangible economic objectives in the
region, inspiring increased overseas activity.' 91
In international law terms, these policies interfered in the sovereign
affairs of foreign states. The most egregious were multiple military inter-
ventions overseas. U.S. policy also included various protectorate rela-
tionships and the taking over of customs collection operations, which
tempered another state's sovereignty.' 92 In terms of U.S. law, these poli-
cies tried to avoid limits to executive power and individual rights protec-
tions overseas. 193 During this period, the executive branch gained
increasing deference, at the expense of congressional influence, in foreign
relations. 194 Protectorate and base arrangements characterized U.S.-
Cuba relations with the Platt Amendment and Guantinamo with lease
187. See Johnston, supra note 104, at 45; Smith, supra note 2, at 96-97; GRANDIN supra
note 103.
188. See Smith, supra note 2, at 92-94.
189. See MARION E. MURPHY, THE HISTORY OF GUANTANAMO BAY 1494-1964, at chs.
4, 8 (U.S. Navy 1964) (1953), available at https://www.cnic.navy.mil/Guantanamo/
AboutGTMO/gtmohistgeneral/gtmohistmurphy/gtmohistmurphyvoll/gtmohistmurphyvoll
index (follow hyperlink to Chapters 4 and 8).
190. LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, supra note 161, at 15.
191. As early as 1846, the United States had negotiated a treaty with Colombia seeking
to guarantee rights of transit across the Panamanian isthmus. Smith, supra note 2, at 86.
192. In addition to being the Cuban protector (1902-1934) and possessing Puerto Rico
since 1898, U.S. presence (with varying legal justifications and legal arrangements) in Cen-
tral American and the Caribbean included: occupying Haiti from 1915 to 1934; occupying
the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924 and controlling customs operations from 1905
to 1940; purchasing the U.S. Virgin Island from Denmark in 1916; making Panama a pro-
tectorate from 1903 to 1939; leasing the Panama Canal Zone in 1903; occupying Nicaragua
from 1912 to 1933 and obtaining right for a canal 1916; intervening in Honduras in 1907,
1911, and 1924; and occupying Mexico of Veracruz in 1914 and the Pershing intervention-
ary expedition of 1916 to 1917. See LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, supra
note 161, at 150; Smith, supra note 2, at 94.
193. LaFeber, The "Lion in the Path," supra note 162, at 711; LeFeber, The Constitution





The base is not only located on Cuban soil, but its legal anomaly is a
product of determinations made in U.S. law concerning Cuba since 1898.
This starts with Cuba's independence from Spain and proceeds to the cur-
rent state of suspended diplomatic recognition between Cuba and the
United States since 1961.196 This Part describes how these factors devel-
oped during: a) Cuba's independence from Spain in 1898 and America's
late military involvement in this; b) a protectorate relationship between
the United States and Cuba from 1902 to 1934, legally crafted by the Platt
Amendment in 1901; and c) lease agreements for the naval station at
Guantinamo, providing the United States "complete jurisdiction and
control," but non-sovereign control, in 1903;197 and indefinite occupation
195. See infra part IIIB.
196. The U.S. occupation of the base, pursuant to the 1903 Lease and the 1934 Treaty,
continues to be contested by Cuba. Since 1960, Cuba does not cash the checks that the
United States provides each year in the amount of $4,085 for the lease. See Kaplan, supra
note 41, at 244; Kathleen T. Rhem, Guantdnamo Bay Base Has Storied Past, ARMED
FORCES PRESS SERVICES (Aug. 24, 2004), www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=
25469; Michael Strauss, Guantcnamo Bay and the Evolution of International Leases and
Servitudes, 10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 479, 505-06 (2006) (describing how the lease payments
increased in amount after 1934, how the United States continues to send checks each year
from its interests section in Havana that are not cashed and which state that the checks are
only valid for one year). Since ruptures in U.S.-Cuban relations, the base has been sur-
rounded by the "largest mine field in the world," cut off from Cuban water treatment
services, and faces stationed Cuban guards. See Wayne S. Smith, The Base from the U.S.
Perspective, in SUBJECT TO SOLUTION: PROBLEMS IN CUBAN-U.S. RELATIONS, at 97, 98-99
(Wayne S. Smith & Esteban Morales Dominguez eds., 1988). Both currently and during
the Cold War, the base serves a symbolic, political, and spying purpose, as opposed to
having any real military purpose, since most strategic operations have been moved away
from this base and Cuba's military could not realistically withstand U.S. military power in
the Caribbean or from the mainland. See, e.g., Rafael Hern~ndez Rodriguez, Cuba's Na-
tional Security and the Question of the Guantdnamo Naval Base, in SUBJECT TO SOLUTION,
supra, at 102, 107-08. Cuba, both historically and currently, continues to voice its protest,
stating that the base is illegally on Cuban territory and that prior agreements are void. See
generally Smith, supra, at 97 (stating the Cuban case that the Platt Amendment and 1934
Treaty were forced on Cuba and the base is on Cuban sovereign territory and is a possible
site to launch an attack against Cuba). Rodriguez, supra, at 108-10 (arguing that the base is
an outgrowth of the interventionistic Platt Amendment process and contradicts Cuba's
sovereignty); Montague, supra note 178, at 471-75; Lazar, supra note 178, at 730; Maris,
supra note 178, at 115 (presenting the international law concerns of base occupation in
light of Cuba's revolution in 1959); Cubanembassy.net, Cuba-U.S. Relations: The Modern
Version of David and Goliath, www.cubanembassy.net/documents/421ED7DCE04B653B
73642071F896650B2BC8B238.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2009) (presenting the argument
that the base violates Articles 4 and 52 of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties); Strauss, supra, at 504 (stating that the Cuban policy of publicly claiming the base
is illegal but not initiating any legal proceedings or making return a high priority is due to
diplomatic concerns and limited legal arguments); Felipe P6rez Roque, Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, Statement at the High-Level Segment of U.N. Human
Rights Council (June 20, 2006), www.cubaminrex.cu/english/Speeches/FPR/2006/FPR_2006
06i.htm (referring to the base as "concentration camp" and "an act of war and propa-
ganda"); Felipe Perez Roque, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, State-
ment to the Local and Foreign media, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Dec. 10, 2007),
embacu.cubaminrex.cu/Default.aspx?tabid=5604 (demanding the "torture center" at
Guantnamo immediately close since it is "cruel, inhumane and degrading" and occupied
illegally). See also infra Part III.C.
197. U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 10.
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with a 1934 treaty. 198
These developments occurred in history, but they frame the conceptual
boundaries of the base's current legal anomaly. This anomaly rests be-
tween determinations in international and constitutional law that sover-
eignty is flexibly interpreted, constitutional rights protections may be
excluded, and the United States exercises overwhelming, if not complete,
authority at this overseas location.199 These developments illustrate the
post-colonial legal condition that prior practices of informal empire (i.e.,
limited state independence, protectorate arrangements, and overseas ba-
ses) influence how the law is currently applied and conceived. Put sim-
ply, legal doctrine established as the United States became a foreign
relations power in the Western Hemisphere after 1898 provided the
United States, as argued by the Bush Administration, with the flexibility
to detain and interrogate enemy combatants from mostly non-Western
countries on Cuban soil for an indefinite period.
A. DANCING AROUND CUBAN SOVEREIGNTY, THE UNITED STATES
ENTERS WAR AND PEACE IN 1898
The American occupation of Guantdnamo is a by-product of the long
and complex process of Cuba's independence from Spanish rule. United
States Marines first landed on Guantdnamo on June 10, 1898, to fight
Spanish troops for one month.200 Guiding the campaign against Spain,
U.S. objectives were to avoid sovereign control but retain influence over
Cuba, while protecting strategic and economic interests on the island and
in the Caribbean. 201 U.S. interests in the region were expanding in inten-
sity and scope with diplomacy and overseas investments. By 1902, Con-
gress eagerly supported prospects for an Atlantic-Pacific Ocean Canal in
198. Agreement Between the United States of America and Cuba for the Lease of
Coaling or Naval Stations, U.S.-Cuba, July 2, 1903, available at avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_
century/dip-cuba003.asp [hereinafter, U.S.-Cuba July 1903 Lease]; see also Smith, supra
note 196, at 97.
199. The anomalous quality of the base, between Cuban sovereignty and U.S. control
and jurisdiction, became evident during refugee detention in the early 1990s. See also
JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR
142-43 (2006) (explaining how court decisions on rights for refugees detained on the base
suggested habeas jurisdiction would not extend to Guantfnamo); see also Philbin & Yoo
Memo, supra note 12 (presenting how jurisdictional determinations from earlier refugee
detention policy were vital to War on Terror detention policies).
200. Library of Congress: American Memory, Today in History: June 10, http://mem-
ory.loc.gov/ammem/today/Junl0.html (last visited Jun. 30, 2008). Former base Commander
Marion E. Murphy describes the U.S.-Spain battle over Guantgnamo and how U.S. troops
invaded Puerto Rico from there. See MURPHY, supra note 189, at ch. 2.
201. See Joint Resolution for the Recognition of the Independence of the People of
Cuba, Demanding That the Government of Spain Relinquish Its Authority and Govern-
ment in the Island of Cuba, and to Withdraw Its Land and Naval Forces from Cuba and
Cuban Waters, and Directing the President of the United States to Use the Land and
Naval Forces of the United States to Carry These Resolutions into Effect, J. Res 24, 55th
Cong, 2d Sess. (Apr. 20, 1898), in 30 Stat. 738, 739 (1899) [hereinafter Teller Amendment];
PPREZ, TIES OF SINGULAR INTIMACY, supra note 180, at 96; PIREZ, CUBA UNDER THE
PLATr AMENDMENT, supra note 180, at 42.
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Panama, which became a prime regional concern for the United States. 202
It could protect access to a canal and regional markets with influence
over Cuba and a base on the eastern end of the island.
The U.S. military campaign of the "Spanish-American War," with
Cubans and Americans fighting against Spain, started in April of 1898
and ended quickly by August. These five months provide the chronology
of U.S. military involvement in Cuban independence. 20 3 Cubans, though,
had been involved in resilient, highly violent, and fractured military con-
tests against Spain since the 1860s.204 These movements sought political
and economic reforms and/or independence from Spain, amid a context
where many elites feared an end to slavery and its consequential animos-
ity and economic ruptures.20 5 Cubans were nearly victorious in attaining
independence in the "Ten Years' War" (1868-1878).206 This severely dis-
rupted Cuba's economy, eliminating a great deal of the landed aristoc-
racy's power which opened opportunities for U.S. investments. 20 7 A
second war for independence began in 1895, during which the United
States provided military and diplomatic leverage in the last five months to
secure Cuba's independence from Spain in 1898.208 Historians have more
appropriately called it the "Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War," sug-
gesting the multinational participation and global scope of the War and
rejecting its bilateral characterization of a "Spanish-American" war.209
In Spain, it is called "el desastre del 98" (disaster of '98) or "la Guerra de
Cuba" (War for Cuba).210
Congressional debates leading to the declaration of war and a peace
treaty with Spain illustrate the U.S. goal of avoiding sovereign control
over Cuba. Despite this hands-off approach to de jure sovereignty, the
United States carved legal space for itself to heavily influence events in
Cuba.21' In foreign relations terms, the War elucidated an obvious shift
away from U.S. neutrality in global affairs, which had characterized a
great deal of its foreign policy regarding European and Western Hemi-
202. See Woolsey, supra note 34, at 534; SMITH, supra note 2, at 86.
203. During most of the Cuban independence struggle, the United States maintained a
policy of strict neutrality that benefited Spain and denied diplomatic recognition to Cuban
leadership. See Luis E. Aguilar, Cuba c. 1860-1940, in V THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
LATIN AMERICA 229, 234 (Leslie Bethell ed., 1984).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 233.
206. Id.
207. LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, supra note 161, at 129-130.
208. See Aguilar, supra note 203, at 242-246; LaFeber, The American Search for Oppor-
tunity, supra note 161, at 140-44.
209. Thomas G. Paterson, U.S. Intervention in Cuba, 1898: Interpreting the Spanish-
American-Cuban-Filipino War, 12 OAH MAG. HIST. 5 (1998).
210. For a description of how Spanish historiography interprets the War, see generally
Sylvia L. Hilton, Democracy Beats the "Disaster" Complex: Spanish Interpretations of the
Colonial Crisis, 12 OAH MAG. HIST, 11-17 (1998).
211. This is evidenced by the 1903 Reciprocal Treaty, U.S. occupation, and the Platt
Amendment.
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sphere events. 212 Out of this history of neutrality, the United States was
reluctant to have sovereign control over Cuba.213
After years of debate to declare war or not, with the last months being
the most intense following failed attempts to purchase Cuba from Spain,
President McKinley, in April 1898, asked Congress to declare war on
Spain.214 Dim domestic economic prospects, insufficient market demand
for industrialized products, high sugar prices, and investments in the pre-
viously profitable Spanish colony of Cuba motivated U.S. involvement. 21 5
Congress included President McKinley's objective to not recognize an in-
dependent Cuban state and to disclaim any sovereignty over Cuba.216
The United States would participate in the war and peace process, as op-
posed to recognizing an independent Cuban nation first. In a resolution
introduced by Representative Henry M. Teller (called the Teller Amend-
ment), Congress declared that the United States "disclaims any disposi-
tion to exercise sovereignty, or control" over Cuba "when that is
accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its
people" and that "the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought
to be, free and independent. '217 After suffering a humiliating defeat on
July third in Cuba and similar losses in the Philippines, Spanish forces
surrendered to the United States.2 1
8
On December 10, 1898 in Paris, Spanish and U.S. representatives
signed a peace treaty, providing the United States with territories in ei-
ther sovereign control or in military occupation.21 9 Cuban representa-
tives did not participate in discussion of the treaty terms.220 In Article I,
the Treaty provided that "Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over
and title to Cuba" and the United States shall occupy the island with
obligations under international law "for the protection of life and prop-
erty." 22l In Article II and III, it ceded the Philippines, Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Mariana Islands to the United States.22 2
This cessation resulted in the United States having territorial posses-
sions over which it maintained sovereignty but of which it did not intend
212. See generally LaFeber, The American Search for Opportunity, supra note 161;
Johnston, supra note 104.
213. Aguilar, supra note 203, at 234.
214. PtREZ, TIES OF SINGULAR INTIMACY, supra note 180, at 94.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 95-96.
217. Representative Teller intended to protect the beet-sugar industry in his constitu-
ency, thus favoring not annexing or incorporating Cuba. See LaFeber, The American
Search for Opportunity, supra note 161. The Teller Amendment was added to the resolu-
tion declaring Spanish-American War. See Teller Amendment, supra note 201.
218. Aguilar, supra note 203, at 244.
219. Id.
220. Id. For an analysis of how by denying citizenship this treaty differed from the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, made with Mexico in 1848, and prior territorial expansions,
see RICHARD DELGADO ET AL., LATINOS AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 49-51
(2008).
221. See Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of
Spain, supra note 48, art. I.
222. Id. art. II-III.
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to make states in the Union. Because these possessions had sovereign
authority but not statehood, the legal controversies in the Insular Cases
arose, which attempted to generally resolve questions about what legal
norms applied to territories within U.S. sovereignty but not incorporated
as states into the Union.2 23 Cuba, though, was firmly regarded under
U.S. law as independent, not to be annexed or incorporated. Congres-
sional resolution, executive objectives, international treaty negotiation,
and even the Supreme Court affirmed Cuba's formal independence.22 4
B. AVOIDING SOVEREIGNTY, THE PLATr AMENDMENT MAKES CUBA
A PROTECTORATE AND PROVIDES A BASE AT GUANTANAMO
The American occupation of the base at Guantinamo began with the
Platt Amendment, which was initially conceptualized in 1901 by U.S. Sec-
retary of War Elihu Root.2 25 It was included in congressional military
appropriations for 1902.226 Senator Orville Platt of Connecticut intro-
duced the bill, providing for its common reference as the "Platt Amend-
ment. '227 The Amendment has been extremely controversial in Cuban,
Latin American, and international law debates, because it secured for the
United States a "right to intervene" in the independent state of Cuba.228
It also initiated the United States move to legally occupy bases in
Cuba.229 The Amendment was not limited to just military appropria-
tions; instead its provisions were also included in Cuba's Constitution of
1901 and in a 1902 Treaty between Cuba and the United States.230 For
this reason, this Article refers to it as the "Amendment" (for the sake of
simplicity) or as the "Amendment process" (to highlight its inclusion in
American, Cuban, and international law). Importantly, the Amendment
served U.S. goals by avoiding sovereignty over Cuba (i.e., it was not an-
nexed or made a colony) and providing Cubans formal independence
from Spain. It secured naval bases to patrol U.S. interests in the Carib-
223. See supra Part II.C.
224. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 120-25 (1901) (holding that Cuba was a foreign
state even under U.S. occupation and approving extradition from Cuba).
225. P8REZ, CUBA UNDER THE PLATr AMENDMENT, supra note 180, at 45.
226. Platt Amendment - U.S appropriations, supra note 15, at 898.
227. PE REZ, CUBA UNDER THE PLATr AMENDMENT, supra note 180, at 47.
228. James H. Hictman, The Platt Amendment Revisited: A Bibliographical Survey, 33
AMERICAS 343, 344 (1967) (providing a thorough, but now dated, review of historical and
scholarly treatments of the Amendment from both U.S. and Cuban perspectives).
229. Specifically, Article III of the military appropriations bill stated "Cuba consents
that the United States may exercise a right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban
independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, prop-
erty, and individual liberty .... Article VII stated so that the United States could maintain
Cuban independence, protect the people of Cuba, and for American defense, "Cuba[would] sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at
certain specified points to be agreed upon with the President of the United States." Platt
Amendment-U.S appropriations, supra note 15, § VII.
230. See DAVID HEALY, DRIVE TO HEGEMONY 54 (1988); PtREZ, CUBA UNDER THE
PLATr AMENDMENT, supra note 180, at 42-47; Pedro Cap6-Rodrfguez, The Platt Amend-
ment, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 761 (1923); The Origin and Purpose of the Platt Amendment, 8
AM. J. INT'L LAW 565, 586 (1914).
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bean and recognized a "right of [ ] intervention" in case the Cuban gov-
ernment could not fully protect U.S. investments. 231 Because base
occupation developed from the Amendment process and because the
Amendment's normative objectives (in American, international, and Cu-
ban law) permitted U.S. foreign policy flexibility, an examination of the
Amendment's legacy illuminates how anomaly influences current deten-
tion on the base.
Central to this comparison between current legal anomaly and events
in legal history is the identification of the importance the Amendment
played in the early Cuban republic. Here, historian Louis P6rez's exten-
sive work on Cuba-U.S relations, the Platt Amendment, and Cuban na-
tional identity is extremely illuminating. In his book Cuba Under the
Platt Amendment: 1902-1934, P6rez shows how the Amendment renewed
elements of a colonial system between the United States and Cuba, while
Cuba remained formally independent. 232 Serving as effective conditions
for this independence, these elements include ceding territory for U.S.
bases, limiting Cuba's sovereign power over foreign relations, and author-
izing a right of intervention for the United States.2 33 The Amendment
explicitly articulated these control measures. It provided a substitute for
a formal colonial arrangement. 234 These elements set public legal obliga-
tions for the United States and Cuba while opening a path for massive
U.S. investment in Cuba's economy. P6rez builds on these insights in
Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy to show how the
United States considered Cuba essential to its political and military secur-
ity after 1898 and how, for Cuba, the United States was vital to its inde-
pendence. 235 This "singular intimacy" was institutionalized with the
Amendment measures, which protected U.S. control and economic inter-
ests and Cuban independence in its "truncated" form.2 36 Their long-term
effect was a "duality of pervasive ambivalence" between the United
States and Cuba, but especially amongst Cubans. 237 This facilitated a
long-term negotiation of competing political values between the United
States and Cuba regarding the rights of intervention and state indepen-
dence, respectively. 238 P6rez argues that this created "dilemmas of prox-
imity" to the United States for Cuban identity.2 39 From these insights,
this Article builds on the historic ambiguity and anomaly regarding U.S.
control, sovereignty over Cuban territory, and Cuban independence.
231. LAFEBER, supra note 109, at 416.
232. P1tREZ, CUBA UNDER THE PLATT AMENDMENT, supra note 180, at 45.
233. Id.
234. See generally LAFEBER, supra note 109; Johnston, supra note 104; Smith, supra
note 2, at 17.
235. PREZ, TIES OF SINGULAR INTIMACY, supra note 180, at xvi.
236. The terms "singular intimacy" refer to President William McKinley's State of the
Union from December 5, 1899, where he stated that "new Cuba" is bound to the United
States by "ties of singular intimacy" and that Cuba's destiny is "irrevocably linked" to U.S.
destiny. Id. at ix, xvii.
237. Id.




The Amendment was conceptualized in 1901, three years after occupa-
tion had become a "burden and annoyance," costing over half a million
dollars a month. 240 Occupation became an increasing political liability in
Washington. 241 The Amendment was devised to create circumstances
and legal guarantees to end occupation. 242 Its goals provided the United
States influence over Cuba and protected investments without annexing
Cuba or retaining sovereignty.243 Secretary Root outlined the majority of
the Amendment's provisions in a letter to Secretary of State John Hay on
January 21, 1901.244 He presented the Amendment as an extension of the
Monroe Doctrine, i.e. as justified by international law.245 This decision
was to have an "international basis for stepping in to protect Cuba with-
out appearing to be the state which was butting in."'246 Root took inspira-
tion from England's protectorate relationship with Egypt, with England
able "to retire and still maintain her moral control. '247
The Amendment provided the United States with flexible control, or
what this Article refers to as "ambivalence[ ] in the rule of law."'248 It
provided more flexibility and control for U.S. foreign policy than the al-
ternatives of negotiating a treaty with Cuba after occupation (which
would be subject to the Senate's two-thirds approval and Cuban influ-
ence) or continuing with congressional approvals via resolutions or ap-
propriation bills.249 Instead, the Amendment was imposed on Cuba.250
Root's letter suggested four provisions. He emphasized that the United
States must have a right of intervention in Cuba; deny Cuba the power to
enter into treaties with other states; acquire land for bases on Cuban soil;
and preserve all rights and actions of the occupation. 25'
Senator Platt introduced it as an amendment to the Army Appropria-
tions Act of March 2, 1901.252 Congress approved it. It contained eight
articles and referred to the declaration of war seeking Cuba's indepen-
dence from Spain.25 3 Amendment Articles 1, 11, and III limited Cuba's
240. PI8REZ, CUBA UNDER THE PLATT AMENDMENT, supra note 180, at 44.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Cuba was formally independent, as opposed to Puerto Rico or the Philippines
which were within U.S. sovereign control. Id.
244. Id. See also The Origin and Purpose of the Platt Amendment, supra note 230.
245. P8REZ, CUBA UNDER THE PLATT AMENDMENT, supra note 180, at 45; see also
Altunaga, supra note 34, at 925-926 (describing the Amendment as "embrac[ing]" the
Monroe Doctrine).
246. P8REZ, CUBA UNDER THE PLAT AMENDMENT, supra note 180, at 45 (quoting Mr.
Root from correspondence with Philip Jessup from October 28, 1935).
247. Id. at 46 (referring to the January 11, 1901 letter from Secretary Root to Secretary
Hay); see also Lejune Cummins, The Formulation of the "Platt Amendment," 23 AMERI-
CAS, 370, 381 (1967) (describing Secretary Root's inspiration for the Amendment from
English intervention in Egypt).
248. See supra Part II.A. (referring to Fiztpatrick and Darian-Smith's "ambivalences in
the rule of law").
249. P8REZ, CUBA UNDER THE PLAT AMENDMENT, supra note 180, at 46.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 45-46.
252. See generally Platt Amendment-U.S. appropriations, supra note 15.
253. Id.
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international sovereignty as an independent state.254 Most political and
international controversy of the period focused on these provisions. Arti-
cle I stated Cuba "shall never" enter into a treaty or agreement with "any
foreign power" which will "impair" Cuban independence, nor may Cuba
permit any foreign power to colonize, control, or occupy any portion of
the island for military, naval, or other purposes. 255 Article II limited
Cuba from assuming public debt for which "ordinary revenues of the is-
land" after expense would be "inadequate. '256 In Article III, Cuba con-
sented that the United States "may exercise the right to intervene" to
preserve Cuban independence, maintain a government able to protect
"life, property and individual liberty," and discharge Treaty of Paris obli-
gations.257 All three of these curtailed Cuba's sovereign powers of for-
eign relations and self-defense. 258
Article IV maintained rights and acts of the U.S. military occupation
since 1898.259 Article V and VI (not included in the Root letter) required
that Cuba implement sanitation and infectious disease prevention plans
and put off for future determination whether the Isle of Pines would be
part of Cuba, respectively. 260 Eventually leading to the base at Guantd-
namo, Article VII required that Cuba "sell or lease" to the United States
lands necessary for coaling or naval stations.261 Article VIII stipulated
the prior provisions be included in a "permanent treaty" with the United
States.262
These Amendment provisions provided the United States with over-
whelming influence over Cuba without having a formal colonial relation-
ship. Most visible was the right of intervention and limitations on Cuba's
foreign relations. In terms of solidifying these U.S. objectives, the
Amendment required that these terms be included in a treaty which
would govern relations between the two states.2 63 The provisions regard-
ing the bases and public debt provided the United States with security in
a context beyond Cuba. A fear was that if Cuba were to default on its
debt, a European force may invade Cuba, which would threaten U.S. se-
curity.264 It would also protect Cuban independence from European
254. See id. art. II-III.
255. Id. art. I.
256. Id. art. II.
257. Id. art. III.
258. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 201 (1987) (defining a "state" under international law as an entity that "has a defined
territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that
engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities").
259. See Platt Amendment-U.S. appropriations, supra note 15, art. IV.
260. Id. art. VI-VII.
261. Id. art. VII.
262. Id. art. VIII.
263. Id. art. VIII. This treaty became Treaty Between the United States and Cuba Em-
bodying the Provisions Defining the Future Relations of the United States with Cuba,
U.S.-Cuba, May 22, 1903, 33 Stat. 2248.
264. See generally Cap6-Rodrfguez, supra note 230, at 761-65 (describing the Cuban
need for the Amendment and providing Secretary Root's descriptions of its strategic im-
portance for the U.S.).
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powers. During the nineteenth century, on multiple occasions French,
English, and/or Spanish forces invaded various Caribbean, Central Amer-
ican, and South American states to collect debts, protect investments, or
protect their nationals. 265 This aspect of the Amendment can be seen as
the United States seeking to protect Cuban independence and/or its eco-
nomic interests in Cuba.
The Amendment's Article VII explicitly mentions territories for bases,
eventually resulting in occupation of the naval station at Guant~inamo.2 66
This was implemented with lease agreements in 1903.267 The Amend-
ment, though, taken as a whole, was an effort to exert non-sovereign con-
trol over Cuba and protect U.S. interests. American interests were
economic and immediate in Cuba and were concerned with both Euro-
pean intervention in the Western Hemisphere and increasing U.S. influ-
ence in the Hemisphere.
The Amendment denied Cuba important incidents to sovereignty that
a free state or fully-sovereign state would enjoy.2 68 U.S. pressure pro-
ceeded to include the Amendment provisions in the Cuban Constitution
and the 1903 Lease between the United States and Cuba.269 Cuba's Con-
stitutional Assembly convened on June 5, 1900, before the Amendment
was conceived by U.S. authorities.270 The Constitution went into force on
May 20, 1902, with the Platt Amendment provisions included in its ap-
pendix.271 On May 22, 1903, the United States and Cuba agreed to a
treaty which also included the Platt Amendment provisions.2 72
Cubans resisted adapting U.S. law on military occupation, i.e., the
Amendment, into Cuban law.273 For many Cubans, independence in the
international system meant not having Cuban sovereignty mitigated by
U.S. objectives. In this case, the United States interfered with sovereign
power regarding Cuba's public debt; Cuban domestic affairs, with a "right
of intervention;" Cuba's foreign relations power, with limitations on
treaty making; and U.S. bases on Cuban soil. Basic notions of sover-
265. For a description of how these repeated intervention experiences were influential
in the development of the norm of non-intervention in international law, for example, the
Calvo, Drago, and other doctrines, see generally ANN VAN WYNEN THOMAS & AARON J.
THOMAS, NON-INTERVENTION: THE LAW AND ITS IMPORT IN THE AMERICAS 10 (1956).
266. Platt Amendment-U.S. Appropriations, supra note 15, art. VII.
267. U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 10; U.S.-Cuba July 1903 Lease, supra note
198.
268. See Altunaga, supra note 34, at 925-27 (presenting how the Amendment conflicts
with Cuba's independence and reviewing Cuba's stable politics to date).
269. See Platt Amendment-U.S. Appropriations, supra note 15, art VIII; see also
Treaty Establishing Relations with Cuba, U.S-Cuba, May 22, 1903-July 2, 1904, 6 Bevans
1116, 1116-19 (abrogated June 9, 1934, by Treaty of May 29, 1934).
270. Cosine de ]a Torriente, The Platt Amendment, 8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 364, 366 (1930).
271. The Origin and Purpose of the Platt Amendment, supra note 230, at 586.
272. Id.
273. Cuba was able to resist some of the American impositions in exchange for some of
its independent objectives. For instance, the United States relinquished claims to the Isle
of Pines, which had been left legally unsettled with respect to claims by the United States
or Cuba in 1898 and 1901, in exchange for Cuba providing leases for coaling and naval
stations. See James Brown Scott, The Isle of Pines, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 102, 103 (1923).
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eignty means that a state controls its own foreign relations and domestic
affairs, without foreign military on domestic soil and without foreign
powers legally permitted to intervene. Cuban concerns about full sover-
eignty stemmed from the violent struggle for independence for forty
years before U.S. entry and by U.S. notions of cultural superiority to
Cuba's mixed-race, non-Protestant population.
In charge of the military occupation of Cuba, U.S. Military Governor
Leonard Wood had the difficult task of presenting the Amendment re-
quirements to the Constitutional Assembly.274 Delegates did not like the
initial descriptions of the provisions. Wood reported that they were
"emotional and hysterical" and felt the provisions were "reflections upon
their ability to govern themselves, and what they regard as limitation on
sovereignty. '275
On April 3, Governor Wood explained to the Assembly the purpose of
the Platt Amendment provisions.276 Many delegates did not want to in-
clude the provisions on public debt, right of intervention, the Isle of
Pines, or the bases in the Constitution. 277 These provisions limited
Cuba's sovereignty and guaranteed these limitations would be law. Faced
with this criticism, Secretary Root provided Governor Wood with the ex-
planation that the intervention was not "intermeddling or interference"
in Cuban government, but that it was to preserve Cuban independence,
maintain an adequate government to protect "life, property and individ-
ual liberty," and to discharge obligations imposed on the United States by
the Treaty of Paris. 278 Later that month, a group of Assembly delegates
traveled to Washington and met with President Theodore Roosevelt, Sec-
retary Root, members of the Cabinet, and Congress.279 U.S. officials pro-
vided a narrow interpretation, stressing the limited nature of intervention
as not meddling in Cuban affairs and protecting Cuba from European
aggression.280 On June 12, the Assembly voted seventeen to eleven to
incorporate the Amendment as an appendix to the Constitution.2 8'
Viewed simply, with determinations in American, Cuban, and interna-
tional law, the Amendment sanctioned the United States' occupation of
bases on Cuban soil.
Historical analysis of Cuban politics shows the Amendment was an
enormous destabilizing force for Cuban democracy. 282 It created a con-
stant threat of U.S. intervention. Likewise it created an incentive for
Cubans to see the United States as an overseer or guardian.283 Domestic
274. Id.
275. Id. at 101 (detailing communications between Governor Wood and Secretary Root
during February and March of 1901).
276. See de la Torriente, supra note 270, at 368.
277. Id.
278. See id. (quoting a telegram from Secretary Root to Wood).
279. Id. at 368.
280. Id. at 370.
281. Id. at 369.
282. PEREZ, CUBA UNDER THE PLATr AMENDMENT, supra note 180, at 53.
283. See Woolsey, supra note 34, at 533.
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decisions on Cuban debt and foreign relations were legally tied to the
objectives of partisan U.S. politics in Congress, foreign policy lead by the
U.S. President, and a foreign country representing different cultural atti-
tudes on religion, "civilization," and expanding international economic
interests.2 84 Ultimately, the United States did intervene in Cuba with
military occupation from 1906 to 1909,285 with troops combating domestic
insurrection in 1912 and 1917, troops stationed in Cuba during World War
I, and a military presence seeking financial and political reforms during
1921 to 1923.286 Guantdnamo was used by U.S. troops for the 1906
occupation.2 87
The Amendment offered a legal basis in American, Cuban, and inter-
national law, for base occupation on Cuban soil. It directly led to the
United States occupying the base at Guantdnamo. But more concep-
tually, the Amendment reflected American legal objectives regarding
sovereignty. The United States avoided sovereignty over Cuba, but
Cuba's sovereignty was also mitigated. It applied key foreign relations
objectives to the base's legal context. This sowed the doctrinal seed for
the current legal anomaly. The Amendment reflected four objectives
concerning legal approaches to U.S.-Cuban relations. These are that the
United States avoids sovereign control, denies incidents of this control for
foreign states, avoids constitutional limitations in this overseas authority,
and protects strategic interests overseas. The Amendment provided the
United States with non-sovereign control over Cuba. Cuba remained for-
mally independent, but with its sovereignty checked. The Amendment
mitigated Cuba's sovereignty by taking away key foreign relations pow-
ers, such as the power to enter into treaties and to allow another state to
intervene militarily. The Amendment protected U.S. investments by pro-
viding the "right of intervention" and minimizing the risk of Cuban public
debt default.
Incidentally, the Platt Amendment avoided the complex constitutional
debates regarding U.S. territories such as Puerto Rico, where the United
States retained sovereignty, but did not incorporate the territories into
the Union. In other words, the Amendment provided control, but it did
not result in the protracted constitutional law debates evident in the Insu-
lar Cases.
284. Id. at 531-32.
285. See id. This intervention was legally defended by referring to the "right to inter-
vene" for "certain clear and well-defined purposes" in the Platt Amendment, similar provi-
sions in the Cuban Constitution of 1901, and the 1903 bilateral treaty. The Nature of the
Government of Cuba, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 149, 149-50 (1907).
286. See generally Woolsey, supra note 34.
287. MURPHY, supra note 189, at ch. 4.
[Vol. 62
Boumediene v. Bush and Guantinamo, Cuba
C. AGREEMENTS FRAME GUANTANAMO'S LEGAL ANOMALY,
PROVIDING THE UNITED STATES COMPLETE BUT
NON-SOVEREIGN CONTROL
Focusing on non-sovereign, but nearly unlimited, control for the
United States, three specific agreements detail the terms of occupancy for
the U.S. naval station at Guantinamo.28 8 These agreements still govern
U.S. occupation. 289 Products of early U.S.-Cuba relations, they paint how
jurisdiction and sovereignty are currently characterized on the base. As
"agreed to" by the United States and Cuba, these agreements include two
leases from 1903 and a treaty from 1934.290 The February 1903 Lease was
the United States' first venture into having an agreement on foreign terri-
tory to be used for U.S. military purposes. 291 Put generally, the 1903
Lease concerns two bases, the present one at Guantdnamo and one that
never came to fruition at Bahia Honda, and it describes both Cuba's "ul-
timate sovereignty" and the United States' "complete jurisdiction and
control" over the base territory.292 The agreement from July 1903 more
specifically addresses annual lease payments of "two thousand dollars, in
gold coin" by the United States and legal issues on the base regarding
custom duties and obligations to return fugitives to Cuban or to base ju-
risdiction.2 93 Reflecting the "good neighbor policy" towards Latin Amer-
ican states, the 1934 Treaty broadly abrogates the Reciprocal Treaty from
1903, containing the Platt Amendment's intervention, foreign relations,
and public debt provisions.294 Article III of the 1934 Treaty states that
the two lease agreements from 1903 regarding Guant~namo "shall con-
tinue in the same form and on the same conditions. '295 It then effectively
makes these lease terms indefinite by requiring one of two things to end
or modify occupation: (1) mutual agreement or (2) the United States
abandoning the base.296
These agreements carve out for the United States an anomalous legal
zone at Guanttnamo, which originally served foreign relations goals for
the early twentieth century, but now serves overseas detention goals. The
initial agreement states the United States has "complete jurisdiction and
control" and Cuba has "ultimate sovereignty. 2 97 Importantly, Article III
288. U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 10; U.S.-Cuba July 1903 Lease, supra note
198; U.S.-Cuba 1934 Treaty, supra note 39.
289. Murphy provides a detailed history of lease negotiations and their relation to the
Platt Amendment process. See MURPHY, supra note 189, at ch. 3.
290. Cuba has contested the validity of the agreements and the 1934 Treaty, referring to
the doctrine of "unequal treaties." See discussion Part III.B.
291. See Gary L. Maris, International Law and Guantdnamo, 29 J. POL. 261, 263 (1967).
292. U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 10, art. III. The United States quit pursu-
ing a base at Bahia Honda in exchange for an increase in the size of GuantAnamo's leased
territory. See de la Torriente, supra note 270, at 371; Strauss, supra note 196, at 497-98.
293. Lease to the United States by Cuba of Land and Water for Naval or Coaling Sta-
tions in Guant~namo and Bahia Honda, U.S-Cuba, Oct. 2, 1903, T.S. No. 426.
294. See Woolsey, supra note 34, at 530-34.





is drafted so that the United States "recognizes the continuance of the
ultimate sovereignty" belonging to Cuba.2 98 As such, the United States is
acknowledging Cuba's ultimate sovereignty and that Cuba's claim existed
then in 1903. Cuba is presented as having eventual sovereignty, and this
claim to what is eventual presently exists. The Article is far more specific
and speaks to present requirements regarding U.S. rights on the base.
The Article changes to describe what Cuba acknowledges. For these,
Cuba "consents," describing how it, as host, understands the rights be-
longing to the United States.2 99 Article III changes its reference to U.S.
rights and Cuban understanding with "on the other hand Cuba consents"
that during U.S. occupation under this agreement. 30 0 Accordingly, what
Cuba understands is the United States "shall exercise complete jurisdic-
tion and control" over the base territory. 30 1 In sum, the United States
"recognizes" Cuba's future sovereignty and that Cuba presently holds
this claim to something eventual while Cuba "consents" to what the
United States "shall exercise. '30 2
Recent jurisprudence on base detention refers to both "jurisdiction"
and "sovereignty," illustrating how contemporary legal reasoning ad-
dresses~historically created "ambivalences in the rule of law."'30 3 These
disputes decide whether U.S. jurisdiction permits or requires constitu-
tional limitations on the base.30 4 Similarly, these inquiries examine if sov-
ereignty, belonging to Cuba and/or denied to the United States, precludes
the base from limitations in constitutional or international law. These
two doctrinal concepts, jurisdiction versus sovereignty, cloud detention
litigation and reify the base's anomalous legal quality.
Taken in their entirety, the 1903 agreements are simple and do not ad-
dress many issues. They definitely do not refer to the controversies re-
garding individual rights protections in American or international law,
which have basically been at issue since the detentions began in 2002.
Importantly, the United States does not have a Status of Forces Agree-
ment (SOFA) regarding Guantinamo, as it does with most overseas ba-
ses.305 These agreements serve as references for courts to determine
what obligations and rights protections-in American, international, or
municipal law-apply on a base. With other overseas bases, the United
States and a host-state positively articulate in a SOFA what law governs






303. See supra Part II.B (referring to Fitzpatrick and Darian-Smith's "ambivalences in
the rule of law").
304. See supra notes 12-13 (describing how Rasul and Hamdan determine if the Consti-
tution applies on Guantinamo).
305. Neuman, Closing the Guantdnamo Loophole, supra note 51, at 39; Raustiala supra
note 35, at 2511-12 (describing the base at Guantinamo and until recently the bases in
Iraq as the only U.S. bases on foreign territory without a SOFA).
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state nationals. 30 6 A unique aspect of Guantanamo occupation is the ab-
sence of a SOFA.30 7 The United States occupied the base with informal
imperial control, when Cuba's consent or conditions were less important
to the United States. Interestingly, until recently the only other U.S.
overseas bases without a SOFA were in Iraq, which the United States
occupied from March 2003 to June 2004.308
The lack of a SOFA with Cuba coupled with the lack of diplomatic
relations between America and Cuba creates a complex situation wherein
occupation and a legal anomaly persist. Specifically, many of the legal
concerns of an overseas base (or of having a foreign base on domestic
territory) are left unanswered by any agreement. In a different scenario,
a SOFA may provide more guidance between lessor (Cuba) and lessee
(United States) and on how jurisdiction is characterized between Cuban,
American, and international law.
The February 1903 Lease first refers to the Platt Amendment provi-
sions, in U.S. appropriations and the Cuban Constitution, requiring Cuba
to "sell or lease lands necessary for coaling or naval stations. ' 30 9 It men-
tions that the base provides for the maintenance of Cuban independence,
protection for Cubans, and the United States' own defense. 310 In Article
I, it states that the duration of the lease is "for the time required for the
purposes."' 311 There is no further elaboration on this in either 1903 agree-
ment. In fact, the duration of base occupation is not addressed until the
1934 Treaty.312 The February 1903 agreement reports on the base's exact
location and coordinates.31 3 Article II refers to the use of water adjacent
to the land. 314 The July agreement requires fences or enclosures to mark
base boundaries.315 It states the United States will not permit any "com-
mercial, industrial, or other enterprise" on the base.316 Lastly, Article V
306. The online security database Global Security describes SOFAs as defining "the
legal status of U.S. personnel and property in the territory of another nation" and setting
"forth rights and responsibilities" between the United States and the host state. The desig-
nations include criminal and civil jurisdiction, matters of diplomatic privileges. GlobeSe-
curity.org, Military Status of Force Agreement, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
facility/sofa.htm (last visited January 30, 2009).
307. See Neuman, Closing the Guantdnamo Loophole, supra note 51, at 39; Raustiala,
supra note 35, at 2512.
308. Peter Graff, Iraq, US Sign Pact on Troops Withdrawal Deadline, REUTERS, Nov 17,
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/vcCandidateFeed7/idUSLH492272. The SOFA was
criticized in the United States and Iraq for issues similar to Guant~namo detention dis-
putes, i.e., what is the jurisdiction of overseas U.S. bases and are military or civilian con-
tractor activities governed by international or municipal law. Cf Bruce Ackerman &
Oona Hathaway, An Agreement Without Agreement, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2008, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/15/AR2008021502539.
html; Greg Bruno, U.S. Security Agreements and Iraq, COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS:
BACKGROUNDER, Dec. 23, 2008, http://www.cfr.org/publication/16448/.
309. U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 10, at preamble.
310. Id.
311. Id. art. I.
312. See U.S.-Cuba 1934 Treaty, supra note 39.
313. U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 10, art. I.
314. Id. art. II.
315. U.S.-Cuba July 1903 Lease, supra note 198, art. II.
316. Id. art. III.
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regards vessels entering the bay as "subject exclusively to Cuban laws,"
except for vessels carrying materials for base use. 317 The 1934 Treaty
makes base occupation effectively indefinite by requiring the United
States either to stop occupation unilaterally or to agree to end the lease
terms.31
8
The United States has continued to occupy the base pursuant to these
three agreements. 319 However, U.S.-Cuba relations changed after the
1959 revolution, and with the intensification of American fear of states
becoming socialist, especially for those states in close proximity to the
United States, Cuba questioned the legality of the lease agreements. 320
After 1961, Cuban civilians and American military personnel ceased to
move freely between the base and non-occupied Cuban soil. 321 Ulti-
mately, Cuba stopped providing water treatment services after 1961, forc-
ing the base to become self-sufficient. 322
At times, academics have challenged the validity of the lease on inter-
national law grounds such as rebus sic stantibus.323 This principle in inter-
national law permits an agreement to be terminated if there has been a
fundamental change in circumstances which were essential to the agree-
ment-consent or which radically transforms agreement obligations.324 It
is doubtful that changed circumstances may be sufficiently claimed to nul-
lify the treaty. A court may easily see that the 1934 Treaty theoretically
provides a method to change the lease terms and that changes since 1961
still permit the base to be used by the United States for defense purposes
and Cuba to be remunerated. Creatively, Kal Raustiala argues that the
lease text of "ultimate sovereignty" may be interpreted as providing
Cuba with reversionary or residual sovereignty.325 This, coupled with the
"complete jurisdiction and control" and practical understanding of the
authority exercised by the United States on the base, makes this territory
"American territory as Puerto Rico. '326
Despite academic or diplomatic claims that the 1903 Lease and 1934
Treaty are inconsistent with international law, states have traditionally
used such leases to exercise indirect control over foreign territories. 327
317. Id. arts. VI, V.
318. U.S.-Cuba 1934 Treaty, supra note 39, art. III.
319. See Raustiala, supra note 35, at 2501.
320. U.S.-Cuba 1934 Treaty, supra note 39, art. III.
321. See Raustiala, supra note 35, at 2537.
322. See id.
323. See id. at 2539.
324. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 64, May 23, 1964, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 347. For descriptions of these arguments see Raustiala, supra note 35, at 2539, and
Montague, supra note 178, at 470-75 (examining the issue of the lease's legality in light of
Cuba's public position on the base after the 1959 revolution).
325. Raustiala, supra note 35, at 2540-42.
326. Id. at 2542.
327. Leases and servitudes provide states with less rights than they would have with
sovereign control, but they provide legal rights to exercise over territories belonging to
other states. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 366 (4th ed. 1997). These
rights exist in rem, meaning they are attached to the land versus to a juridical person. Id.;
MAcALISTER-SMITH, supra note 35, at 387.
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After 1898, a consistent U.S. foreign policy goal for the Caribbean and
Central American region was to exercise indirect control.328 This was not
only specific to Cuba, but generally exercised in the region.329 Leases or
servitudes provided the United States a legal instrument to control the
strategically valuable bay at Guantdnamo. Relevant to Guantinamo's
history and current legal anomaly, leases provided two significant bene-
fits for lessee-states. First, they conferred a way to control territory with-
out annexing it. Second, sovereignty would remain in the lessor/host-
state. This restriction for the lessee made these agreements a servitude,
because the restriction was tied to the territory.330 Leases developed in
international law after prior common practices of attaining bases by sim-
ple occupation and flying a national flag.33 1
Lease agreements commonly laid out two important sets of rights.
First, for the lessee, there was a grant of authority to occupy and use the
delineated area.332 Second, there was a description of jurisdictional rights
and duties between the host/lessor and lessee states. 333 Within the second
set of stipulations, the agreement would describe how the host/lessor's
sovereignty was restricted.334 This was invariably determined by the spe-
cific relations and contexts of the two states at that period in time.3 35
This includes history, relative political power, and domestic politics. 336
IV. GUANTANAMO'S ANOMALOUS RECENT PAST:
QUESTIONS INSPIRED FROM THE
WRIT'S PATH OVERSEAS
This Part describes how in Boumediene the Supreme Court addressed
Guantinamo's legal anomaly and how objectives historically shaping this
anomaly framed the Court's reasoning. These two developments, the le-
gal anomaly and the objectives shaping it, inspire this Article's post-colo-
nial questions regarding U.S. authority on Guantdnamo. 33 7 Similarly, as
328. See C. Todd Piczak, The Helms-Burton Act: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Cuba, The
National Security Exception to the Gatt and the Political Question Doctrine, 61 U. Prir. L.
REV. 287, 288-91 (1999).
329. See generally HEALY, supra note 107 (describing how the goal of indirect control
over Cuba was pragmatically reached by the U.S.); see also supra note 162 (detailing myr-
iad methods of indirect and/or non-sovereign control used by the United States in the
region).
330. SHAW, supra note 327, at 367.
331. MAcALISTER-SMITH, supra note 35, at 383.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. See also George Grafton Wilson, Leased Territories, 34 AM. J. INT'L L. 703-04
(1940) (describing the basic point that in leases "sovereignty was too important a matter to
pass thus with a lease," giving U.S. examples of leases in Cuba, Panama, and Nicaragua
and leases of other states in Asia and Africa).
335. MAcALISTER-SMITH, supra note 35, at 383-84.
336. Id. at 384.
337. This Article provides a researched-suggestion on how post-colonial legal themes
influence base detention litigation. This suggestion is based on finding similarities in base
occupation and base detention and then relating this with the Boumediene holding that the
constitutional writ of habeas corpus does apply on the base. As such, Boumediene serves
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base detention is programmed to end by January 2010, its becomes im-
portant to identify how anomaly, a product of history and a normative
force for checks on detention authority, may result in similar extraterrito-
rial detention programs.
With an initial doctrinal glance, Boumediene addressed whether base
detainees benefit from the writ of habeas corpus in the Constitution's
Suspension Clause, whether the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA) and Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) legally suspend the
writ, and if the MCA and DTA offer an adequate substitute for habeas
proceedings.338 The Court found that the constitutional writ of habeas
corpus did apply to the base, the MCA and DTA unconstitutionally sus-
pended the writ, and the DTA and MCA provided an inadequate substi-
tute for habeas proceedings.339 Correlated to the law supporting base
occupation, these findings suggest that American law continues to shape
Guantinamo's legal anomaly with four objectives from U.S.-Cuba for-
eign relations, concerning American and Cuban sovereignty, extraterrito-
rial constitutional limits, and strategic interests.
as one example, regarding the writ, to spur further scholarly examination of base deten-
tion. The main inquiry concerns: what legal norms extend (or not) to the base at Guanti-
namo, that is, a non-sovereign territory under U.S. control. This inquiry does not include
various relevant Guantinamo themes in U.S. and international law. For examples of di-
verse analysis of what law applies on the base, see Neuman, Anomalous Zones, supra note
11; Neuman, Closing the Guantdnamo Loophole, supra note 51; Neuman Extraterritorial
Rights, supra note 21; Raustiala, supra note 172; Raustiala, supra note 35, at 2501. See also
Diane Marie Amann, Guantdnamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNT'L L. 263 (2004) (describing
how international law doctrine applies to base detention); Fiona De Londras, Guantdnamo
Bay: Towards Legality?, 71 MOD. L. REV. 36 (2008) (arguing for an extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Constitution to preserve the rule of law); David L. Franklin, Enemy Combatants
and the Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1001 (2008) (explaining how
detention litigation fits within separations of powers debates between the three branches of
government); Kristine A. Huskey, Standards and Procedures for Classifying "Enemy Com-
batants": Congress, What Have You Done?, 43 TEX. INT'L L.J. 41 (2007) (detailing the
procedural shortfalls in CSRT proceedings and Administrative Review Boards for base
detainees); Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in Guantdnamo Cases,
2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 49 (presenting the problems with finding aliens outside the U.S.
as having access to the writ of habeas corpus); Kermit Roosevelt III, Application of the
Constitution to Guantdnamo Bay, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017 (2005) (suggesting a conflict of
laws approach to determine if the Constitution applies on the base); Joseph C. Sweeney,
Guantdnamo and U.S. Law, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 673 (2007) (presenting how U.S. law
has treated the base from 1898 to the present); Elizabeth A. Wilson, The War on Terrorism
and "The Water's Edge": Sovereignty, "Territorial Jurisdiction," and the Reach of the U.S.
Constitution in the Guantnamo Detainee Litigation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 165 (2006) (ex-
amining how Rasul's statutory holding suggests how to extraterritorially apply the Consti-
tution, especially Due Process rights, to the base). For examinations of how Guantinamo
detention reflects changes in legal reasoning in domestic national security and criminal
procedure contexts, see generally CIVIL LIBERTIES Vs. NATIONAL SECURITY IN A POST-9/
11 WORLD (M. Katherine B. Darmer et al. eds., 2004), and M. Katherine B. Darmer, Mi-
randa Warnings, Torture, the Right to Counsel and the War on Terror, 10 CHAP. L. REV.
631-654 (2007).
338. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2234-38 (2008) (referring to the Suspen-
sion Clause in the Constitution, art. I, § 9, cl. 2; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L.
No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)); Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.
339. See id.
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Boumediene made significant legal determinations regarding sover-
eignty on the base territory. Doing this, the Court pointed to how base
authority is an outgrowth of legal instruments derived from an informal
imperial influence over Cuba.340 Since 2002, GuantAnamo detention liti-
gation has confronted these legal issues regarding jurisdiction and sover-
eignty on the base.341 These issues stem from legal determinations made
when Cuba was a U.S. protectorate and when U.S. bases were established
overseas.
342
To explain how Guantinamo's legal anomalous status heavily influ-
enced Boumediene's reasoning, this section makes five arguments. The
first argument regards how the decision correlates the base's anomalous
status with legal history regarding the writ of habeas corpus, while the
next four arguments concern the four legal objectives used in this Article
to describe U.S. influence overseas. First, because of the base's legally
anomalous status, the Court was reluctant to find legal history and com-
mon law regarding the writ dispositive when determining whether these
rights apply (or not) on the base.343 The Court found that the abundant
legal history examples, regarding the writ in overseas and non-sovereign
territories, to be dissimilar, and only informative, when examining deten-
tions on Guantinamo. 344 Second, the Court tempered the objective of
avoiding U.S. sovereignty overseas by finding that the U.S. has de facto
sovereignty on Guantdnamo. 345 The United States, though, lacks de jure
sovereignty. 346 This finding is inconsistent with political determinations,
in the MCA and DTA, that Guantinamo is not part of the United
States.347 Third, the Court did not find that Cuban sovereignty over the
base bars extending rights protections in constitutional or international
law.348 Cuba's "ultimate sovereignty" was found to be nearly irrelevant
and lacking "practical influence" to deciding if the Constitution has extra-
territorial effect there.349 Fourth, the Court explained that limited consti-
tutional rights protections apply to the base, referring to the Insular Cases
and their fundamental rights distinctions.350 While this promises to check
political authority abroad, it still avoids full constitutional protections
when the United States has "complete jurisdiction and control" over-
340. See e.g., id. at 2252, 2254 (referring to the U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease); supra note
10; U.S. Cuba 1934 Treaty, supra note 39; SPARROW, supra note 68.
341. See James Thuo Gathii, Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism, and the International
Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 335, 347 (2003).
342. See supra Part III.A-C.
343. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2249.
344. Id.
345. See id. 2252-53 (explaining the United States does not "maintain[ ] sovereignty in
the legal and technical sense" but "by virtue of its complete jurisdiction and control ...
maintains de facto sovereignty") (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480, 487 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring)).
346. See id. at 2253.
347. See id. at 2252 (citing the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
§ 1005(g), 119 Stat. 2739, 2743).





seas.351 Fifth, the Court identified important overseas interests to justify
its findings. 352
Majority and dissenting opinions argue these points, while their justifi-
cations are normatively different.353 The majority opinion referred to de-
tention on Guantinamo as lasting too long, sometimes six years with no
judicial review. 354 The dissenting opinions explain how Boumediene's
holdings threaten national security and separation of powers. 355
These preliminary arguments, regarding one Supreme Court decision,
serve as post-colonial reference points for examining extraterritorial legal
anomaly beyond the writ of habeas corpus or beyond Guantinamo. This
five-point analysis of Boumediene suggests how to pose post-colonial le-
gal questions concerning overseas authority. Sample questions include:
how does current jurisprudence incorporate legal history; how does this
jurisprudence characterize the sovereignty of the United States and for-
eign states; does the Constitution limit U.S. authority overseas; and what
foreign relations objectives justify legal determinations supporting this
authority? Illustrating how the law evades individual rights protections
by manipulating sovereignty determinations and severing the Constitu-
tion, these questions contextualize legal issues for future overseas deten-
tion.356 Boumediene's holding is limited to the Suspension Clause and
the inadequate substitutes for habeas proceedings in the MCA and
DTA.357 When these findings are contextualized with foreign relations
history and the law supporting overseas authority, a post-colonial under-
standing of base authority begins to emerge. In this light, these questions
importantly relate current legal contests with informal imperial influence
and Cuba's subaltern position. Accordingly, Boumediene provides an ex-
ample of how post-colonial research methodologies describe the United
States' overseas influence. With this, significant connections begin to ap-
pear between legal mechanisms used for overseas detention, the denial of
individual rights protections, and foreign relations authority. Studying
these three issues together illuminates an important context, which may
be lost by solely examining legal issues raised in litigation. As this post-
colonial focus suggests, doctrinal narratives in constitutional law and sov-
ereignty determinations result in the law endorsing detention, rights ex-
clusion, and plenary authority over foreign relations.
351. U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 10. See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at
2257-59 (distinguishing formal or territorial sovereignty from its holding and arguing
against the government's position that the political branches have "the power to switch the
Constitution on or off at will").
352. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275.
353. See generally id. at 2229.
354. See id. at 2262 (describing the length of detention with no real judicial review).
355. See id. at 2294-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
356. See Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution, supra note 21 (describing how this
decision unclearly settles detention issues regarding non-citizens not in U.S. custody or
held in foreign locations other than Guantdnamo).
357. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2240, 2271-74.
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It is important to highlight that on the Boumediene decision, this Arti-
cle offers a limited perspective on what law governs detention on Guanti-
namo. As briefly explained below, Guantinamo detention litigation
represents a complicated and multi-issue set of legal problems, far larger
than what Boumediene's holdings and international agreements in 1903
and 1934 clarify.358 This Article examines how Boumediene provides lim-
ited clarification on what norms, in this case constitutional habeas corpus
rights, apply on base territory. Contextualized with foreign relations his-
tory, this limited clarification points to how the law endorses detention
and evades rights protections. Other issues concerning detainee rights
and political authority, in alienage, constitutional, international, interna-
tional human rights, and international humanitarian law (also known as
law of war) surely influence current detention policy and litigation. Many
issues have not been examined by the courts or executive agency tribu-
nals.359 Similarly, a complex, limited, and evolving set of procedures
have contested military authority, slowly affirming what legal norms ap-
ply to the base.360 These procedures have slowly developed since deten-
tion began in 2002, with varied input from the three branches of
government. 36 1 They include CSRTs, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reviewing appeals of CSRT determinations,
military commissions (most recently), and district court habeas proceed-
ings (after Boumediene).362 These procedures have had the potential to
further determine which sources of law (American, international, plural,
and most likely not Cuban) and which norms apply to base detention.363
With these two points in mind, this Article offers the example of how
the base's historic legal anomaly shapes current lawmaking on constitu-
tional habeas corpus rights on the base. Perhaps in another security con-
text, authorities may seek to detain persons overseas without clearly
explaining what rights they have. Accordingly, these points elaborate
how detention tries to escape individual rights checks. This Article sug-
358. Recent books on Guantinamo from attorneys representing detainees and the gov-
ernment present a series of political and administrative issues far more complex than what
recent litigation elucidates, suggesting that the law at play on the base is unsettled. See
generally KYNDRA MILLER ROTUNDA, HONOR BOUND: INSIDE THE GUANTANAMO TRIALS
(2008) (offering a firsthand description of experiences as a legal advisor to the base com-
mander, liaison to the International Committee of the Red Cross, member of the Criminal
Investigations Task Force, and Office of the Chief Prosecutor to present how soldiers in
these legal and military contexts are "honor bound to protect freedom"); JOSEPH MARGU-
LIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (2006) (presenting legal
contests about detention as testing the rule of law and unchecked executive authority);
STEVEN T. WAX, KAFKA COMES TO AMERICA: FIGHTING FOR JUSTICE IN THE WAR ON
TERROR-A PUBLIC DEFENDER'S INSIDE ACCOUNT (2008) (presenting the story of two
persons detained by the United States, one a foreign national detained in Guantinamo and
one U.S. citizen, to suggest how fragile individual rights are).
359. See supra note 31 (indicating how many issues regarding GuantAnamo detentions,
military commissions, and habeas proceedings remain unclear)
360. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus and the Ge-
neva Convention, 101 AM. J. INT'L 322, 323-27 (2007).
361. See id.
362. See id.; see generally Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
363. See Bradley, supra note 360.
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gests how legal instruments, historically used to extend informal imperial
influence, currently help endorse base detention. This one scholarly ex-
ample has the goal of inspiring post-colonial inquiry regarding legal de-
terminations in future overseas detention disputes.
A. GUANTANAMO'S ANOMALY MAKES THE WRIT'S
HISTORY INAPPLICABLE TO DETENTION ISSUES
The Court's examination of the writ of habeas corpus's legal history
provides a clear example of how Guantdnamo's legally anomalous status
clouds detention litigation.364 Detainees and the Government offer many
examples from English common law history, explaining how the writ did
or did not apply to overseas territories. 365 Both sides use these historical
examples to argue that when the Constitution was written in 1789, its
framers intended, or not, to apply the writ overseas.366 The Court found
these examples inconclusive because they do not comment on Guantd-
namo's particular legal issues, primarily that habeas is denied for lack of
jurisdiction on a territory where the United States has total military and
civil control.367 Importantly, the Court found a prisoner's alienage in
common law was not a "categorical bar" to relief from the writ.368
This inconsistency between the writ's history and Guantinamo's legal
status highlights the influence this legal anomaly has had on detention
litigation. At play are how a geographic territory fits within a central
political authority's sovereignty and jurisdiction.369 Legal history argu-
mentation shows the writ applying or not applying to locations such as
Scotland, colonial India, or the Isle of Hanover.370 This argumentation
364. Seeking guidance from "founding-era authorities," the Court presented this legal
question as whether foreign nationals, apprehended and detained in distant countries dur-
ing a time of serious threats to our Nation's security, may assert the privilege of the writ
and seek its protection. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2248.
365. Petitioner-detainees argued that the writ followed the King's officers and the Re-
spondent-government argued that the writ only extended to territories where the Crown
was sovereign. See id. at 2248.
366. This argument follows the standard created in INS v. St. Cyr that "at the absolute
minimum," the Constitution protects the "writ as it existed when the Constitution was
drafted and ratified," 533 U.S. 289, 300-301 (2001). But the Court also noted that it has
been "careful not to foreclose the possibility" that these protections have expanded with
post-1789 developments. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2248.
367. The Court also referred to the denial of the writ because a prisoner is deemed an
enemy combatant under Department of Defense standards. Id.
368. Id. at 2248.
369. The preliminary suggestions raised by this Article on the territorial location of
Guantgnamo and legal norms will be developed in future projects. For this, "law and geog-
raphy" scholars have been extremely influential. For examples of this scholarship see
Keith Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the "Third World" in International Law
and Critical Race Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913 (2000) (presenting the value political geog-
raphy provides in critical examination of race and law); Hari M. Osofsky, A Law and Ge-
ography Perspective on the New Haven School, 32 YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 422 (2007)
(presenting the underappreciated value of geography, and describing how "time, space,
place, and scale" influence policy and lawmaking).
370. In Boumediene, the detainees argued that their detention was analogous to two
territories, the Channel Islands and colonial India, described as "exempt jurisdictions" to
which the writ did run. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2249. The Court noted that although
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stresses the writ's application (or not) and then refers to sovereignty and
jurisdiction as similar (or not) to the Guantinamo example. 371
Ultimately, the Court found these historic examples inconclusive and
not dispositive because the situation at Guantdinamo is quite different,
with habeas being denied due to a lack of jurisdiction on a territory under
U.S. control.372 While these examples are different, more importantly,
Guantdinamo was legally crafted, in the Platt Amendment Process and in
a 1934 treaty, to specifically create uncertainty regarding Cuban sover-
eignty and American sovereignty. 373 As stated by policy makers of the
time the motivation for creating this anomaly was to avoid formal sover-
eignty and constitutional checks overseas.374 Seeking overseas influence,
these motivations, in a sense, are U.S. legal responses to formal colonial-
ism. 375 Litigants provided common law examples from periods in history
much earlier than when international law positively endorsed flexible
control over periphery states, e.g., the United States and Cuba after
1898.376
In reality it is not that the common law history is incomplete, but that
during that time in history leased territories or informal imperial rule
were not common or did not exist. 377 Overlooking this legal history spe-
cific to overseas bases and instead focusing on eighteenth century prac-
tices results in the Court painting Guantinamo as having a "unique
status. ' 378 Non-sovereign base territories are not unique. Protectorates
relationships or occupied territories producing overseas were also not
unique. Guantinamo is an outgrowth of U.S.-Cuba relations during the
these jurisdictions were "exempt," they were under England's colonial control. Id. This
makes them quite different from Guantinamo where the U.S. lacks formal sovereignty. Id.
Next, the Court referred to the government's examples of Scotland and Hanover, not in-
cluded as part of England but where the English Crown controlled. Id. It highlighted that
the writ was not applied there because of "prudential concerns," not because of "formal
legal constructs" where sovereignty was determined. Id. at 2250. The Court noted that "in
the end a categorical or formal conception of sovereignty" does not explain why the writ
ran to Ireland but not Scotland. Id. at 2251. This analysis of prudential concerns, that is,
conflicts with another court or practical inability to enforce a court's ruling, leads to two
important findings later in the opinion. First, the Court distinguished case law denying the
writ to enemy alien prisoners held on non-sovereign territory. Id. at 2259-60 (distinguish-
ing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950)). Second, this permitted the Court to dis-
count the present practical significance of Cuba's sovereignty. Id. at 2252.
371. Id. at 2249.
372. Id. (stating "evidence as to the geographic scope of the writ at common law in-
formative, but ... not dispositive").
373. See supra discussion Part III.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2251.
377. See id. (doubting assumptions held by both sides that the "historical record is com-
plete and that the common law, if properly understood, yields a definite answer"). The
Court was highly hesitant to draw too much, if any, precedential authority from this incom-
plete history. It then noted similar analysis from Brown v. Board of Education and Reid v.
Covert that constitutional findings should not be limited to inconclusive or episodic history.
Id.; see also supra Part III.C (discussing the use of historic use of leases and servitudes in
international law).
378. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2251.
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early twentieth century. More germane to what law may currently apply
on the base, Guantinamo's and Cuba's legal history includes significant
deviations from the concept of formal sovereignty. By the end of the
nineteenth century, treaties and international agreements between states
devised legal territories like Guantdnamo, where one power clearly af-
firms jurisdiction and control and the other power retains ultimate or titu-
lar sovereignty. 379 In sum, in Boumediene, the Court's finding that the
writ's legal history (concerning pre-1789 situations) is inconclusive sug-
gests Guantdnamo's legally anomalous status (created in 1903) shapes
how American courts tried to recently resolve detention disputes.
B. "DE FACTO SOVEREIGNTY" TEMPERS U.S. OBJECTIVES
OF AVOIDING SOVEREIGNTY
In Boumediene, the Court found that the United States has de facto
sovereignty over base territory, which was relevant to finding the Consti-
tution's Suspension Clause applies to detention on the base.380 It ac-
knowledged and did not try to contradict U.S. policy of avoiding
sovereignty over Guantinamo. 381 Importantly, it found that the United
States lacks de jure sovereignty over the territory.382 Focusing less on
formal sovereignty concerns, the Court made a note of the United States'
policy of avoiding sovereignty over the base.383 It made three points con-
firming this historic policy. 384 The Court observed that the base is not
formally part of the United States, referring to the DTA provisions stat-
ing the base is not within the United States;385 that Cuba retains "ulti-
mate sovereignty" referring to the February 1903 lease386 and Rasul v.
Bush;387 and that under the 1934 Treaty, Cuba "effectively has no rights
as a sovereign" until the United States and Cuba agree to modify the
1903 Lease. 388
To find de facto sovereignty, the Court noted it is not "improper for [it]
to inquire into the objective degree of control the Nation asserts over
foreign territory. ' 389 It stated a territory may be "under the de jure sov-
ereignty of one nation, while under the plenary control or practical sover-
379. See supra Part III.C; Neuman, Closing the Guantdnamo Loophole, supra note 51.
380. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252 (stating that the Court "do[es] not question the
Government's position that Cuba, not the United States, maintains sovereignty in the legal
and technical sense of the term"); id. at 2251 (indicating that when the Court finds that
sovereignty is a political question it refers to sovereignty in the "narrow, legal sense of the
term, meaning a claim of right" and referring to this definition in RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 206, comment b); see also supra Part III.C.
381. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252.
382. Id. at 2253.
383. Id. at 2252.
384. Id. at 2251-52.
385. Id. at 2252 (referring to the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148,
§ 1005(g), 119 Stat. 2739, 2743).
386. Id. (referring to U.S.-Cuba February 1903 Lease, supra note 10, art. III).
387. Id. (referring to Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 471 (2004)).
388. See id. (referring to U.S.-Cuba 1934 Treaty, supra note 39, art. III).
389. See id.
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eignty of another. '390 Historic examples of such territory include
Guantinamo, which was "seized during" the Spanish-American War,
U.S. control of the port of Tampico during the Mexican-American War,
and the United Kingdom's control of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in
South Africa.391
These examples serve as a way to conceptually separate formal or de
jure sovereignty from control (actual or practical) a state may have over a
territory. This actual control may exist even though the state lacks actual
sovereignty. This becomes highly significant to the dispute at hand for
two reasons. First, as expressed in policies specific to Guantinamo and
Cuba (historically), the United States does not have sovereignty over the
base territory.392 As such, in making these distinctions, the Court is seek-
ing to distance itself from formal interpretations of sovereignty to find
that a check on political power exists. Second, by focusing on practical
control and not formal sovereignty as key reference points, the Court is
able to relate U.S. control over the base with the prudential concerns
relevant to the writ of habeas corpus. As described previously, the Court
presents the common law history of the writ as emphasizing prudential
concerns or effective control to determine when to extend the writ over-
seas or not. These practical concerns significantly make sense given the
writ's long history. They are particularly relevant to territory such as
Guantdnamo, which is undoubtedly under American control, but not for-
mally within its sovereignty.
Focusing on practical control, the Court does not hold that the issue of
whether habeas applies on Guant~inamo is a political question.393 It finds
to do so would be finding that de jure sovereignty is the "touchstone of
habeas jurisdiction. ' 394 Instead, it finds that prudential concerns are
more central to determining if habeas applies or not. The United States
maintains "obvious and uncontested" de facto sovereignty over the base
by virtue of its "complete jurisdiction and control. ' 395 In sum, highlight-
ing prudential concerns and finding the United States has de facto sover-
eignty over the base, Boumediene, in a limited fashion, steps away from
the objective of avoiding sovereignty overseas.
390. See id. at 2252.
391. Id. (referring to Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 614 (1850), and King v.
Earl of Crewe, [1910] 2 K.B. 576, 603-604 (C.A.) (opinion of Williams, L.J.)).
392. See supra Part III.C; Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2251-52.
393. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2235, 2253. See also Colangelo, supra note 21, at 3
(describing how the Court's use of de facto, de jure. and practical sovereignty classifica-
tions implies important separations of powers and judicial review determinations).
394. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2235, 2253. See also Colangelo, supra note 21, at 3
(describing how the Court's use of de facto, de jure, and practical sovereignty classifica-
tions implies important separations of powers and judicial review determinations).
395. Id. at 2252-53 (using the terms "complete jurisdiction and control" from the U.S.-
Cuba Feb. 1903 lease, supra note 10).
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C. FORMAL SOVEREIGNTY (BELONGING TO CUBA) Is IRRELEVANT TO
"PRACTICAL" CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING THE BASE
In Boumediene, the Court discounted the importance of Cuba's "ulti-
mate sovereignty" 396 over Guant~inamo by emphasizing "practical con-
siderations" to determine when base authority is subject to constitutional
checks such as the writ of habeas corpus. 397 This is a significant judicial
step away from the U.S. objective of denying incidents of sovereignty for
foreign states. Here, the Court does not avoid checking U.S. authority on
the base because Cuba, another state, has formal sovereignty over the
territory.398 Instead, it regards practical or prudential concerns as signifi-
cant to determining when habeas jurisdiction may be applied abroad.399
Consequently, it does not regard Cuba's formal sovereignty as excluding
the application of checks in American constitutional law. This effectively
minimizes the normative significance of the U.S. objective of denying in-
cidents of sovereignty for foreign states, when exercising extraterritorial
authority.
Lease agreements from 1903 and a treaty from 1934 limit Cuba's sover-
eignty over base territory.4° They state or affirm that the United States
has "complete jurisdiction and control" over the base and that Cuba has
"ultimate sovereignty."'40 1 The agreements cover a small range of issues,
such as tariffs, fugitives from justice, and vessel use on the bay, but they
do not elaborate on what Cuban sovereignty or American "jurisdiction
and control" entail.402 This ambiguity becomes more acute with recent
concerns about detention and potential limits to military authority on the
base. A basic reading of these agreements and the history of U.S.-Cuba
relations of the period indicate Cuba was denied incidents of
sovereignty. 403
This denial provided a space for a U.S. policy to detain persons far
from checks in domestic law, 40 4 clearly within U.S. control and jurisdic-
tion, and theoretically within Cuba's sovereignty. Focusing on just formal
or de jure sovereignty, it can be argued that constitutional checks do not
396. Id. at 2252.
397. Id. at 2301.
398. Id. at 2251-52. The four justices in the dissenting opinions essentially argue that
Cuba's sovereignty over the base bars applying checks in U.S. constitutional law. Id. at
2279-92 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2293-2307 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
399. See Colangelo, supra note 21, at 3-4.
400. See supra Part III.C.
401. U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 10.
402. See id.
403. See supra Part II.
404. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258-59 (describing the Government's argument that
Cuba's disclaiming sovereignty and granting the U.S. "total control" make it possible for
"the political branches to govern without legal constraint"); see also Yoo, supra note 199,
at 142-43 (explaining how court decisions on refugees detained on the base suggested that
habeas jurisdiction would not extend to GuantAnamo).
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apply to the base because the territory is not within U.S. sovereignty. 40 5
Cuba has sovereignty and the United States is just leasing the territory.
To apply checks in domestic American law would be to interfere with
Cuban sovereignty.40
6
In Boumediene, the majority of the Court stepped away from this per-
spective to examine the prudential concerns, which weigh into determin-
ing if the writ can be applied or not. This effectively discounts the
significance of Cuban sovereignty to detention concerns. The Court ex-
plained that the United States has exercised "plenary control" over the
territory since 1898,407 without any foreseeable change or limitation, and
Cuba exercises no influence over the territory.
40 8
The Government's formal perspectives on sovereignty and constraints
to political authority are argued to be inconsistent with the Constitution's
separation of powers.40 9 The Court described a formal reading of sover-
eignty in this case as "a striking anomaly" in a three-branch form of gov-
ernment, where Congress and the President, and not the Court, say "what
the law is."'4 10 The Court highlighted that Congress and the President
have the power "to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory," but they do
not have the power to "decide when and where" the Constitution's terms
apply. 411
Next, the Court directly addressed this legal anomaly (between Cuban
sovereignty and U.S. control) by emphasizing the significance of pruden-
tial concerns to applying the writ on the base.4 12 This is done in two
respects: (1) the history of writ applied overseas in the common law, and
(2) American case law regarding the writ extended to overseas enemy
combatants. As detailed earlier, Guantdnamo's legally anomalous status
does not fit neatly within the legal history of the writ. To resolve this, the
Court emphasized how prudential or practical concerns determined when
405. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258-59 (The government argued that "the Constitu-
tion had no effect [on the base], at least as to noncitizens, because the United States dis-
claimed sovereignty in the formal sense of the term.").
406. See id. at 2298-99, 2299 n.3 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (presenting the Eisentrager hold-
ing that the Constitution does not protect habeas to aliens held by the U.S. "in areas over
which our Government is not sovereign" and citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950)), see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 500-01 (2004) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (empha-
sizing that Cuba's ultimate sovereignty precludes U.S. sovereignty on the base).
407. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258.
408. See id. at 2252, 2261 (explaining that "no Cuban court has jurisdiction" over U.S.
military on the base; there is no indication of friction from Cuba if writ jurisdiction were
applied on the base, and "for all practical purposes, the United States is answerable to no
other sovereign for its acts on the base").
409. See id. at 2258.
410. See id. at 2259 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137, 177 (1803)).
411. See id.
412. Id. at 2255-56 (discussing whether enforcing the writ would be "impracticable and
anomalous" (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1957) (Harlan, J. concurring in




the writ did or did not apply overseas. 41 3 This was done instead of a
formal or doctrinal analysis of sovereignty determining when the writ ap-
plied or not.414 Prudential concerns include avoiding conflicting judg-
ments by two courts or the practical inability, because of distance, to
enforce a judgment.415 Applied to Guantdinamo, these concerns do not
exist. First, there is no reason for a federal court order to be disobeyed
on the base.416 Second, no Cuban court has jurisdiction over these is-
sues.417 Third, no laws, other than those of the United States, apply to
the base.418
Next, to emphasize these practical concerns in American case law re-
garding overseas authority and constitutional protections, the Court ap-
plied analysis from Reid v. Covert.419 In this 1956 case, answering
whether jury rights could be evoked by spouses of American military per-
sonnel living in England and Japan, the Court emphasized practical con-
cerns. 420 The test developed from this case was whether a court enforcing
a constitutional provision would be "impracticable and anomalous. '421
Likewise, Justice Kennedy applied this test in his concurring opinion,
needed for a majority in judgment, in United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez,422 concerning extraterritorial examinations of the Fourth
Amendment.
Stressing that "practical considerations" determine when habeas rights
apply overseas, the Court distinguished Johnson v. Eisentrager, precedent
viewed by the Government and the dissenting opinions as prohibiting the
writ's application in non-sovereign territory.423 In Eisentrager, the Court
determined that enemy aliens detained in Germany had no access to the
writ because the detainees were never within "territory over which the
United States is sovereign" and their capture, punishment, and the loca-
tion of their offences were "all beyond the territorial jurisdiction" of any
U.S. court. 424 The respondent Government used this language from
Eisentrager to argue for a "formalistic sovereignty-based test" to decide
413. Id. at 2249-51 (describing how "prudential concerns" limited applying the writ in
historic Scotland or Hanover versus a "categorical or formal" sovereignty conception ex-
plaining this).
414. Id. at 2251 (explaining that prudential concerns evident in Scotland or Hanover do
not exist on GuantAnamo).
415. Id. at 2250 (referring to concerns of "comity and orderly administration" in habeas
jurisdiction from Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2220 (2008)).
416. Id. at 2251.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 2255-56.
420. See id. at 2255 (describing how Reid emphasized the "specific circumstances of
each particular case" and how it rejected a "rigid and abstract rule" when determining
where constitutional protections extend).
421. Id. at 2255-56 (citing Reid, 354 U.S. at 74-75 (Harlan, J. concurring in the result)).
422. Id. (citing United States v. Verdugo Urguidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1990)).
423. Id. at 2257 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 399 U.S. 763 (1950)).
424. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778; see also Posner, supra note 21, at 4 (emphasizing that
the Court overlooks the limited constitutional rights noncitizens have especially outside of
the United States).
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where the writ extends. 425 The Boumediene Court rejected this analysis,
emphasizing three factors in the Eisentrager decision. First, Eisentrager's
relevance is not limited to just the sovereignty-based language, and Part
II of the opinion stresses "practical considerations" to explain its hold-
ing.426 Second, Eisentrager regards different sovereignty circumstances
than Guantinamo, making it inapplicable as a precedent for a formal-
sovereignty test. Under the facts in Eisentrager, the United States lacked
both de jure sovereignty and plenary control over Landsberg Prison in
Germany. 427 On Guantinamo, the United States exercises de facto sov-
ereignty and has "complete jurisdiction and control," as affirmed by a
series of U.S-Cuba agreements. 428 Third, such a rigid sovereignty-based
test would require "a complete repudiation of the Insular Cases' (and
later Reid's) functional approach" to legal questions about the extraterri-
torial reach of the Constitution. 42 9 The Court highlighted that the Eisen-
trager decision barely mentioned concerns over territorial sovereignty,
suggesting the Government overstated the requirement of formal sover-
eignty for the writ.430 Instead it stressed that prudential concerns for the
military, such as shipping space, guard personnel, and "billeting and ra-
tions" motivate Eisentrager's reasoning.431 The Court explained that
these concerns require balancing "the constraints of military occupation
with constitutional necessities. '432
Next, building on factors the Eisentrager Court found relevant, and
previously recognized in Rasul, the Court offered a six-point framework
for "determining the reach of the Suspension Clause. '433 The factors are
as follows: (1) the detainee's status is as an "enemy alien"; (2) whether
the detainee has been in or resided in the U.S.; (3) whether the detainee
was captured outside U.S. territory and held in military custody as a pris-
oner of war; (4) whether the detainee was tried and convicted by a Mili-
tary Commission outside U.S. territory; (5) whether the detainee
committed offenses outside the United States against the laws of war; and
(6) whether the detainee is at all times imprisoned outside the United
States.434 Three factors are relevant to the question of whether Guanti-
namo detainees benefit from the writ in the Constitution's Suspension
Clause: (1) the detainee's citizenship and status, coupled with the "ade-
quacy of the process" regarding how this status was determined; (2) the
nature of the apprehension and detention sites; and (3) "practical obsta-
425. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2257 (referring to Brief for Respondents 18-20,
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196)).
426. See id.
427. See id.
428. Id. at 2252.
429. See id. at 2258.
430. See id. at 2258 (stating Eisenstrager only mentions "territorial sovereignty" twice).
431. See id. at 2257 (quoting Eisenstrager, 339 U.S. at 779).
432. See id. (quoting Eisenstrager, 339 U.S. at 769-79, and referring to Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466, 475-76, 486 ( 2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).
433. See id, at 2259 (referring to Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476, 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment).
434. Id. at 2259.
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cles inherent" in the detainee benefiting from the writ.435
Applying these factors, the Court first found the process of determin-
ing detainees as "enemy combatants" quite different in Eisentrager and
Guantinamo. In Eisentrager, the prisoners did not deny their status as
German military personnel during World War II. Additionally, they had
been through military commissions where the prisoners were entitled to
rebut accusations, retain representative counsel, and introduce and rebut
both evidence and witnesses.436 In Guantgnamo, the detainees contest
their status as "enemy combatants" or "unlawful enemy combatants. '437
Before any military commission or potential habeas proceeding, the
CSRT determined this status.438 Here, the Court explained this process
was far more limited than the Eisentrager process and did not eliminate
the need for a habeas corpus review.439 These deficiencies include no
counsel representation during a CSRT proceeding, Government evidence
enjoying a presumption of validity, and a detainee's inability to rebut this
evidence because of their confinement and because they have no legal
counsel.440 CSRT determinations can be appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, but this review cannot cure the
CSRT defects. 441
Second, significant distinctions are made between the Eisentrager and
Guantdinamo apprehension and detention sites. In Eisentrager, the de-
tainees were in a prison in Germany where the United States lacked sov-
ereignty or control and instead was operating under jurisdiction of the
combined Allied Forces.442 Consequently, the United States was answer-
able to the Allied Forces, and American military occupation was tempo-
rary. 443 Guantinamo presents a different scenario, as "no transient
possession" exists and in "every practical sense" it is not abroad, but is
"within the constant jurisdiction of the United States.' '444
Third, the Court stated there are "few practical barriers" to applying
the writ on Guantfnamo. It found none of the threats, which had existed
for the U.S. military in 1950s Germany in Eisentrager.445 Back then, the
United States had the enormous task of occupying large sections of Ger-
many and working to rebuild Germany, often with defeated enemy popu-
lations. The Court acknowledged additional expenditures and resources
would be needed to comply with habeas proceedings, but military forces
435. Id.
436. See id. at 2259-60 (referring to UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, 14
LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 8-10 (reprint 1997) (1949) and Memoran-
dum by Command of Lt. Gen. Wedemeyer, Jan. 21,1946, in Transcript of Record at 33-40,
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (No. 306)).
437. Id. at 2259-60.
438. Id. at 2241.





444. See id. at 2261 (quoting Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480, 487 (2004)).
445. Id. at 2261.
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and civil courts have functioned simultaneously. Likewise, the base has
served various functions beyond military operations, such as housing mi-
grants, refugees, long-term residents, and workers. The base offers a se-
cure prison in an isolated and fortified military base.446
At this point, the Court referred to the base's legally anomalous status.
The Court also observed how the base's status is a legacy of foreign rela-
tions history. While complying with the 1903 Lease, the United States is
"for all practical purpose, answerable to no other sovereign for its acts on
the base.""4 47 With this, extending the writ to the base does not pose an
"impracticable or anomalous" problem. 4 4 8 Since the United States has
such historical and ample control, is answerable to no other sovereign
there, and faces no practical barrier, the Court held the Suspension
Clause does apply to non-citizens overseas on the base. It acknowledged
that this was a novel holding, with Cuba maintaining de jure sovereignty,
but that the circumstances of the base merited this result.449 These cir-
cumstances include detainees held by Executive Order during "the long-
est wars in American history" on territory technically not part of the
United States but "under complete and total control" of the United
States.450 Prior cases do not offer "precise historical parallel," and this
"lack of precedent on point is not barrier" to the constitutional
holding.45 1
D. WITH INSULAR CASE EXAMPLES, A CONSTITUTION-LIGHT IS
SUGGESTED FOR THE BASE
The base's historic anomalous status and the Boumediene Court's
search for "impracticable or anomalous" 4 52 circumstances when applying
constitutional provisions point to conceptual similarities between an im-
perial past and the status quo. Seen in terms of which legal norms apply
to a specific overseas territorial location like Guantinamo, the Court's
use of the Insular Cases illustrates how this legal anomaly is a legacy from
historic informal imperial control and how this anomaly frames legal res-
olution in detention litigation. The United States occupied the base in
1898 after it started a war with Spain.45 3 The Insular Cases and the Incor-
poration Doctrine are contemporary legacies from legal determinations
made after 1898, specifically when Spain ceded Puerto Rico and other
islands to the United States and when the United States occupied Cuba.
Two examples of legal anomalies developed from these events in 1898:
446. Id.
447. See id. at 2261.
448. Id. at 2261-62 (referring to the test in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957)
(Harlan, J. concurring in the result)).
449. Id.
450. Id. at 2262 (referring to the length of the "War on Terror" since Sept. 11, 2001, and
the OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 849 (John Whiteclay Cham-
bers ed., 1999)).
451. See id.
452. Id. (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result)).
453. Id. at 2258.
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the Incorporation Doctrine and the base lease. 454 The Court referred to
the Insular Cases to powerfully show that the Constitution does extend to
non-citizens in non-sovereign territory.455 Pointing to congressional proc-
lamations and precedent, it refuted the Government's argument that "the
Constitution necessarily stops where de jure sovereignty ends. 456
The Insular Cases references provide the Court two important judicial
tools. First, it can rely on established and affirmed case law to demon-
strate the Constitution has extra-territorial force.457 This happened six
years after detention began and after prior Government losses on Guan-
tinamo issues before the Court.458 Observers can refute, with clear
Court holdings, the existence of a rights-free zone or black hole because
now the Constitution guarantees habeas rights on the base. Second, the
Incorporation Doctrine provides the United States with the flexibility to
determine what constitutional provisions do or do not apply. This is
achieved with functional or prudential-based tests.459 This approach fits
nicely with how the Court presented the writ of habeas, extraterritorial
history, and how it characterizes de facto sovereignty over the base. As
such, this decision makes a big push in affirming a functional approach to
deciding how the Constitution's provisions limit government authority
overseas.
This Article argues the flexibility in such a functional approach contin-
ues the ambiguity, "ambivalences in the rule of law," and simultaneous
inclusion and exclusion evident in post-colonial examinations of interna-
tional law.460 Similarly, the functional test leaves many observers won-
dering how it can be applied in the future, or if it instead reflects a more
global or interdependent world. 461  Prior foreign relations contexts
454. Id. at 2253-54.
455. Id. at 2254.
456. Id. at 2253-54 (referring to the determinations outside of the Insular Cases of an
extraterritorial Constitution such as American Insurance Co v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828); An Act: to Establish a Territorial Government for Utah, 9
Stat. 458 (1850); and the Northwest Ordinance, 1 Stat. 52 (1789)).
457. Id. at 2254. Here, the applicability of the extraterritorial Constitution from the
Insular Cases can be mitigated by arguing that the United States is not sovereign over the
base, but it was clearly sovereign over the insular possessions or that the residents in insu-
lar possessions were not noncitizens. See, e.g., Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2298-99 (Scalia, J.
dissenting); Posner, supra note 21, at 10, 15.
458. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 574-76 (2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,
480-81 (2004).
459. Neuman presents the Boumediene holding as rejecting "formalistic reliance" on
factors such as nationality or location and presenting functionalism as the "standard meth-
odology." See Neuman, supra note 21, at 3.
460. See supra Part II.B (referring to law's ambivalence in overseas authority).
461. Cf Ronald Dworkin, Why It Was a Great Victory, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Aug. 14, 2008
(stating that the functional test depends on whether conservative justices cooperate and
that it must allow the government to try those guilty of war crimes, prevent dangerous
terrorists from returning, and free those wrongly imprisoned). But see Cole, supra note 21,
at 51 (arguing that the decision is similar to the transnational trend of invalidating security
measures, favoring individual rights, and suggesting new conceptions of sovereignty, terri-
tory, and rights in a globalized world).
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viewed it necessary to have strict legal determinations of sovereign bor-
ders between states and deferential state authority domestically.
In the majority opinion for Boumediene, the Court referred to the In-
sular Cases when reasoning that the Constitution's Suspension Clause,
which bars suspension of the writ of habeas corpus except for in times of
war or rebellion, does apply to Guantinamo. 462 The references argue
that the Constitution's provisions do have extraterritorial application. 463
The Insular Cases generally held that the "Constitution has independent
force in these territories, a force not contingent upon acts of legislative
grace." 464
With this doctrine developed in the Insular Cases and applied since
then, the real legal concern is not if the Constitution applies, but which
provisions are applicable to limit executive and legislative power. 465 With
the former Spanish colonies previously under a different legal system,
and with "differences of race, habits, laws, and customs of the people, and
from differences of soil, climate and production," the Court has been re-
luctant in these cases to apply the Constitution fully in these territories.466
As the Court recently reported, the Incorporation Doctrine addressed
these "considerations," which states the Constitution applies in "full in
incorporated Territories surely destined for statehood but only in part in
unincorporated Territories. '467
Analyzing which provisions do or do not apply, the Court suggested a
functional-based approach. This involves "inquiry into the situation of
the territory and its relations to the United States. ' 468 It explained that
there would be "inherent practical difficulties of enforcing all constitu-
tional provisions 'always and everywhere."' 469 For these reasons, the
Court described the doctrine as "century-old" and influential in limited
situations, such as this one, where "it would be most needed. '470
To these inquiries, the Court added the practical considerations from
Reid to decide how "specific circumstances of each particular case" per-
tain to determining the "geographic scope of the Constitution."'471 This
inquiry was suggested to be territory and situation specific.472 The stan-
dard is whether a court enforcing a hypothetical constitutional provision
would be "impracticable and anomalous. '473 This places an emphasis on
462. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2254-58, 2662.
463. Id. at 2254.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 2254-55 (citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922)).
466. Id. at 2254 (quoting Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282 (1901)).
467. Id. (citing Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143 (1904, and Downes, 182 U.S. at
293 (White, J., concurring)).
468. Id. at 2254 (quoting Downes, 182 U.S. at 293 (White, J., concurring)).
469. Id. (quoting Balzac, 258 U.S. at 312).
470. Id.
471. Id. (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 54 (1957)).
472. Id. at 2259 (explaining that the political branches have the power to "acquire, dis-
pose of, and govern territory" but not the power to "decide when and where" the Constitu-
tion's terms apply; the Constitution expresses these limits).
473. Id. at 2255 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74-75).
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a court's examination of what is practical and necessary. This is done to
reject "rigid and abstract rule[s]" regarding sovereignty. 474 The Court
summarized its approach to questions about extraterritoriality, presented
as a common thread in the Insular Cases, Eisentrager, and Reid, as turn-
ing "on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism. '475
As Neuman argued, the decision firmly backs a functional approach,
but leaves important ambiguities regarding non-citizens not in American
custody and how to make sense of what provisions apply in different for-
eign locations, that is, not on this base.476 While the functional approach
rejects the formal perspective, which effectively created a rights-free
zone, it still endorses a "Constitution-light" for overseas authority. This
is a legal legacy from informal imperial control, created after 1898, and
prominent in the early twentieth century.
The Court does not mention the significant racial, cultural, and relig-
ious reasons the Insular Cases denied full constitutional protections over-
seas. Those Justices were motivated by notions of Anglo-superiority, and
this influenced their decision that not all right protections in the Constitu-
tion applied to overseas possessions. Universal and liberal claims from
the Constitution are that individual rights protections extend to all. But
the Insular Cases limited this with important distinctions between funda-
mental and non-fundamental rights and incorporated and unincorporated
territories.
Comparing these overlooked concerns in Insular Cases jurisprudence
with present post-colonial examinations points to how legal instruments
needed for imperial rule shape lawmaking today. Generally, as Fitzpat-
rick and Darian-Smith explained, these situations create "ambivalence in
the rule of law."'477 The law includes for some aspects, such as whether
the Constitution and writ apply, but excludes for others like maybe due
process or international human rights do not apply. 478 Applying practical
tests may lead to significant exclusions in areas such as humanitarian law
or emergency-justified exceptions to rights protections. 479
While these issues remain to be determined by American courts and
military commissions, we possess the analytical tools to suggest where
they occur and how they mimic historic exclusions. Legal scholars of in-
ternational law's imperial legacy describe how legal determinations in the
"War on Terror" resemble prior legal choices made when central powers
474. Id. (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74).
475. Id. at 2258.
476. Neuman, supra note 21, at 1.
477. See Fitzpatrick & Darian-Smith, supra note 50, at 2; see also Neuman, supra note
21, at 19-20 (describing how the functional test treats Guantdnamo as a "dual status
space[ ]").
478. See Fitzpatrick & Darian-Smith, supra note 50, at 2.
479. See Posner, supra note 21, at 16 (finding conceptual weakness in the Court not
clearly stating if individual rights derive from global or national sources of law). But see
Cole, supra note 21, at 52, 60 (arguing that extending the writ to the base reflects important
individual rights protections that many courts around the world have recently found in
transnational, security, and international law contexts).
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expanded their colonial influence during the nineteenth century. James
Gathii described the Government's arguments in Guant~inamo detention
litigation as the product of legal mindsets "embedded in the jurisdictional
power map" or empire, not unlike British legal distinctions applied to
protectorates in East Africa.480 Here, state authority escapes liberal
rights protections as power extends overseas. Antony Anghie described
how the U.S. occupation of Iraq in the War on Terror is similar to prior
occupations of the Philippines and Puerto Rico.481 In these cases, indi-
vidual rights, despite universal claims in international law or constitu-
tional law, lose their application in periphery settings.482
The exclusionary results of a functional approach to individual consti-
tutional rights are particularly relevant to Guantinamo detention. For
instance, Fr6d6ric M6gret showed how the "enemy combatant" classifica-
tion echoes the savage or uncivilized in the nineteenth century, to exclude
protections from the law of war.483 Despite the law of war governing the
treatment of prisoners since the early nineteenth century in European
conflicts, this legal doctrine was excluded in armed conflict used to ex-
pand European colonization. This exclusion was conditioned on classify-
ing certain populations as savages or unclassified. 484 Until recently, the
"unlawful enemy combatant" classification was used by the United
States.485 Despite Boumediene's holding that the writ and the Constitu-
tion apply486 and Hamdan's holding that military commissions are re-
quired, American policy has essentially applied the "enemy combatant"
classification to avoid Geneva Convention protections for detainees.487
Perhaps these exclusions based on functional tests will be contested in
future habeas proceedings, but at this time the exclusion is possible de-
spite Boumediene's holding. Exclusions from these rights protections
may be applied by a court using an "impracticable" standard.
From another perspective, judicial tests of what is "practical" may cre-
ate enormous loopholes from the substantive individual rights protections
sourced in the Constitution or international law. Referring to Carl
Schmitt's theories, Nasser Hussain describes sovereignty as the power to
480. See Gathii, Imperialism, Colonialism, and International Law, supra note 113, at
1057-59.
481. ANGHIE, supra note 26, at 279-90.
482. Id. at 289.
483. Fr6d6ric Mdgret, From 'Savages' to 'Unlawful Combatants': A Postcolonial Look at
International Humanitarian Law's Other, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS OTHERS 265-
318 (Anne Orford ed., 2006).
484. Id. at 278.
485. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008).
486. Id. at 2277.
487. See generally Mdgret, supra note 483. Cf Press Release, Dep't of Justice, supra
note 12 (explaining the President's authority to detain persons at Guantinamo Bay com-
plies with international Laws of War); see also Respondent's Memorandum Regarding the
Government's Detention Authority Relative to Detainees held at Guantinamo Bay, In re
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf (referring to this authority
based on Supreme Court precedent, U.N. and N.A.T.O. treaties, while averring for the
government in recent district court habeas proceedings).
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determine exceptions to the rule. 488 Regarding substantive rights for de-
tainees or procedural rights, a military or security determination may ex-
clude detainees from important rights protections, e.g., rights protections
in habeas, CSRT, or military commission proceedings. 489
E. STRATEGIC OVERSEAS INTERESTS JUSTIFY CHECKING (OR NOT)
AUTHORITY ON GUANTANAMO
Taken as a whole, the Boumediene majority and dissenting opinions
pointed to the legal anomaly surrounding how American law supports
overseas authority. This is evident in their different policy justifications.
Applied to non-domestic base jurisdiction, the law in Boumediene both
includes and excludes individual rights protections and deference to polit-
ical authority.490 With such nebulous jurisdiction, the opinions reach
their holdings based on strategic objectives. The most obvious for the
majority is applying individual rights protections to base detention, which
at its longest has lasted over six years with no trial or charges. 491 For the
dissenting opinions, the most important strategic objective is to provide
the political branches deference and authority to fight a "War on
Terror., 492
Similar to legal choices made after 1898, strategic objectives guide how
to determine when constitutional limits check foreign relations authority.
In the past, limits were specifically about individual rights in the Insular
Cases and generally how separation of powers limited military action, ter-
ritorial acquisition, treaty powers, and diplomacy. Now, the question is
whether detention on an overseas territory is at all limited by individual
rights protections. This force-objectives influencing legal determina-
tions-shapes this legal anomaly's normativity. While prior objectives
were different, the dynamic of strategy shaping this legal anomaly is simi-
larly influential after 1898 and after 2001.
Historically, courts deferred to the Executive Branch on foreign rela-
tions issues493 so the United States could compete with global powers,
unencumbered by the Judiciary and less encumbered by Congress. The
value of overseas territories motivated legal reasoning, which justified
overseas authority and this deference. 494 Acquiring territory beyond the
continent was needed for naval, commercial, and geopolitical pur-
488. Hussain, supra note 58, at 740; see also Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity:
Torture and the State of Constitutional Culture, 61 SMU LAW REV. 221, 229 (2008).
489. See Hussain, supra note 58, at 741-42.
490. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2275-76.
491. Id. at 2275.
492. See id. at 2294, (Scalia, J. dissenting) (describing the need to defer to the political
branches because the U.S. "is at war with radical Islamists," which began with Marine
deaths in Lebanon in 1983, and the Court's holding will "cause more Americans to be
killed").
493. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936);
see generally Spiro, supra note 179.
494. See Neuman, supra note 21, at 16-17.
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poses. 495 In this period, the United States gained territorial possessions
or control in Asia, the Caribbean, the North Pacific, and Central
America.496 Meeting these objectives helped the American economy and
provided a sphere of influence to offset European intrusion.497 The In-
corporation Doctrine provided a jurisprudential sanction for the United
States' increased territorial expansion, foreign relations, and international
economic relations. Accordingly, jurisprudence which did not fully do
away with constitutional guarantees and separations of power helped pre-
serve the republican experiment in its second century. In terms of "legal
spatiality," referring to Raustiala's analysis, the law obsessively protected
rigid and formal demarcations of authority, deference, and territory with
sovereignty. 498 The Court used cultural and racial concerns to decide
what individual rights protections, in this case fundamental rights, applied
overseas.
Strategic goals implicit in overseas authority likewise shape the current
legal anomaly between "complete jurisdiction and control" for the
United States and "ultimate sovereignty" for Cuba.499 Theoretically, pro-
tecting individual rights and/or deferential authority seeks doctrinal force
in this legal anomaly. Overseas authority is once again the repeat subject
of these legal questions. In finding the writ applies on the base and that
Congress has provided insufficient substitutes in the MCA and DTA, the
Boumediene majority's justification is that detention potentially violates
individual rights guarantees in constitutional and international law and
that detention has lasted too long.5°° The remedy is to not permit the
political branches to turn the Constitution on or off depending on the
geographic location of the detention center. 501 Specifically, the Court
reasoned the writ of habeas is an essential individual right, with a historic
purpose to check executive power.502 It is one of the few individual rights
included by the Framers in the Constitution. 50 3 Valuing the protection of
individual rights and checks to excessive political authority, it suggests
impracticable and prudential examinations guide when to extraterritori-
ally apply the constitutional limitations or not. Here, the majority's per-
spective reflects transnational interpretations of sovereignty, increased
judicial participation in foreign affairs, and increased human rights and
individual rights protections in international and constitutional law. Put
simply, the Court values its interference to check excessive state power.
495. See SPARROW, supra note 68, at 232.
496. See id.
497. See id.
498. See Raustiala, supra note 35, at 250.
499. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2252.
500. Id. at 2275. Initial suggestions of these motivations to overturn the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that appeared in the dissenting opin-
ions from the Court's initial denial of writ of certiorari. See generally Boumediene v. Bush,
127 S. Ct. 1478, 1479-81 (2007) (denying certiorari) (Breyer, J, dissenting).
501. Bournediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259.




The dissenting opinions instead place a higher value on protecting state
authority, even if the Constitution may apply extraterritorially. This au-
thority benefits from more deference on non-sovereign territory. Noting
that DTA and MCA remedies have not been tested and that the writ does
not apply on non-sovereign territory, the dissenting opinions referred to
threats to our national security efforts to combat terrorism and judicial
interference in political affairs. 5°4 There is no explicit cultural or racial
justification given to not applying the writ to detainees. 505 Instead, it is
argued non-citizens and unlawful combatants do not enjoy this privi-
lege.50 6 To extend these privileges in the Constitution would be to dis-
rupt separations of powers.507 Here, territory is treated as clearly
demarcating where sovereignty is exclusive. 508 The lack of de jure sover-
eignty on the base for the United States, referring to lease agreements
and treaties, excludes the application of constitutional rights protections
for non-citizens. 509 More so because it is a matter regarding foreign rela-
tions and sovereignty, the political branches have plenary power, where
judicial review is inappropriate. 510
V. EMPIRE'S ANOMALOUS FUTURE: ARE THERE
OVERSEAS RIGHTS WHEN GUANTANAMO
DETENTION ENDS?
Rebel spaceships, striking from a hidden base, have won their first victory
against the evil Galactic Empire...
-Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope511
The evil lord Darth Vader, obsessed with finding young Skywalker, has
dispatched thousands of remote probes into the far reaches of space...
-Star Wars Episode V: The Empire Strikes Back512
504. Id. at 2279-80 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (detailing how the CSRT procedures and
appeal measure in the DTA have not tested the evidentiary and procedural faults claimed
by the detainees).
505. Interestingly, the dissent makes broad and oblique references to Islamists, the de-
tainees, and far off events such as the Lebanon events from 1982. The detainees in these
cases were captured in Bosnia and Guinea. These factors suggest de facto categorization
of "Muslims" to detainee in the "War on Terror." Id. at 2294.
506. Id. at 2305.
507. See id. at 2295-96, (Scalia, J. dissenting) (emphasizing the Court in Hamdan af-
firmed Congress' authority pass the MCA and its limits on the writ).
508. Id. at 2296-98 (highlighting Cuba's sovereignty and the fact that the detainees are
located within this territorial sovereignty); id. at 2300 (presenting the Eisentrager holding
as emphasizing the location of U.S. jurisdiction).
509. Id. at 2299.
510. Id. at 2302 (averring an "inflated notion of judicial supremacy" drives the Court to
deny "formal notions of sovereignty").
511. STAR WARS EPISODE IV: A NEw HOPE (20th Century Fox & Lucasfilm 1977),
http://www.starwars.com/movies/episode-iv/.
512. STAR WARS EPiSODE V: THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (20th Century Fox & Lucas-
film 1980), http://www.starwars.com/movies/episode-v/.
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Little does Luke know that the GALACTIC EMPIRE has secretly begun
construction of a new armored space station even more powerful than the
first dreaded Death Star...
-Star Wars Episode VI: Return of the Jedi5 13
This Part describes developments since Boumediene in June of 2008,
suggesting that legal anomaly continues to cloud overseas detention. A
brief reference to the Star Wars trilogy's narrative on empire's expansion
highlights the post-colonial insight of examining overseas authority in
broad strokes, historically and geographically. For these fictional movies
the value is that three stories show how the "empire strikes back," despite
isolated gains made by resistance. For the present "War on Terror," a
similar significance lies in examining what law checks overseas authority
after Boumediene and beyond a base in Cuba. This Part argues that the
danger is viewing isolated events from a hidden base, in Cuba or a galaxy
far away, as conclusive. To minimize this legal myopia, a post-colonial
approach focuses on historical appreciation of how norms developed. In
a highly preliminary fashion, this Part extends this Article's analysis to
post-Boumediene events.
While a recent Executive Order ends Guantinamo detentions by Janu-
ary 22, 2010 and Boumediene affirms significant constitutional rights pro-
tections, legal anomaly appears to characterize the release of
Guantinamo detainees and judicial review for detainees under U.S. con-
trol in Afghanistan. These two facts, legal challenges for release and al-
ternative detention locations, point to this Article's three central claims.
Specifically for these detention developments anomaly is not an aberra-
tion but a precise objective, post-colonial analysis of foreign relations his-
tory describe how the law creates and facilitates anomaly, and four
objectives characterize anomaly, i.e., the United States avoids sovereign
authority overseas, limits sovereign authority for other states, seeks to
avoid constitutional limitation abroad, and protects strategic interests.
Accordingly, this Part proceeds with preliminary identifications of anom-
aly in the January 22, 2009 Executive Order, habeas corpus efforts to re-
lease base detainees, and recent legal challenges to detentions in the U.S.
Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan.
A. GUANTANAMO DETENTION ENDS, AVOIDING NEW RIGHTS
AND SPURRING RELOCATION
In his first week in office, President Obama issued an Executive Order
ending the Guantdnamo detention program by January 22, 2010.514 It
513. STAR WARS EPISODE VI: RETURN OF THE JEDI (20th Century Fox & Lucasfilm
1983), http://www.starwars.com/movies/episode-vi/.
514. See Exec. Order No. 13492, supra note 18. Two additional Executive Orders were
issued the same day. One orders a review of "lawful options for the disposition of individ-
uals captured or apprehended in connections with armed conflicts and counterterrorism
operations." See Exec. Order No. 13493, 74 Fed. Reg. 4901 (Jan. 22, 2009). Another re-
vokes interrogations techniques previously used and requires that interrogations for "indi-
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requires that all remaining detentions be subject to reviews, coordinated
by the Attorney General with cooperation and participation from foreign
relations, defense, homeland security, intelligence, and counter-terrorism
agencies. 515 Regarding these detainees, it stays military commission pro-
ceedings which have not reached judgment and bars any new charges
from being sworn.5 16 Similarly, it requires detainee custody be under hu-
mane standards, described as confirming with "all applicable laws gov-
erning such confinement, including Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. ' '517 The Secretary of Defense will review these conditions
to ensure full compliance by February 22.518
While it is barely a month old and much policy remains to be imple-
mented, the Order disposing detainees and closing the detention facilities
points to elements of anomaly on two fronts. Specifically, the Order
states: 1) it does not create any rights, and 2) detainees may be trans-
ferred to other U.S. detention facilities or third countries. 519 The Order
does affirm that these detentions are governed by the Geneva Conven-
tions and that detainees have the constitutional writ of habeas corpus. 520
But it does not give any indication whether detainees in Guantinamo or
in other locations have constitutional rights beyond habeas challenges of
unlawful detention. For instance, due process rights are not mentioned.
Accordingly, the Order potentially leaves detainees on the base with dis-
trict court jurisdiction to claim unlawful detention, but without any clear
determination of what substantive rights do or do not apply to this non-
sovereign space. This anomaly is compounded with the prudential con-
cerns and Constitution-light approaches affirmed by the slim Boumediene
majority.521
This anomaly, i.e., unclear state of what rights check detention author-
ity, is reified in the Order's last subsection. After announcing dramatic
changes in detention policy, the Order states it does not intend to and
"does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforce-
able at law or in equity .... "522 As such in legal terms, the Order leaves
things as they were after Boumediene, but clearly states that no right
(procedural, substantive, or in equity) exists to seek the Order's
objectives.
Second, the Order opens the door for detainees to be transferred to
locations where Constitutional habeas and/or other individual rights do
not extend. For remaining Guantdnamo detainees, it provides they may
be "returned to their home country, released, transferred to a third coun-
viduals in custody or effective control of the US" be "authorized and listed in Army Field
Manual." Exec. Order No. 13491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009).
515. Exec. Order No. 13492, supra note 18, § 2b.
516. Id. § 7.
517. Id. § 6.
518. Id.
519. Id. §§ 3, 8c.
520. Id. § 2c, 6.
521. See supra Part IV.C.
522. Exec. Order No. 13492, supra note 18, § 8c.
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try, or transferred to another" U.S. detention facility.5 23 Here, the con-
cern is detainees may be relocated to third countries where they may
tortured. 524 Alternatively, they may be placed in U.S. detention facilities
with even less jurisdiction or constitutional rights than Guantinamo. As
explained below, the detention example in Afghanistan has quickly
developed.
B. ANOMALY AMIDST HABEAS PROCEEDINGS FOR DETAINEES
Habeas proceedings since Boumediene suggest anomaly appears when
courts start examining what makes detention unlawful. Anomaly exists
because the location of detention produces a situation where it is unclear
what legal norms, sources of law, or jurisdiction apply. This develops
from situations created by U.S. foreign relations to have control of base
territory without de jure sovereignty.525 Here, the puzzle develops from
constitutional habeas rights affirmed by Boumediene, providing a judicial
method to contest detention, but it is not entirely clear what makes de-
tention illegal. Many substantive rights in constitutional or international
law remain unconfirmed if they extend, by case law or statute, to the base
or to non-citizens there. In theory, a clear determination that these rights
exist or apply would ease the release of Guantdnamo detainees after
Boumediene. Meanwhile some detainees remain in custody seven years
after detentions began.
While habeas proceedings since June 2008 have been numerous and
their full examination beyond this Article's scope, preliminary develop-
ments suggest anomaly may cloud these proceedings. On January 21,
2009, one proceeding in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colum-
bia found the offered definition of "enemy combatant" lacking clarity to
determine whether a detainee was lawfully held.526 In the newest devel-
opment on March 13, 2009 in similar habeas proceedings, the Govern-
ment quit using the "unlawful enemy combatant" classification as a
justification for base detention and argued that the President's detention
authority stems from the AUMF and complies with international laws of
war.527 The Government argues that the standard for detention is for
523. Id. § 3.
524. Many scholars and advocates point to the controversies of these "renditions," i.e.,
the transfer of individuals across international borders without extradition or deportation
proceedings. See, e.g., Marjorie Cohn, A Call to End All Renditions, JURIST, Feb. 10, 2009,
available at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/02/call-to-end-all-renditions.php; Mar-
garet L. Satterthwaite, From Rendition to Justice to Rendition to Torture (Jul. 9. 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1157583.
525. See supra Part III.
526. See Order, All Ali Bin Ali Ahmed, et al. v. George W. Bush, et al., No. 05-1678
(D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2009); Order, Mohammed Ahmed Tahrer v. George W. Bush, et al., No.
06-1684 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2009),
527. Respondent's Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guant~namo Bay, In Re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig.,
supra note 487; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 12; Declaration of
Attorney General Eric H. Holder, In Re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., No. 08-442
(TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/documents/ag-decla-
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persons who "substantially supported ... Taliban or al-Qaida forces or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States
or its coalition partners," including those who aid such enemy forces by
"commit[ing] a belligerent act" or "directly support[ing] hostilities. 528
Accordingly, the substantive legal determination of what is (or not) the
standard for Guantinamo detention remains anomalously stuck between
prior claims of complete executive authority, limited Supreme Court
holdings since 2004, planned detention facility closure, limited military
commissions, and the newest standard that detention authority complies
with international law, all without any practical effect in releasing the cur-
rent 200 plus detainees.
Additionally, on February 18, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit ruled that it lacked the authority to release
seventeen Uighars (Turkic Muslim minorities from China) detainees from
Guantinamo. 529 The Court argued it lacked the sovereign authority,
which belongs to the political branches, to decide who may or may not
enter the United States. Such a determination requires congressional or
executive determinations. 530 In U.S. law, this plenary authority has been
rooted in international sovereignty, since the Chinese Exclusion Case in
1889. 531 The Court of Appeals overturned an October 8, 2008 district
court order to release the seventeen detainees.5 32 They are not enemies
of the United States, were captured in Afghanistan, and their return to
China is problematic given China's resistance and/or potential human
rights abuse upon return.533 According to the Court, these detainees are
not within the United States.534 They require determinations in immigra-
tion law to enter the territorial United States from a location within the
United States' complete control and jurisdiction. It effectively reasoned
that courts lack this authority. Despite Boumediene's constitutional hold-
ing, these detainees effectively remain in a jurisdictionally anomalous lo-
ration.pdf (presenting how the Department of Justice along with other agencies is conduc-
tiong a "comprehensive review of the lawful options" regarding "apprehension, detention,
trial, transfer, release, or other disposition" in connection with armed conflicts and
counterterrorism operations" following the Boumediene decision and Executive Orders
13492 and 13493).
528. Respondent's Memorandum Regarding the Government's Detention Authority
Relative to Detainees Held at Guant~namo Bay, supra note 487, at 2.
529. See Jamal Kiyemba et al. v. Obama, No. 08-5424, (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 2009), http://
pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200902/08-5424-1165428.pdf.
530. See id.
531. See generally Ernesto Herngndez-L6pez, Sovereignty migrates in U.S. and Mexican
law: Transnational Influences in Plenary Power and Non-Intervention, 40 VAND. J. TRANS'L
L. 1345-1424 (2007).
532. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Memorandum Opinion, Nos. 05-1509, 05-
1602, 05-1704, 05-2379, 05-2398, 08-1310 (D.D.C. Oct. 8, 2008), https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/
cgi-bin/show-public.doc?2008cv1310-45.
533. WrrrEs, supra note 3, at 82.
534. In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig, No. 05-1509, at 8 (citing Detainee Treat-
ment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(g), 119 Stat. 2739, 2743, and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(38) (2006)).
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cation. Events confronting anomaly continue to develop. 535
C. DETENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN SUGGEST SIMILAR ANOMALY
As explained above, the January 22 Executive Order confirms remain-
ing Guantdnamo detainees may be transferred to other U.S. detention
facilities. For this, a likely location is the detention facility at the Bagram
Airfield or other detention centers in Afghanistan. Commentators have
noted how the closing of Guantinamo detention facilities and/or constitu-
tional checks affirmed there create incentives for detention efforts to
move elsewhere especially Afghanistan. 536 Reports indicate that over
600 detainees are at Bagram and there are likely plans to build larger
detention facilities at the base and in Afghanistan. Detentions in Af-
ghanistan will become increasingly important to U.S. policy as military
efforts increase there.
Two important facts concerning what law may check detention author-
ity distinguish these detentions from Guantinamo. First, the government
may claim to be detaining in the theatre or war and this precludes any
habeas jurisdiction. Close to the conflict, it also arguably escapes many
of the prudential limits suggested in the Boumediene majority opinion. It
affirms many of Boumediene's reading of Eisentrager's limits, which
found habeas did not extend to post-World War II Germany. From a
practical standpoint, U.S. presence in Guantdnamo is more established,
removed from conflict zones, and is closer to the United States. Perhaps
applying Boumediene reasoning to Afghanistan will prove more difficult.
Second from a sovereignty standpoint, any lease agreements or'troop
presence authority in Afghanistan may provide more guidance as to what
law applies (or not) on detention centers. It may be difficult to find de
facto sovereignty for the United States in Afghanistan, as the
Boumediene court did. Guantinamo's anomaly was explicit in the Janu-
ary 1903 lease stating Cuba has "ultimate sovereignty" but the United
States has "complete control and jurisdiction. '537 It was also accented by
the absence of any SOFA, which would delineate facility jurisdiction and
immunities for military abroad. The United States' long-term presence at
535. Most recently, attorneys for the detainees have directly requested that the Presi-
dent order their release, given the legal determinations in the October district court order,
the Boumediene decision, and the President's January 22, 2009 Executive Order. See Let-
ter from Counsels for Huzaifa Parhat, Five Uighar Detainees, Mohammed el Ghrani,
Lakhdar Bomediene, and Saber Lahmer to President Barack Obama (Feb. 26, 2009), http:/
/www.scotusbiog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/detainee-counsel-to-obama-2-26-09.
pdf.
536. Voila! Ship Gitmo Detainees to Afghanistan, Editorial, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2009, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/feb/24/voila-ship-gitmo-de-
tainees-to-afghanistan/; Charlie Savage, Obama Upholds Detainees Policy in Afghanistan,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/22/washington/22
bagram.html?hp; Daphne Eviatar, Bagram's Black Hole: Guanttnamo Bay Was Bad
Enough - Bagram Is Worse, AM. LAW., Nov. 13, 2008; William Fisher, Bagram: The Other
Gitmo, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Jan. 16, 2008, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/SouthAsia/JA16
Df02.html.
537. See supra Part III.C
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Guant~inamo without any SOFA and in light of Cuban protests since 1961
created a jurisdictionally peculiar situation, which required the Court to
re-visit issues of the Constitution's extraterritoriality. Anomaly in Af-
ghanistan may be more implicit, floating between agreements for troop
presence or base leases and immunities for troops, executive military au-
thority, private contractors, and Afghani authority. In this light, positive
law such as international agreements recently reached may be tailored for
the necessities of the War on Terror. Different than in 2002, the experi-
ence of Supreme Court precedents since 2004 and more current interna-
tional agreements minimize constitutional and international law liabilities
for the administration.
So far, at the time of writing in February 2009, two developments sug-
gest legal anomaly will be a barrier for detainee release in Afghanistan.
First, on February 20, 2009 in district court proceedings, government at-
torneys for the Obama Administration argued habeas corpus does not
extend to the Bagram base in Afghanistan, continuing the prior adminis-
tration's position. 538 This is just an early Government position and not
necessarily a sustained or judicially affirmed claim. It suggests, though,
that Afghanistan may be presented as different, for the variety of reasons
explained above, for habeas corpus and other constitutional rights, even
though many of the detainees are the same or similarly captured. Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court decision in Munaf v. Geren concerning U.S. citi-
zens detained in Iraq implies habeas corpus rights may be difficult to
affirm for non-citizens in Afghanistan. 539 Reported the same day as
Boumediene in a unanimous opinion, the Court found detained U.S. citi-
zens in Iraq do have access to habeas corpus jurisdiction.5 40 Citing the
sensitivity of military operations in Iraq, it quickly reviewed the merits of
the claims to find it could not affirm the release because to do so would
intrude on Iraq's sovereignty.541 Munaf points to the importance a court
will place on finding a foreign state's sovereignty dispositive for habeas
jurisdiction, even though the United States is detaining someone in that
territory. This is different than on Guantdnamo when it was unlikely that
Cuban law would influence detention at all. Similarly, the Court's quick
decision on the merits versus remanding the case to the lower courts indi-
cates a likely deference to military necessity.
In sum, the law of overseas detention possibly has an anomalous fu-
ture, as these quick identifications suggest. This Article's three major
claims about how U.S. law checks detention authority on Guantinamo
538. U.S.: No habeas rights at Bagram, SCOTUS BLOG, Feb. 20, 2009, http://www.
scotusblog.com/wp/?s=bagram; ProPublica, Obama Admin. On Detention Policy: "What
He Said," HUFFINOTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/propublica/obama-admin-
on-detention_b 169448.html; see, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, Government's Response to
This Court's Order of January 22, 2009, 1:06-cv-01669-JDB (D.D.C., Feb. 20, 2009), http://
www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/us-reply-re-bagram-2-20-09.pdf.
539. Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008)
540. Id. at 2217 (finding "actual custody by the United States" is sufficient despites the
multinational forces in Iraq).
541. Id. at 2220, 2223-24.
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are highly relevant to overseas detention authority in a post-Boumediene
world. First, anomaly is not an aberration but a precise objective for
Guantinamo detention between 2002 and 2009, decisions in habeas pro-
ceedings since 2008, and detentions in Afghanistan. It suits political and
military needs to keep detainees far from individual rights, which may
clearly project individuals in the territorial United States or in fully sover-
eign spaces. For detention, location matters. It confirms or avoids legal
anomaly. Second, post-colonial appreciation of how history and informal
imperial influence shape legal doctrine proves extremely illuminating for
Guantdnamo, Cuba and Afghanistan. Geopolitical, security, and eco-
nomic interests inspired U.S. activities in the Caribbean after 1898 and
2002, similarly in Afghanistan since 2001, not to mention the U.S. support
of anti-Soviet forces after 1979. The rise of the Taliban and its support of
Al-Qaeda is not isolated from the effects of Afghani devastation and dis-
order, which for American audiences has been painted as first a Cold War
struggle and now a War on Terror struggle. Third, strategic interests
guide U.S. interpretations of law, whether that was securing geopolitical
influence over the Caribbean and Cuba or more recently avoiding indi-
vidual rights in constitutional and international law to gain intelligence
from detainees. Fourth, sovereignty and the Constitution become mallea-
ble sources of public obligations when the United States extends it over-
seas influence. Here, U.S. objectives shape, historically and currently,
this anomaly for courts to then interpret. For Guantinamo the concerns
focused on lease agreements and an extra-territorial constitution via the
Incorporation doctrine. Post-Boumediene events will examine how sover-
eignty, whether in plenary power over immigration or Afghani authority,
apply to detentions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Article has described how Guantinamo's legally
anomalous status exerted enormous influence in recent determinations
made by the Supreme Court in Boumediene. Legal anomaly is evident as
an unclear state of what rights check detention authority. Legal anomaly
exists because the base's territory is not clearly within American or Cu-
ban sovereignty. This ambiguity unclearly guides what law (if any)
checks detention authority on the base. This is apparent when litigation
confronts how detention location produces a situation where it is unclear
what legal norms, sources of law, or jurisdiction exists.
Historic agreements with Cuba in 1903 specifically created GuantA-
namo's legal anomaly, while American foreign relations practices, at the
time and since, perpetuate it. This decision continues a discourse of nor-
mative anomaly on the base. This legal anomaly has facilitated detention
policies in which the United States tries to avoid individual rights protec-
tions for "War on Terror" detainees on the base since 2002. Just in June
of 2008, after a second Supreme Court case on the writ and the base, may
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habeas proceedings possibly release persons from detention.542 Trying to
paint this legal anomaly as an accident or unintended, recent Supreme
Court opinions refer to this anomaly by labeling base jurisdiction as
"quirky" or "unusual. '543
An analysis of U.S.-Cuba relations since 1898 shows that the base's
legally anomalous status was a precise U.S. foreign policy objective. 544
This legal anomaly develops from the United States avoiding sovereignty
overseas while reserving the authority to exercise significant influence
abroad. 545 Specific to the base at Guantinamo, U.S.-Cuba agreements in
1903 and 1934 crafted this legal anomaly. 546 They affirm that the U.S.
lacks sovereignty over Guantinamo, but retains "complete jurisdiction
and control" for an indefinite period, while Cuba has "ultimate sover-
eignty" with no ability to end U.S. occupation. 547 Wavering between the
concepts of sovereignty and jurisdiction, this legal anomaly clouds legal
challenges to base detention. This is achieved by arguing that the base is
not within U.S. sovereignty, thus the Constitution cannot check base au-
thority, and by arguing that Cuban sovereignty prohibits extending con-
stitutional protections in American law. 548
Boumediene addressed this legal anomaly with its examination con-
cerning whether the Constitution's Suspension Clause applies on the
base.549 By a slim majority, the Court held that it does apply to this non-
sovereign territory under U.S control.550 Importantly, this holding ex-
tends the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to base detainees. 551 To
do this, the Court found that the United States has de facto sovereignty
on the base and the Constitution applies extraterritorially.552 Highlight-
ing these findings, this Article raises two general points regarding the le-
gal analysis of base detention.
First, while the base's legally anomalous status effectively endorses de-
tention, four legal objectives in U.S. foreign relations shape this anoma-
lous status. Any legal continuation or limitation to this overseas
authority must address these objectives. These objectives are that the
United States avoids sovereignty abroad, limits incidents of sovereignty
542. See supra note 31 and discussion Part IV.
543. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2279, 2293 (Roberts C.J., dissenting).
544. See supra discussion Part II.B-C.
545. The Platt Amendment of 1901, included in U.S. military appropriations, Cuba's
Constitution, and a bilateral treaty, affirms this anomaly in U.S-Cuban relations. It permit-
ted the U.S. to avoid sovereignty over Cuba, but also provided the United States with
significant influence over Cuba by limiting its sovereignty. Specifically, the Amendment
provided that the United States had a "right to intervene" in Cuba, control its foreign
relations, and place bases on Cuban soil. See supra discussion Part III.B.
546. See id.
547. U.S.-Cuba Feb. 1903 Lease, supra note 10; supra discussion Part III.B.
548. See supra discussion and notes 356, 409, 425, 504-10 (describing government's ar-
guments and Scalia's dissent in Boumediene).
549. See supra discussion Part IV.A-C.
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for foreign states, avoids constitutional limits for its overseas authority,
and protects strategic overseas interests (geopolitical, economic, and le-
gal). These objectives craft the legal anomaly evident in base occupation
since 1898 and in base detention litigation since 2002. Specific to the
base, lease agreements in 1903 and a bilateral treaty in 1934 provide the
United States with non-sovereign control and protection of overseas in-
terests, such as a strategically placed base, an effectively indefinite term
of occupation, and military authority free from constitutional re-
straints. 553 These objectives also appear in the Treaty of Paris of 1898554
and in the Platt Amendment of 1901. 555 The Platt Amendment is signifi-
cant to the base for two reasons. It required that Cuba lease or sell lands
to the United States for coaling or naval stations. This provides the
United States legal occupancy of Guantinamo, which it had physically
occupied since 1898. Also, the Amendment set the terms for the United
States to avoid sovereignty over Cuba, but to retain enormous influence
over the island state. The Amendment limited Cuban sovereignty with a
"right of intervention" for the United States, limitations on Cuban for-
eign relations and economic powers, and a base for the U.S. military on
Cuban soil.556 The United States moved to include these Amendment
provisions in military appropriations, the Cuban Constitution of 1901,
and a bilateral treaty in 1902.557
These legal objectives similarly characterize how the Court in
Boumediene recently addressed this legal anomaly regarding detainee ac-
cess to the writ of habeas corpus. The Court addressed whether base
detainees benefit from the writ in the Constitution's Suspension Clause,
whether the MCA and DTA legally suspend the writ, and whether the
MCA and DTA offer an adequate substitute for habeas proceedings. 558
The Court found that the constitutional writ extends to the base and to
alien detainees, the MCA and DTA unconstitutionally suspend the writ,
and the DTA and MCA provide an inadequate substitute for habeas
proceedings.
To reach these holdings, the Court confronted each of the four legal
objectives regarding this legal anomaly. For instance, its finding that the
United States exercises de facto sovereignty over the base tempers the
objective of avoiding sovereignty for the United States.559 Next, the
Court regarded formal or de jure sovereignty over the base, belonging to
Cuba, as irrelevant to "practical" considerations governing the base. 560
In this regard, the Court does not find a formal determination of Cuban
sovereignty, termed "ultimate sovereignty" in the agreements, as a bar to
553. See supra discussion Part III.C.
554. See supra note 48.
555. See Platt Amendment-U.S. appropriations, supra note 15; see supra discussion
Part III.B.
556. See supra discussion Part III.B.
557. See id.
558. See supra discussion Part IV.
559. See supra discussion Part IV.B.
560. See supra discussion Part IV.C.
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finding the writ is applicable. These sovereignty findings essentially pro-
vide a slight and nuanced distancing from the two objectives of avoiding
U.S. sovereignty and limiting Cuban sovereignty. This is achieved by the
Court focusing less on sovereignty as a categorical determination, but
more on prudential or practical concerns regarding base authority. Here,
the Court is motivated by practical concerns, for example, that U.S. au-
thority on the base is over a century-old, capable of following court or-
ders, and answerable to no other sovereign. The next two objectives,
avoiding constitutional limitations overseas and protecting strategic over-
seas interests, appear in the Boumediene opinions as well.561 With exam-
ples from the Insular Cases, the Court suggests a Constitution-light for
the base. It affirms the doctrine that not all of the Constitution's provi-
sions apply to overseas authority under U.S. sovereignty. This doctrine
historically endorsed an informal empire for the United States. Similarly,
the opinions identify strategic overseas interests, such as national secur-
ity, deference to the political branches in foreign relations, and the ability
to hold individual detainees for six years without any court proceedings
Second, Boumediene provides an example of how the law addresses
post-colonial circumstances. In identifying history's present influence,
this Article contextualizes future and deeper examinations of what legal
checks (if any) apply to U.S. authority overseas. The law used to support-
ing historic imperial control, such as the Incorporation Doctrine and base
agreements, currently governs overseas authority. Specific to Guantd-
namo, base occupation and legal anomaly on the base are products from
U.S. influence over Cuba since its independence from Spain in 1898.
Here, the relevant legal instruments are the Treaty of Paris from 1898, the
Platt Amendment process initiated in 1901, base lease agreements in
1903, and a bilateral treaty in 1934. This Article highlighted the following
three points from post-colonial legal analysis relevant to Guantinamo:
(1) that legal narratives deny sovereignty to certain populations in order
to exert overseas control; (2) that American constitutional law excludes
various individual rights protections overseas; and (3) that American con-
stitutional law creates ambiguities and ambivalences in the rule of law
overseas.
Sovereignty continues to be the reference point for legal approaches to
overseas authority. This is obvious whether sovereignty is checked in the
Platt Amendment in 1901 or found to be de facto by the Boumediene
Court. Likewise, individual rights protections are potentially excluded
when U.S. authority extends abroad. This occurs whether in the funda-
mental rights distinction of the Insular Cases (1901-1920) or more re-
cently in MCA and DTA efforts to deny the writ to Guantinamo
detainees. Developed from informal and formal colonial encounters,
American law regarding overseas authority purposefully created ambiva-
lences and ambiguities in the law. These legal anomalies currently have
normative and doctrinal impacts. The most vivid and applicable example
561. See supra discussion Part IV.D-E.
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exists in the United States having "complete jurisdiction and control"
over the base and Cuba having "ultimate sovereignty. ' 562 This lack of
clarity suited U.S. needs to occupy a base over a century ago, but it has
been used for over seventeen years to detain foreign civilians.563 This
legal anomaly also permits U.S. authority to escape limits in constitu-
tional and international law because detention occurs on territory that is
neither fully within a foreign sovereign jurisdiction nor clearly within do-
mestic U.S. jurisdiction.
A preliminary analysis of developments since Boumediene suggests
similar anomalous situations are emerging. Briefly, this Article has ex-
amined a recent Executive Order to end the Guantdnamo detentions and
dispose detainees to other locations, initial habeas proceedings to release
detainees, and legal challenges to detention by the United States in Af-
ghanistan. In each of these situations, individual rights are clouded by
anomaly. The parameters of detention authority get lost amidst determi-
nations of sovereignty and territorial distinctions of foreign versus domes-
tic. Similar to Guantdnamo, anomaly is shaped by policy objectives
seeking to avoid sovereign authority overseas, limit sovereignty authority
for other states, avoid constitutional limitation abroad, and protect strate-
gic interests. Here, the interests are intelligence gathering and detention
during the War on Terror. Checks to detention authority are avoided by
mitigating sovereign authority with agreements to lease bases, transfers
of custody authority, or claims of judicial immunity over immigration au-
thority. While this analysis is extremely preliminary, it does suggests post-
colonial approaches to examining the law of overseas authority should
not be limited to habeas rights and a base in Cuba.
Taking these suggestions on the doctrine and theory of overseas deten-
tion at Guantdnamo, it appears that the "empire strikes back." The legal
legacy of imperial influence is not limited to history in 1898, old Euro-
pean practices, or "a long time ago in a galaxy far, far away. . . ." (as the
Star Wars movies explain). 564 Instead, these legacies have current legal
currency in base occupation and base detention on Guantinamo, Cuba.
Post-colonial legal theory suggests that the "empire strikes back" with
legal ambivalences shaped by objectives to avoid sovereignty, limit sover-
eign powers for foreign states, avoid constitutional protections abroad,
and protect strategic overseas interests. With doctrinal narratives, we see
sovereignty is manipulated and the Constitution is severed to endorse
overseas authority. The narratives are both historic and present. Within
this discourse, legal goals of indefinite detention and protecting individ-
ual rights ambiguously co-exist. Whether these goals belong to Lord
Darth Vader in a fictional story, 565 U.S. General Leonard Wood in Cuba
562. See supra discussion Part III.A, B, C.
563. While "War on Terror" detention began in 2002, detention for asylum-seekers be-
gan in 1991. See supra note 51.
564. THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK, supra note 1.
565. See supra note 1.
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in 1902,566 Guantinamo detainees since 2002, or U.S. base authority since
1898, they seek normative doctrinal force.
566. See supra note 2.
